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In this thesis I attempt to show the different interpretations and meanings around 
scientific citizenship. In the first section, the ‘Meeting of Minds. European Citizens’ 
Deliberation on Brain Science’ project is described and analysed in depth. This project is 
meant to involve citizens in the debates on the possible political, ethical, legislative and 
economic implications of developments in brain science. Furthermore, in relation to this 
project and its connections to European policy debates the thesis describes three 
discursive layers: the academic, the official and the citizens’ layer. In these layers one can 
find different ways to express the meaning of participation in a ‘postnational 
technological society’. The analysis of these different layers not only delineates the 
different manners through which involvement is possible in Europe but also shows 
connections between discursive fields and frames.  
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i. The theme of the thesis 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to describe and analyse a special kind of citizenship 
model which I call post-national scientific citizenship. This model is strongly related to a 
recent initiative of involving citizens in European policy-making in a scientific issue, 
namely, the ‘Meeting of Minds – European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science’. For 
creating a context both for this initiative and for this citizenship model, this initiative will 
be investigated and discussed alongside with the theoretical, policy and social 
environment in which it is embedded. The thesis, therefore, is neither empirical nor 
theoretical in itself but attempts to unravel interrelated practices, discourses and 
meanings. All of these levels will be represented in the thesis with a clear focus on the 
topic of citizenship which will hopefully act as an adhesive substance between diverse 
fields of knowledge and of social reality.  
 
In contemporary Europe citizenship reappears on the agenda due to various social, 
economic and political processes such as globalisation, growing cultural plurality and 
development of science and technology, just to mention the most important ones.  
 
Globalisation, for example, while in many aspects undermines the economic and political 
manoeuvring capacity of nation states, also challenges the traditional relationship between 
nation state and its citizens. According to Habermas (Habermas, 2001), this process leads 
inescapably to the emergence of transnational political units such as the European Union. 
However, the immanent coherence of these transnational political units is very fragile and 
therefore citizenship is often considered as being “an avenue for the social integration of 
Europe” (Giesen&Eder, 2001).1  
1 Recently the Dutch ‘nee’ and the French ‘non’ demonstrated to the leaders of the EU that the voice of 




While the question of what kind of citizenship can integrate the tenants of such a diverse 
territorial and cultural area like Europe is still on the minds of European politicians, due 
to modern migration traditional European nation-states themselves become inwardly 
culturally diversified. As a result, the traditional link between cultural-linguistic 
community and political community tends to break. This calls for the reconsideration of 
roles, rights and meanings attached to citizenship. 
 
Last but not least, in the second part of the last century, due to many negative effects of 
the development of science and technology, these spheres have lost their distinctive 
positions and, among many other spheres such as economy or culture, also became 
problematic elements of our societies. While the application of scientific results, various 
devices and technologies have become more and more part of citizens’ life, they have also 
become aware of their downsides. 
 
Phenomena such as the destruction of our environment, the incomprehensible hazard of 
nuclear and biological weapons or the role that info-communication technologies play in 
trafficking, prostitution and terrorism all contributed to the public’s declining trust in 
science and technology. I would argue that the straightforward relationship between 
science and society, that is, the image of science as a common good is no longer generally 
true. 
 
It is not to say that the public has become techno-phobic but that science and technology 
cannot negate their political aspects anymore. Science and technology have not only 
altered what well-being means in a late modern society but they have also changed the 
boundaries, the inner structure and the operational logic of political communities. 
Furthermore, debates on science and technology are becoming a part of political life and 
therefore the political subject, that is, the citizen of the late modern societies has to be 
aware not only of the changes in narrowly defined politics but also developments of 
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science and technology (Winner 1993, Feenberg 1999, Bijker 1995, 2006). As Elam and 
Bertilisson put it about these issues:  
 
“In a globalizing world, where states continue to struggle for their existence in the 
absence of clear-cut enemies, innovation and technological competition are gaining 
recognition as perhaps the most important forces shaping the creative destruction of 
sovereign powers. When the future of ‘our’ society is seen to depend upon science and 
technology, it is only to be expected that interests will arise wishing to redefine citizenship 
in more ‘scientific’ terms (Elam & Bertilisson, 2003, p. 247.).”  
 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to describe and understand a citizenship model which 
redefines citizenship in more ‘scientific’ terms in a globalising world, namely, the ‘post-
national citizenship’.  
 
ii. The theoretical background 
 
It is important to address the theoretical foundations for such investigations at the 
beginning of the ‘journey’. Instead of drawing on one particular school of thought, this 
thesis draws on several different strands of thinking. This investigation attempts to be 
interdisciplinary in nature standing at the crossroads leading to the domains of Sociology, 
Political Science, Citizenship Studies and Science and Technology Studies. As a 
consequence, it also runs the risk that neither field will consider this thesis as its own 
child.  
 
As I am a sociologist and this thesis is created under the auspices of a sociology PhD 
programme, if I really have to identify the theoretical background I would say that the 
meta-framework is sociology in which I operated with different theories. I would only like 
to express my hope that the argumentation shifts smoothly from one theoretical domain 
to another without any significant ruptures. If so, that would mean that my aim to weave 
an interdisciplinary ‘seamless web’ of ideas succeeded. I shall very briefly present the role 
the different disciplines played in the development of the train of thought. 
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As I have mentioned above, I have used Sociology as a general framework for this whole 
theoretical journey called thesis. The role of sociology in this thesis would be a general 
sensitivity for different identities, practices and strategies which are used by the actors in 
this story whether they are institutions like the EU or individuals like citizens.   
 
From the vast domain of ‘Political Science’, I am particularly interested in deliberative 
democratic theory since this is the approach which serves as a foundation for new 
initiatives of public participation such as the MoM project. Deliberative Democracy 
Theory attempts to develop new forms of participation which are meaningful and direct 
in nature. This approach contributed significantly in the mapping of the theoretical milieu 
from which the idea of Meeting of Minds stems. 
 
As the central theme of the thesis is ‘scientific citizenship’, the connection to citizenship 
studies is obvious. The field of ‘Citizenship Studies’ is one of the recently emerging 
interdisciplinary accounts which has a strong focus on one particular aspect of social 
reality. This field attempts to understand the new layers and aspects of citizenship in 
connection with globalisation, feminism, social movements or economic degradation. 
These challenges ask for a kind of new political subject, or as the advocates of this 
approach argue. In line with this, I shall argue in this thesis that the pace of development 
in the sphere of science and technology also request a new kind of political actor. 
 
Science and Technology Studies (hereinafter STS for short) is also a fairly recent strand of 
research attempt to understand how science, technology and society co-construct each 
other in a complex and interrelated way. From the vast array of approaches in this field I 
particularly draw on Actor-Network-Theory (hereinafter ANT for short). ANT has a 
robust analysing capacity for mechanisms composed by technologies as well as human 
actors. Therefore, I used it in order to understand the setting of MoM in a new and 
inventive way.   
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Although, these approaches are quite different we can see that agency and identity are a 
common challenge for all of them. This is the reason why they can be used to understand 
recent policies and developments in connection with participation, science and 
technology. All in all, the changing concept of citizenship and particularly of ‘scientific 
citizenship’ will be the common thread which keeps these diverse fields together. 
 
iii. The structure of the thesis 
 
As it has been indicated above, the topic of this thesis has come from a recent initiative 
which aims to involve European citizens in a deliberative process on brain science. 
Therefore, I did my empirical research about an initiative which is called ‘Meeting of 
Minds – European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science’ (hereinafter MoM for short).  
 
However, this thesis will attempt to investigate not only this initiative but also the 
theoretical, policy and social environment in which it is embedded. According to Haajer, 
the real challenge of his ADA (Argumentative Discourse Analysis) method is to find ways 
of combining analysis of the discursive production of reality with analysis of socio-
political practices from which social constructs emerge and in which actors are engaged 
(Haajer, 2002, p. 62). In order to meet this challenge one should base his analysis on three 
interrelated elements: practices, discourses and meanings. As Haajer puts it:  
 
“The allocation of meaning in a given context is thus analysed in terms of particular 
forms of discourse within the context of the particular practices in which the discourse is 
produced. Hence ADA is not simply about analysing arguments – it is much more about 
analysing politics as a play of ‘positioning’ at particular ‘sites’ of discursive production 
(Haajer, 2002, p. 62).” 
 
Following this line of thought, this thesis on the one hand describes a special type of 
socio-political practice in which actors are engaged, namely, the MoM. On the other hand, 
it also discloses meanings in connection with interrelated discourses about the very actors 
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involved, that is, the citizens. In order to show the different aspects, discursive layers2 and 
meanings of the topic, this essay consists of five main parts.  
 
The first chapter introduces the methodological background of the research project this 
paper is based on. I used diverse methodologies in order to describe the various 
characteristics of the MoM project and of three discursive layers (see below). So, in this 
chapter there is a detailed description of the methods used and a brief section on my 
methodological position and value commitments.  
 
The second chapter is mainly empirical in its nature as it aims to present the structure and 
the goals of the MoM project. This chapter has two main sections. On the one hand, it 
introduces the participatory process in general and focuses on MoM in connection with 
them. After this descriptive part the chapter will move on to an analysis using the concept 
of ‘laboratisation’ in order to investigate the process as a special kind of laboratory. This 
perspective will raise many questions about citizenship models and policy intentions. By 
attempting to disclose the theoretical, policy and social environment in which a process 
like the MoM came forth, the questions raised in this chapter will be answered or at least 
cleared in a way which allows further investigations. Consequently, the following chapters 
will give a more detailed description and analysis of this model of citizenship outlining its 
theoretical, policy and citizen perspectives.  
 
The third chapter is to disclose the theoretical space around citizenship in connection with 
science and Europe. The introduction to this academic discursive layer is essential 
because the models developed here are more than just futile ideas of highbrow scientists. 
These citizenship models based on different models of political thought also deeply 
2 It is important to mention that instead of just using the term ‘discourse’ I prefer to use the concept 
‘discursive layer’ because it refers to the phenomenon of tectonically moving layers in the litho-sphere 
under our feet. Similarly, three discursive layers of citizenship are not distant, loosely connected, 
independent strata which refer to the same concept, but are constantly moving, merging and dividing 
layers of the same discursive field. However, I do not intend to write a historical paper, analysing what the 
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influence how policy makers construct political subjects or at least strive to impose certain 
social identities on a political community.  
 
The fourth chapter will discuss the ‘official discursive layer’, that is, the different documents 
published in the last few years by the European Commission in connection with science 
and citizens. As the reader will be able to see, these documents can be clearly related to 
the MoM project. The chapter will not only analyse the identity constructions embedded 
in these texts but will also attempt to show connections between the academic and the 
policy discursive layer. 
 
In the fifth chapter the discursive layer of the citizens will be described and discussed. Here, 
the focus will come back to Meeting of Minds to investigate how citizens understand 
themselves in terms of their role in the project. Moreover, it will also be possible to trace 
different connections and visions of Europe. Since interviews were conducted with both 
Hungarian and Dutch participants, the question of how participants from different 
political cultures could find their place in the process will be touched upon.  
 
In this way, the analysis of the citizenship discursive layer is intended to complete the 
collection of samples from various discursive layers. This collection attempts to represent 
all the important perspectives around citizenship, science and Europe. It might be argued 
that both European policy documents and the MoM project favour a special kind of 
identity position, namely, post-national citizenship. In the conclusion, both the viability 
and the minimal requirements for such a subject position will be discussed in depth. 
 
In this fashion, this essay aims to be academic and political at the same time. It is 
academic in its nature because it discusses theoretical backgrounds, relationships and 
conflicts between theories. However, it is also political in the sense that it aims to 
‘composition’ of the different layers can say about events of the past. Instead, I shall trace recent 
‘tectonical’ movements in terms of citizenship models. 
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demonstrate how these relationships, conflicts and value-clashes between the very same 












In this thesis, several different methodologies were used to unravel the interrelationships 
between citizenship, science and Europe. So, first of all, I will introduce the 
methodologies used to collect and interpret the data in connection with the structure of 
this paper. It will be followed by a detailed introduction of various methodological trends3 
together with the material analysed. The last section will briefly touch upon the basic 
underlying values and starting points on which the research project is based. 
 
1.1. Methodologies and Structure 
 
According to Bowden, there are two distinct usages of the concept ‘method’ (Bowden, 
1995, p. 65). The first approach refers to data collection. This usage of the term mainly 
focuses on finding the appropriate tool for the chosen problem from the researcher’s 
methodological toolbox. The second concept is not so much about collecting data as 
about the method of explanation of the data that has been collected. In line with 
Bowden’s ideas, I shall present each part of the thesis as a combination of methodologies 
of data collection and explanation.  
3 In this section, I shall not introduce all the different kinds of methodologies used in this thesis but just 
those which in my opinion require special explanation. Therefore, I will not introduce interviewing or 
comparative analysis of theories, in other words, literature review but focus on the more sophisticated 
research methodologies.  
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Figure 1. Methodologies Used 
METHODOLOGIES USED 
Parts of Thesis Data Collection Data Explanation 
1. Meeting of Minds Part Participatory fieldwork Actor-Network-Theory 
2. Theoretical Discourse 
Part Library research 
Comparative Analysis of 
Theories 
3. Official Discourse Part Library research / Online research / Interviewing Discursive Policy Analysis 
4. Citizens’ Discourse Part Interviewing Discursive Interview Analysis 
   
In the first part of the thesis, I shall write about and analyse the MoM initiative. For this 
part, I collected my data as a participating observer as I was following up the process 
from the beginning to its end. As far as the explanation of data is concerned, I am using 
Actor-Network-Theory to make sense of my recorded notes and documents collected on 
the mechanisms. Before the analysis concerned is given, I shall give a detailed review of 
this approach in the first part. 
 
In the second part, I shall present the different theoretical strands in relation to scientific 
and European citizenship. As it is usually the case with theoretical parts, I have collected 
the necessary ‘data’ at the library reading through the literature concerned. On the other 
hand, my methodology of explanation is comparative analysis of theories since I will compare 
and combine theories from different academic fields.  
 
For the third part, I have collected my data through library research, online research and 
by conducting an interview with one of the organisers of the MoM project. On the other 




In the fourth part, which is the ‘citizens’ discourse layer’, I have collected my data by 
conducting interviews with the Hungarian and Dutch participants of the project. For 
making sense of the findings I use discursive interview analysis. I shall demonstrate the 
various interpretative repertoires which appear in the interviews made with the 
participants. When analysing the answers of the citizens, I will attempt to display the 
dynamics of different concepts and the variety of discursive thematisation on 
participation and European-ness in their responses. 
 
1.2. Fieldwork  
 
It is not easy to describe fieldwork4 nor is it easy to find exact guidelines on how it should 
be done. Hammersley and Atkinson when writing about ‘ethnography’ emphasise that the 
term should be understood in a liberal way. In its most characteristic form it means that 
the researcher is participating, overtly or covertly, in people’s daily life for an extended 
period of time. During this period the researcher is watching what happens, listening to 
what is said, is asking questions. His or her attitude towards the field should be what I call 
‘everything comes’, in other words, collecting whatever data is available to throw light on the 
issues that are the focus of the research (Hammersley & Attkinson, 1983; Mesman & Mol, 
1996). As McCall and Simmons describe it in relation to the participant-observer role: 
 
„...participant observation is not a single method but rather a characteristic style 
of research which makes use of a number of methods and techniques - 
observation, informant interviewing, document analysis, respondent interviewing 
and participation with self-analysis (McCall & Simmons quoted by Smith, 1997 
Wp).” 
 
As Hammersley and Atkinson point out, ethnography is one of the most basic forms of 
social research (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, pp. 1-2). It bears a close resemblance to 
the routine ways in which people makes sense of the world in everyday life. In the early 
4 Although I know that there are differences between the meanings of the terms ‘ethnography’ and 
‘fieldwork’ here I will use them as synonyms for the sake of simplicity.  
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days of fieldwork, the conduct of an ethnographer often differs very little from that of 
any layperson faced with a practical need to understand a particular social setting. 
Hammersley and Atkinson compare the position of the researcher to the novice or recruit 
who finds him- or herself in relatively strange surroundings. The novices act like social 
scientists: making observations and drawing inferences, asking informants, constructing 
hypotheses, and acting on them (ibid. pp. 99-109). However, the... 
 
“...crucial difference between the ‘lay’ novice and the ethnographer in the field is that the 
latter attempts to maintain a self-conscious awareness of what is learned, how it has been 
learned, and the social transactions that inform the production of such knowledge 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 101).” 
 
Generally a series of potential roles are open to the researcher doing fieldwork. Walsh in 
his paper on Doing ethnography quotes Junker who identifies four different social roles for 
the fieldwork (Walsh, 2004, pp. 221-223). These are complete participant, participant as 
observer, observer as participant and complete observer. I shall not discuss these roles 
here in detail since their names already imply their meaning. It may be be worth 
mentioning, however, that it is no use making decisions about the sort of role to be 
adopted in a setting because it will depend on the purposes of the research and the nature 
of the setting. Fortunately, one does not have to stick to one kind of role but shifts in the 
researcher’s position can be made all through the fieldwork. Using the words of 
Hammersley and Atkinson: 
 
“Different roles within a setting can be exploited, then, in order to get access to different 
kinds of data, as well as to acquire some sense of the various kinds of bias characteristic 
of each (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 109).” 
 
In a similar fashion, my role as a researcher shifted during my fieldwork as well. The 
structure and process of the Meeting of Minds, about which I was doing research, kept 
changing in the course of the project, and so did my position as a researcher. At the 
beginning, I was an ‘observer as participant’ independent from the process itself. Later, I 
shifted to a ‘participant as observer’ position as I became more and more involved in the 
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project documenting the arguments put forward by citizens in order to help them follow 
the discussion. This involvement helped to get the information needed for the research 
and helped me get into places to which I would have no access as an observer just as a 
staff member. It also may be worth mentioning that this engagement with the project 
made it difficult to keep my distance from the data collected and sometimes even made it 
impossible to make notes because I was too busy during the actual fieldwork as a staff 
member. However, I attempted to distance myself from the data collected during the 




1.3. On Discourse  
 
In this thesis I will very often use the expressions discourse, discursive layer and discursive field. 
My methodology is not based on only one understanding of discourse but on several 
different approaches of Discourse Analysis (DA), which I will discuss in detail below. 
      MATERIALS ANALYSED
 
I did fieldwork on five long weekends on which the Meeting of Minds project took 
place (Figure 3). In the course of the fieldwork I made notes and collected project 
material such as 
 
staff programmes of the meetings 
internal evaluation documents 
comments of the staff on the project 
project working documents summarizing the views of the citizens 
introductory document for the citizens  
the webpage of the project (MoM2005).  
 
I also extensively used the reports (MoM 2005B, 2005C, 2006) which present and 
describe the events like the First and the Second European Convention, the 
milestones of the MoM project. 
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Discourse has very different meanings and interpretations in the different schools of 
thought and, therefore, I will not attempt to give discourse a straightforward definition, 
but rather I shall emphasise those aspects of the concept which are significant, as far as 
research methodology is concerned. However, I hope that at the end of this section the 
reader is going to acquire a certain understanding on what discourse is.  
 
From the different trends and accounts, I mainly draw on Foucaldian social theory and on 
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) when using the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discursive’. The 
main aspects of the concept discourse are its inner order, its co-constructive relationship with 
society and culture, the characteristic that it is beyond the control of the individual, 
consequently it is historical and contextual, and it exerts its effects on different levels of social 
reality. I shall reflect briefly on those aspects. 
 
According to the schools of thought mentioned above, the expression ‘discourse’ is much 
broader than if one just speaks about one’s viewpoints or opinions. The discourse is a 
semantic field in which the various meanings are constantly constructed by the inner order of 
the discourse. This inner order is crystallised by mutual relationships between meanings. 
A discourse therefore can be seen as a complex network of interconnected meanings in 
which each discursive element is mutually stabilising the others. As a consequence, no 
discursive element can be understood separately from the others and from the context in 
general. The focal point of discursive theory is not the text per se, but rather: 
 
“Practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak. Of course discourses 
are composed of signs; but what they do is more than use these signs to designate things; 
it is this ‘more’ that renders them irreducible to the language and to speech. It is this 
‘more’ we must reveal and describe. (Foucault, quoted by Jeppesen, 2006, p. 5.)”  
 
Yet this ‘more’ is not happening at the level of the individual subject but at a higher level. 
The ‘practices which systematically form the objects’ are social practices and cannot be 
controlled by the free will of the subject (Jeppesen, 2006, p. 5.). Meaning is constructed in 
historically specific contexts, by reciprocally constitutive elements of meaning. Because of the 
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theory’s focus on meanings and how these meanings form the objects in the social world, 
discursive theory is often dismissed as post-modern rubbish which reduces reality merely 
to language games (Wetherell, 2001A). In contrast with this view Discourse Theory does 
not negate reality, just stresses the fact that our understanding of reality (as human 
subjects) is always discursive since we comprehend the world by using language. As 
Jeppesen puts it:  
 
“The perception of ‘reality’ as being discursively constructed does not however entail 
denying the existence of a world of objects. For example, a horse might be discursively 
constructed as a pet, food or perhaps a means of transportation. This does not mean that 
the relation between signs and what they signify is completely arbitrary as one might be 
led to believe, and everything cannot be said at every point in time and context. 
Consequently discourses are not to be perceived as unfolding manifestations of the 
knowing, speaking subject. (…) Rather, discourses are situated or embedded in social 
practices and are always contextually bounded, and therefore never constructed on their 
own (Jeppesen, 2006, pp. 5-6).”  
 
In line with the Foucaldian theory, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) also conceives 
discourse as practice, and stresses the importance of the connection between discourse 
and social and historical context. 
 
Discourse is also ‘historical’ which means that it has acquired its characteristics through 
time so for the individual it represents a certain inertia and obduracy. Moreover, because 
of its historical aspect, discourse cannot be understood without considering the context. 
Furthermore, both Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak – two outstanding figures of the 
CDA school – stress the interdiscursive nature of discourses. This term means that a 
given discourse is always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier, as 
well as to those which are produced synchronically or subsequently (Wodak 2001, 
Fairclough, 1999). I will discuss this aspect in the following section in depth.  
 
Another significant assumption of these theories is ‘co-constructivity’ which means that there 
is no straightforward, one-way relationship between the discourse and the social worlds, 
in other words, discourse constitutes society and culture as well as being constituted by 
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them.5 According to Fairclaugh’s account6, there are three dimensions of this socially 
constitutive, constructive effect of discourse (Jolliffe, 1997, Wp).  
 
Firstly, he argues that discourse helps to construct the “social identities” and “subject 
positions”. Secondly, discourse also plays a part in giving form to social relationships 
between people. Thirdly, discourses also serve as a basis for systems of knowledge and 
belief. Fairclough argues that these three effects correspond to three functions of 
language and dimensions of meaning, that is, the 'identity,' 'relational,' and 'ideational' 




In line with the above mentioned arguments on the concept of discourse, Discourse 
Analysis (DA) studies practices of producing knowledge and meanings in concrete 
contexts and institutions8. Talja argues that discourse analysis “systematizes different ways 
of talking in order to make visible the perspectives and starting points on the basis of 
which knowledge and meanings are produced in a particular historical moment (Talja, 
1999, p. 2.)”. DA focuses on how discourses produce and transform social reality, that is, 
5 As Wodak puts it: „CDA assumes a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and 
the situations, institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: the situation, 
institutions and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn, discourses influence social 
and political reality (Wodak, quoted by Jeppesen 2006, p. 6).”  
6 Here I will use draw on Jolliffe’s (Jolliffe, 1997) interpretation of Fairclough’s approach. In his paper, 
Jolliffe introduced the ideas elaborated in Fairclough’s book Discourse and Social Change (Fairclough, 1992). 
In the following paragraphs thus I will refer to Jolliffe’s paper although I am going to present Fairclough’s 
ideas. 
7 Fairclough provides the example of the social scene of schools to clarify these different aspects. So, the 
‘speech of the classroom’ contributes to construct not only the identities of ‘teachers’ and ‘pupils’ but also 
a social relationship in which the teachers organize the pupils’ activities and assess them. At an ideological 
level, this complex relationship between the ones who are in a position to judge others (teachers) and 
those who are the subject of assessment and evaluation (students) generally reproduces a society's systems 
of knowledge and belief about the nature of schooling, but it is also open to transformations which may 
partly originate in discourse (Jolliffe, 1997, Wp). 
8 It has to be mentioned that the meaning of the term ’DA’ is much broader that I am using here (Gering, 
2005). However, I shall use here this narrower definition of the term and in the following section I draw 
on this approach and introduce the main aspects of the analytical implications of it. 
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how it unfolds the practical consequences of approaching a particular phenomenon – like 
citizenship (K.G.) – in different ways (p. 2). 
 
Talja also argues that the approach of DA is not at all new and unfamiliar because there 
were methods way before its emergence to analyse the written and oral utterances of 
other people. DA thus has a close connection to rhetorics, a traditional research 
approach, which was the established form of critical analysis from the ancient world to 
the 18th century (Talja, 1999, p. 15). Using Talja’s own words: 
 
„Rhetorics examined the way in which texts are weaved together in order to achieve 
particular effects. No difference was made between talk and writing, or philosophy and 
fiction, as objects of study. All texts were analyzed in the same way as forms of social 
action, power, and public persuasion (Talja, 1999, p. 15).”  
 
One special branch of DA particularly stresses the importance of analysing the ‘forms of 
social action, power, and public persuasion’. This approach is Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) which has an especially strong commitment to disclose embedded power relations 
and ideologies. Beyond the basic framework of discourse analysis, three additional 
assumptions are made by CDA to achieve this goal (Porter, 2005, Wp.). 
 
Firstly, because discourses tend to support social institutions, there is usually a 
correspondence between them: particular social, political, and economic regimes are 
associated with particular types and orders of discourse.  
 
Secondly, discourses contribute to the reproduction and stabilisation of power relations, 
where power is meant as asymmetrical subject position in discursive situations and, in 
connection with this, also as unequal capacity to participate in the production, 
distribution, and consumption of texts in specific contexts.  
 
Third, discourses and texts are not at all merely transparent and unambiguous means of 
mediating ideas between the ‘reader and the writer’ but have serious ideological effects: 
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they convey the ‘watermark’ of implicit doctrines and beliefs underpinning political, 
economic, or other systems. Given these assumptions, the main questions of CDA are as 
follows: what type of subjects and objects benefit or lose out in connection with a focal 
discourse and what type of political, economic, and social regimes are reinforced in the 
course of the discursive activities involved (Porter, 2005 Wp., p. 3)? 
 
1.4. Discursive Policy Analysis 
 
From this lively and complex theoretical and methodological space called discourse 
studies I shall use Discursive Policy Analysis. This approach differs from other DA 
approaches more in its field of research than in terms of methodology. As its name 
shows, the main goal of this strand of DA is to disclose discourses underpinning policies. 
The reason for particular interests in policies is that policies are ways of putting forward 
an argument about what a particular situation (or what the world) is like, and what should 
be done about it (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 1). According to Gasper and Apthorpe, 
the most important aspects of policy discourses are, as follows:  
 
„Policy discourse inevitably frames problems in a certain way, i.e. includes some aspects 
rather than others. This approach to discourse analysis might focus on the specific 
concepts, tropes and frames used in policies. 
 
Policy discourse determines (and is determined by) a larger set of 'rules' about what is 
sayable and thinkable. (For example, it is thinkable that participation is a good thing, but 
it is less thinkable that participation is a bad thing.) This approach might focus more 
widely on the stories and narratives that sustain policies, and the explicit or implicit rules 
of validation. 
 
Policy discourse is not ’just words’ but has material effects, as a change in discourse will 
have an effect e.g. on the distribution of resources (Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996, p. 1).” 
 
In this thesis, I shall use one special approach of Discursive Policy Analysis developed by 
Véronique Mottier (Mottier, 2002, 2005). This approach puts a special emphasis on the 
analysis of identity constructions in policy texts and is therefore suitable to examine 
citizenship constructions in policy texts, which is of special importance as far as this thesis 
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is concerned. As it can be read both below and above, Discourse Analyses problematises 
the category of identity since it shows that different kinds of discourses valorise, prefer 
and even enforce definite social positions and social identities. This, of course, also means 
that identity is not a pre-existing entity but is both challenged and shaped by political 
actors, at local as well as global levels (Mottier, 2002, p. 59). Therefore, 
 
“Discourse Analysis could (…) be seen as a quest to translate constructionist theoretical 
insights into more methodologically grounded framework of analysis. However, adopting 
a discourse approach to identity construction does not imply that only symbolic 
constructions are deemed relevant. Identities – ethnic, national or other – are produced, 
reproduced and transformed through institutional practices (including) state policies, 
political organisations and everyday interactions (Mottier, 2002, p. 59).”  
 
Moreover, argues Mottier, the Foucaldian strands of Discourse Analysis emphasise that 
identity is not only constructed by relations of meaning but also within institutionalised 
relations of power. In line with this school of thought, discourses around national 
identity, sexuality, gender or race are not autonomous systems but operate in the context 
of the institutional supports and practices they rely upon (p. 59).  
 
“From a top-down perspective, discourse analysts have explored the social and political 
identities that are being articulated and produced through specific public policies. They 
have looked at the different ways in which politics shapes identities, in particular identities 
associated with language, ethnicity, sexuality, or gender. For example, what types of 
boundaries around national identity are being constructed within specific immigration 
regulations? Or, what kinds of gender identities are being generated in retirement or 
unemployment policies? (Mottier, 2002, p. 60)” 
 
In a similar fashion, one could also ask what kind of citizenship models are being used 
and generated in European policy documents. In order to do this, I shall use Mottier’s 
version of Discursive Analysis in this thesis. The focus will be on how citizens and 
citizenship models are constructed ‘from above’ in connection with European science and 
technology in general and with the Meeting of Minds process in particular. 
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1.5. Discursive Interview Analysis 
 
In the thesis, I will also analyse interviews using Discursive Interview Analysis to make 
sense of the data collected. I will draw on Sanna Talja’s approach in which discursive 
interview analysis is not about finding accurate definitions of ‘the truth’ or a single reality, 
but rather seeks to uncover reality from the viewpoint of the person delivering the text 
(Talja, 1999).  
 
In Talja’s method of qualitative analysis the principal unit of analysis is not the individual 
but cultural regularities in participants’ accounts. She calls these regularities ‘interpretative 
    MATERIALS ANALYSED
 
I will use Discursive Policy Analysis to analyse the following documents: 
 
‘White Paper of Governance’(Commission of the European Communities, 
2001) 
‘Science, Society and the Citizen of Europe’(2000A) 
‘Science and Society Action Plan’(European Commission, 2002).  
 
I shall also examine the rhetoric of the organisers of the project, based on the 
information available on the  
 
Website of the project  
Interview which I made with one of the main organisers, namely, Rinie van Est 
 
I attempted to choose the right material for the analysis of the official discourse. The 
underlying reason of the selection was that these are the most important official 
documents which partly or entirely focus on the relationship between the political 
subject of Europe and science and technology. The model of relationship can be 
analysed by DA and the thematical connections with the academic discourse can be 
clearly displayed. 
 
Although, I did not use Discourse Analysis in disclosing the main trends of the 
academic discourse, I presented the ideas and models in a way that allows to show the 
possible connections between the academic and the official discourse.  
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repertoires’ based on the work of Wetherell and Potter (Wetherell & Potter, 1988). The 
identification and analysis of these repertoires does not aim at capturing participants’ 
authentic intentions, meanings, or experiences but interview data are understood and 
analysed at a macro-sociological level, as social texts. As Talja puts it, it “concentrates on 
the analysis of knowledge formations, which organize institutional practices and societal 
reality on a large scale (Talja, 1999, p. 2.).” 
 
Talja uses her version of interview analyses to explore the different ways library users 
define and conceptualise the function of library especially the musical collection of the 
institutions concerned. In the course of her research, she identified three different 
repertoires in the library users discourse as far as music collection is concerned (Cranfield, 
2002). These three are the following:  
1. The common culture repertoire  
2. The consumer culture repertoire  
3. The mosaic culture repertoire  
As a conclusion, she argues that the way library users define and conceptualise selection 
principles does not differ dramatically from the way library selection policy has been 
formulated over the years. Seemingly, these three cultural repertoires might give the 
impression that they are totally different, yet they are tenants of the same contradictory 
space and related to different situations in library practice. While the common cultural 
repertoire is often used in an attempt to secure better financial support for libraries, the 
consumer culture repertoire is used to defend the library’s choice of materials for minority 
audiences. And lastly the mosaic culture repertoire is related to broader discussions of 
citizens’ cultural interests (Cranfield, 2002 Wp.). In the interview situation, it is not 
unusual that the same person uses different repertoires as a point of reference. According 




“In discourse analysis, this kind of variability and inconsistency in explanations is not seen 
as a potential source of error when trying to make coherent sense of participants’ views. 
Interview talk is the resourceful, context-dependent application of common interpretative 
resources. The variability of interpretations does not mean that there is no regularity at all 
in participants’ discourse; it only signifies that regularity cannot be pinned at the level of 
the individual speaker. (...) There are considerable similarities in ways of making sense of 
the library as an institution (...), but all interpretations and arguments are not equally 
logical and acceptable in a particular speech situation. In similar conversational contexts, 
similar arguments tend to be used (Talja, 1999, p. 7.).” 
 
Interviews as social texts 
 
As we could see above, the starting point of Talja’s interview analysis is that meanings, 
values, and ethical principles are not individual creations, but entities that people create 
together in communication and social action. She emphasises that in the process of 
communication language is not just a tool to be taken up and put down at will. Language 
plays a very significant role in every aspect of communication since it manifests itself at 
the very level of the subject’s self-understanding considering the fact that words are 
present in every act of interpretation (Talja, 1999). 
 
This is also in line with the understanding of the subject’s self by Wetherell (Wetherell, 
2001B). A new trend has connected discourse theory and psychology which called forth a 
radical change in the understanding of the self. According to the traditional approach of 
psychology, the ‘self’ exists independently from language and speech. A typical example 
of this idealtype is Rodin’s Le Penseur who is sitting and thinking in a solitary manner. This 
approach has been changed by a new approach emphasising the discursive nature of the 
individual.9 Moreover, it also stresses that speech, language and thinking are inseparable 
entities and our feelings, thoughts and beliefs are not autonomous but formed as parts of 
a discourse (Géring, Draft). Even though, in this approach the individual and the self are 
at the forefront, the dominance of language is also emphasised: 
9 „’Le Penseur’ may be alone with his thoughts but those thoughts bear the marks of social contexts and 
historical struggles over meaning. Mind and selves are constructed from cultural, social and communal 
resources.” (Wetherell, 2001B, p. 187) 
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“Language’s own talk is, however, supreme in its power compared to individual speakers’ 
views, since pre-existing conceptualizations and ways of classifying phenomena have to 
be used even by speakers whose conscious intention it is to oppose them. Individuals are 
not able to modify the resources of interpretation freely, since they are limited by the 
episteme of a specific cultural and historical phase. However, discourses, like individual 
subjects, are variable, conflicting, and continuously changing and developing (Talja, 1999, 
p. 12)” 
 
In this way, participants’ accounts, or verbal expressions, are not perceived as descriptions 
of actual processes, behaviour, or mental events. Talja emphasises that interview talk is by 
nature a cultural and collective phenomenon. The meaning of an answer largely depends 
on the local and broader discursive system, a surrounding context in which the written 
and oral utterances are embedded (ibid. p. 3). The aim of the research therefore is not to 
disclose what people really think but to unfold and identify the hidden forms and patterns 
through which they arrange their perception of the world and according to which they 
formulate their answers. A way to do this is identifying interpretative repertoires in the 
answers concerned. 
 
Talja draws on Wetherell and Potter (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) who define interpretative 
repertoires as “bounded language units” constituted out of a restricted range of terms 
used in a specific stylistic and grammatical fashion (p. 8). One can find these ‘language 
units’ by recognising one or more key metaphors and certain trophes or figures of 
speech.10  
 
Nevertheless, Talja argues that interpretative repertoires cannot be “bounded language 
units” consisting only of a restricted range of terms pointing out that the same terms are 
used in different discourses, in which their meanings are constituted differently. The 
interpretation of the common concepts in a discourse corresponds to the viewpoint on 
which the discourse is based. So, Talja argues, this difference has to be captured instead 
10 Talja quotes the following examples to figures and tropes of speech: “cradle of counter culture,” and 
“reach for higher destinations”. (Talja, 1999, p. 8) 
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of trying to assign terms and expressions to a restrained discursive space or language unit 
(ibid. p. 8-9.).11 
 
The Analysis of Interpretative Repertoires 
 
Interviews are understood as social texts and not as individual utterances, in other words, 
they are understood as meanings and models of the facets of the social world are 
understood as social and discursive constructions on which individuals draw when they 
are formulating their answers. As Talja puts it, the “analysis of interpretative repertoires is 
like putting together a jigsaw puzzle (p. 8)” because interviews are not interpreted as 
stories having a clear and distinguishable line and meaning. On the contrary, the 
researcher has to take into consideration all the accounts produced by the participants and 
analyse significant patterns of consistency and variation in them. In order to do that the 
researcher has to pursue three phases of disclosing the pattern of repertoires: 
 
1. phase: analysing inconsistencies and internal contradictions in the answers of one 
participant.  
 
2. phase: identifying regular patterns in the variability of accounts: repeatedly occurring 
descriptions, explanations, and arguments, in different participants’ talk 
 
3. phase: identifying the basic assumptions and starting points which underlie a 
particular way of talking about a phenomenon (Talja, 1999, p. 8). 
 
11 „Thus, the different starting points of discourses are discernible from the way common concepts are 
understood and defined. Terms that have been linked together on the basis of a particular background 
assumption, lose their link on the basis of a different assumption, and are linked to other words. 
Discourses are also classification practices: analyzing discourses involves analyzing the selection, linkage, 
and ordering of terms. Words are articulated with other words differently in discourses, and they implicate 
different ideas and ideologies (Talja, 1999, p. 9).” 
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As it can be seen in this sequence of phases, the aim of the discursive interview analysis is 
not just identifying certain patterns but also understanding why such patterns exist in a 
particular historical situation. I will use this method in this paper to analyse the citizens’ 
discourse on participation and European identity, which are ‘hot’ issues both in official 
and academic arenas. In this fashion, my aim with respect to the analysis concerned is 
pretty much in line with Talja’s approach. Using Talja’s own words: 
 
“...the aim of discourse analysis is not only to identify interpretative repertoires, but to 
point out the power and influence of particular narratives, and to analyze their potential 
societal and institutional functions and effects. This is not to say that discourse analysts 
should argue that some discourses are inherently more truthful and valuable than others. 
The uses and effects of discourses are context-dependent. However, it is a central feature 
of discourses, knowledge formations, that they organize social reality at a large scale. The 
aim of discourse analysis is to make it possible for the readers to weigh the practical 
consequences of different discourses, and to show the problems and possibilities created 
by their existence (Talja, 1999, p. 15).” 
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     MATERIALS ANALYSED
 
I undertook 25 interviews with Hungarian and Dutch participants of the Meeting of 
Minds project. 16 interviews were conducted throughout the first Hungarian national 
meeting (7-8. 05. 2005) with Hungarian participants and 9 interviews were conducted 
with the Dutch at the first European convention (3-5.06.2005.). The reason why fewer 
interviews were made with Dutch participants is that I was also doing fieldwork as a 
participatory observer at the first European Convention and I had to share my 
attention between two tasks. Moreover, I used English for interviewing the Dutch and 
considering the fact that it was neither their native language nor mine, carrying out 
interviews was less smooth than it was with the Hungarians. However, in my opinion 
this difference between the number of Dutch and Hungarian citizens does not cause 
bias because of interview analysis focus on qualitative and not on quantitative aspects. 
 
All interviews were carried out in a semi-structured way. In the course of doing 
interviews, I did not try to squeeze out information from my interviewees but 
attempted to gently direct the discussion to get answers to my questions formulated in 
advance. The questions were, as follows. 
 
How do you evaluate your own part in this project? 
What do you think the organisers expect from you as a citizen? 
In what capacity do you think you are involved in this project, as a 
Dutch/Hungarian citizen or as a European citizen? 
What do you think is the relation between the European and the 
Dutch/Hungarian citizenship? 
 
The purpose of asking the first two questions was to gain information about the 
citizens’ views on scientific citizenship. Using this exact term, however, would have 
been confusing, as it is not commonly used in everyday life-contexts. Therefore, I 
asked sub-questions steering the interviews in the direction of the issue of changing 
concepts of citizenship in relation to science and technology in general and the 
Meeting of Minds project in particular. Asking questions about the relationship 
between European and national citizenship was less problematic in that sense. 
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1.6. Value-commitments and the position of the researcher 
 
In this section, I shall highlight certain positions which researchers can occupy when 
conducting a project. These positions are not to be understood as fixed and rigid 
standpoints but as two extreme poles of continuums. These issues are important to clarify 
before commencing the actual discussion of the topic in question because they bear a 
direct relation to the methodologies used, the style of writing and the conclusions drawn 
at the end. Therefore, in the following section there will be a brief discussion on 
objectivity versus situated knowledge, political neutrality versus commitment. In my 
opinion, choosing between these positions is always value-laden and cannot be judged or 
criticised from an objective position just as different worldviews cannot be measured 
against each other (Rorty, 1994). The aim here is not to outline and examine the existing 
trends but to indicate and reflect on the position of my ‘researcher identity’. This 
reflexivity guarantees that my value and political commitments are clear and transparent at 
least as far as I am aware of them. 
 
Objectivity versus Situated knowledge 
 
First of all, one of the most important questions is the matter of objectivity versus 
situated knowledge. In this continuum, proponents of objectivity argue that reality, the 
world outside exists independently of us, independently of our knowledge and our tools 
of research. This reality is to be discovered in the examination of that ‘outside’. In this 
fashion, methods are mere instruments designed to identify and analyse the obdurate 
character of the empirical world (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983, p. 1-22.). 
 
In contrast with this, advocates of the ‘situated knowledge’ account emphasise that there 
is no reality existing independently from our knowledge. Therefore, we cannot reach an 
objective view on things outside because there are always intermediaries between like 
language, preliminary knowledge and research tools (Kuhn, 2000; Feyerabend, 1999; 
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Collins&Pinch, 1999).12 The way in which we approach phenomena always reflects our 
understanding and our values. However, as its name shows, the outcome is not going to 
be total relativity but situated knowledge. It is not universal but situated and only ‘true’ in 
given contexts, in other words, situations (Haraway, 1999; Latour 1987, 1999; Callon, 
1986). 
 
This thesis does not attempt to produce universal knowledge, it especially does not focus 
on the things in themselves but on the knowledge created by actors about a model of the 
social and political subject, that is, citizenship. As the reader could read above, the choice 
of methodologies also reflects this standpoint and aims to grasp and analyse how situated 
knowledge is connected and produced in different contexts. I think a thesis about 
different kinds of situated knowledge cannot be objective but at least can show how 
actors struggle to establish and stabilise one kind of approach as objective and universal. 
 
Neutrality versus Political commitment 
 
In this continuum, one extreme pole is neutrality where the research project and the 
researcher should always be independent from the surrounding political and economic 
contexts and forces. This independence guarantees that the knowledge produced is not 
biased or not just those aspects are stressed of a particular phenomenon which are 
important for political purposes. Usually, these researchers do not reject every kind of 
application of their results, but rather insist on the idea that research and political aspects 
should be kept separately (Wetherell, 2001B). 
 
On the other pole, there are those who argue that research is always affected by values, 
and always has political consequences which means that researchers ought to take 
responsibility for their value commitments and for the effects of their work. It is also 
12 Latour negates the very distinction between the world outside and the understanding and cognitive 
subject (Latour, 1999A, B; Kutrowátz, 2005). 
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suggested that social scientific research has little impact and value in itself and in order to 
give value and importance to it, it should be concerned not simply with understanding the 
world but with applying its findings to bring about change (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
1983, p. 15; Wetherell, 2001B).  
 
In this thesis, the very topic is political since it is closely connected to a deliberative 
project, that is, the Meeting of Minds. Personally, I am one of the proponents of 
deliberative processes and the democratisation of policy-making, especially policy-making 
in science and technology. This commitment can be clearly traced in the choice of the 
topic, the literature processed and in the train of thought. However, I will attempt to keep 
a distance from the topic and project described and analysed and not to be biased by my 
values in the course of the actual analysis. The conclusion of this paper is going to be 
more political in nature and contains lessons drawn from the analytic parts which can be 
regarded as policy recommendations as well. 
38
2. DELIBERATION AND LABORATORY. THE DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF 
MEETING OF MINDS  
 
The following chapter deals with a European level initiative – Meeting of Minds 
European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science – which engaged citizens in the 
discussion of scientific and technological issues by using the theory of deliberative 
democracy and participatory methodology. In order to present a full picture of the 
programme concerned, the section does not only describe the structure of MoM but also 
caries out its analysis by using Actor-Network-Theory’s concept of laboratorisation 
(hereinafter ANT for short). Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows: 
 
The first sub-chapter gives a theoretical introduction to the characteristics of deliberative 
democracy. Special attention is paid to a particular type of participatory method, that is, to 
Participatory Technology Assessment (hereinafter PTA for short), which if not in its tools then 
definitely in its topic is significantly different from other participatory mechanisms. The 
discussion also touches upon the differences between traditional technology assessment 
and participatory technology assessment and explores the scientific-technological 
approaches underpinning them. 
 
In the second sub-chapter the structure of the Consensus Conference and the Meeting of 
Minds are compared to illustrate how this new, European initiative transcends the 
approach of traditional participative mechanisms. Traditional participatory mechanisms, 
like the Consensus Conference, usually take place at a national level, whereas the Meeting 
of Minds took place at an international level. Thus, the programme can be considered 
unique not only in terms of its special subject, namely brain science, but with respect to 
its international level. Meeting of Minds was the first participatory technology assessment 




In the third part of this section, there is an overview of the concept of laboratisation 
developed by the scholars of ANT with a view to providing a framework for the 
interpretation of the process. On the one hand, as it will be apparent, the deliberative 
process is partly based on Habermas’ theory.13 On the other hand, the initiative can also 
be conceived as a huge laboratory in which through successive mechanisms the opinions of 
the participants were being distilled to an increasing degree of purity and coherence. 
 
The two main questions of the analysis is how it is possible to keep the conditions of the 
deliberation constant, as well as what kind of constellation of tools, technologies, people, 
and guidelines are required on setting the scene for creating a discussion situation which 
could be more or less characterised by the habermasian uncoerced and undistorted 
communication principle.  
 
2.1. Characteristics of participatory mechanisms 
 
Participatory methodology has several different forms and mechanisms which may differ 
from each other in terms of the level of decision-making, the topic and the actors 
involved.  
 
Generally speaking, all participatory mechanisms are comprised of three different – 
mutually complementary – aspects. These three are the research, the educational and the 
13 There are several articles, accessible through Internet, on the connection between the theory of 
democracy and the participatory methodology. Here, I will only use one of the passages concerned from 
Abels:  
„Given the strong claim about the democratic nature of pTA it is astonishing that the link between pTA 
concepts and theories of democracy is so far rather weak. Recently, some scholars have explicitly taken up 
democratic theory (…). However, they restrict themselves basically to just one strand of democratic 
theory: that is deliberative theory which is in principal well-equipped to deal with problems of knowledge 
and complexity. Most proponents refer to the strong tradition in deliberative democracy that is founded 
on Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics and the principle of argumentation. According to Habemas, in 
an ideal discourse it is only the ‘unforced force of the better argument’ that prevails. Habermas attempts 
to draw the perspective of real-life argumentation into the deliberation of a norm by admitting all affected 
as participants; he stresses the need for practical, participatory discourse. The discourse has to be free of 
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political dimensions.14 It can also be said that the various participatory methods differ from 
each other because of the different emphasis they put on these different dimensions, 
respectively. Transcending the social science research and the educational aspects, these 
methods become political due to the fact that citizens can also develop recommendations 
that, in turn, are taken into consideration by their political representatives.15 
 
So, participatory mechanisms are social science research tools in the sense that they are 
meant to reveal opinions, hopes and fears about a given subject. They achieve these aims 
by helping participants to get informed about the topic concerned. They grant access to 
the necessary knowledge which is a precondition for laymen to form their own opinions on 
a complex issue. However, at the end of this learning negotiating and deliberative process 
participants develop recommendations which are then submitted to the decision-makers 
concerned with the particular issue. In this manner, they participate in shaping public policy, 
as they ‘make their voice heard’ in those political arenas as well which are normally 
inaccessible to the man in the street. Thus, in this sense, participatory methods 
simultaneously have a research, an educational as well as a political dimension. 
 
Apart from these three major dimensions, participatory processes have several other 
typical features which could be identified through their aims. The main aims of 
participatory methods are as follows:  
 
Facilitating dialogues between citizens, experts and politicians; 
Preparing for decision-making on complex issues and the presentation of the 
citizens’ viewpoint; 
domination and the outcome is the result of reasonable public discourse procedure (Abels, 2004, Wp., p. 
5).” 
14 Although with different terminology, there is a similar approach to participatory methodology: See. 
(Várkonyi,  2006. Lecture)  
15 And therein lays a shortcoming of the method as what is there to ensure that politicians will take 
citizens’ recommendations into account? However, if it does not happen, the processes actually remain 
just expensive and complicated ’opinion polls’. 
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Encouraging social learning; 
Enhancing the role of civic society; 
Propagating new citizen models based on political participation and public debate; 
Supporting governance instead of government, which means not one, independent 
political centre should have the authority to make decisions but rather 
decisions should result from negotiations between various political actors and 
stakeholders; 
And last but not least, participatory processes mean feedback for politicians, 
scientists and experts on whether the direction they are taking is gaining the 
support of society. 
 
Several papers have been published to introduce the specific features of various 
mechanisms (Andersen & Jæger 1999; Danish Board of Technology, 2006; EUROPTA, 
2000). In the following only one of the participatory methods will be shown, the 
Consensus Conference, which was the first and most widespread form of participatory 
methodology. I shall also compare this method to the structure of the Meeting of Minds 
project, which was a technological assessment process. 
 
The Approach of Technological Assessment  
 
The question might arise as to why participatory mechanisms are required to assess 
technologies which a layperson knows nothing about in any depth. Why should not the 
discussion of technical issues be left to those who are really knowledgeable on the subject, 
i.e. the experts? How can non-professional people contribute to an engineering-
technological process?  
 
One of the evident answers to the questions above would be that scientific and 
technological progresses exert such profound influence on society that ethical and 
political disputes should be induced about their role in and their influence on our life. 
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Society is increasingly faced with the sort of challenges, dilemmas and situations which 
have been created by various technical devices and scientific inventions. The borderline 
which so far has seemed to separate the production of science and technology from social 
processes is getting increasingly blurred. 
 
However, the reverse is true as well, or to put it more clearly, social processes also exert 
an effect on the development of science and technology, in addition to the conditions of 
the technological framework and/or the internal theoretical changes of science, as a 
narrow technocratic perspective might suggest. In other words, it is the science and 
technology itself that contain the social elements which internally determine their 
development and operation. The social dimension is not something external in relation to 
the spheres of science and technology but rather it is their integral and inseparable part. 
 
Feenberg (Feenberg, 1992) demonstrates this by giving the example of 19th-century 
changes in the boilers of steamships. He claims that in disputes on technical 
specifications, ethical issues are very often opposed on the grounds of efficiency. The 
history of steam engines is also related to this claim: when politicians wanted to increase 
the safety of boilers of steam engines, thus changing their technical specifications, 
shipping companies began to protest, saying that the changes would decrease both their 
technical and economic efficiency.16 After the social debate on safety was closed, argues 
Feenberg, the issue of socially acceptable safety standards was converted into the 
technical specifications of the boiler. The level of safety became part of the horizon of 
both the technological and social realities. Thus, after the dispute had been closed, issues 
16 „The accident rate fell dramatically once technical improvements were mandated. Legislation would 
hardly have been necessary to achieve this outcome had it been technically determined. But in fact boiler 
design was relative to a social judgment about safety. That judgement could have been made on strictly 
market grounds, as the shippers wished, or politically, with differing technical results. In either case, those 
results constitute a proper boiler. What a boiler ’is’ was thus defined through a long process of political 
struggle culminating finally in uniform codes issued by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(Feenberg, 1992, Wp.).”  
Beck follows a similar line of argument, writing that there is often a central core ’for ’good life’ included in 
the arguments on technical specifications. (Beck, 2003) 
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on safety became part of the socio-technical background, beyond the discussions on 
assessing efficiency. Feenberg argues that: 
 
“Such fetishism of efficiency ignores our ordinary understanding of the concept which 
alone is relevant to social decision-making. In that everyday sense, efficiency concerns the 
narrow range of values that economic actors routinely affect by their decisions. 
Unproblematic aspects of technology are not included. In theory one can decompose any 
technical object and account for each of its elements in terms of the goals it meets, 
whether it be safety, speed, reliability, etc., but in practice no one is interested in opening 
the ’black box’ to see what is inside.  
 
For example, once the boiler code is established, such things as the thickness of a wall or 
the design of a safety valve appear as essential to the object. The cost of these features is 
not broken out as the specific "price" of safety and compared unfavorably with a more 
efficient but less secure version of the technology. Violating the code in order to lower 
costs is a crime, not a trade-off. And since all further progress takes place on the basis of 
the new safety standard, soon no one looks back to the good old days of cheaper, 
insecure designs (Feenberg, 1992, Wp.).” 
 
If on the above grounds the complex interdependence of technology, science and society 
are accepted then it can also be seen that decisions on technological systems, the direction 
and boundaries of scientific research cannot be separated from political decisions. The 
technical specifications of an incinerator or a radar system close to a village, the technical 
specifications and the site of a bridge under construction, the research using foetuses for 
scientific purposes are all examples which cannot be considered and understood 
separately from the social-cultural context they are part of and which exert an influence 
on them. 
 
Having adopted this train of thought, there are many (Feenberg, 1992: Wp.; Callon, 1987; 
Pinch & Bijker, 1984) who argue that the development of science and technology is not 
an autonomous process, i.e. not a process moving in a predetermined direction, 
independent of society and its effects but on the contrary the direction of its progress can 
be shaped and influenced. 
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This difference in approach is reflected in the difference between traditional and 
participatory technological assessments as well. The methodology of the traditional 
technological assessment is based on the presupposition that technological and scientific 
development cannot be steered or influenced in any way. It is not possible to regulate 
these areas since they are autarchich systems following their own inherent rules. In 
accordance with this view, the assessments of technologies were conducted by experts 
without the participation of any stakeholders or citizen groups, and the aim of the reports 
prepared by them was primarily to make forecasts about the impacts of various 
technologies and to prepare decision-makers for potential negative side-effects or 
disasters. 
  
In contrast to the practice described above, the proponents of participatory technological 
assessment believe that the development of science and technology cannot only be foreseen 
but shaped as well. If the technical specifications of an incinerator and its distance from 
the living area of the local community is also a social-political issue then making a 
decision based on merely technical points, without any kind of stakeholders’ involvement 
is no longer possible on moral grounds. In addition to that, it can be claimed that there 
are no ’purely’ technical points, but rather different social and technological scenarios 
determining the newly-made decisions, which incur different costs and bring different 
benefits to different social actors and different social groups respectively.  
 
Proponents of PTA argue that ideally, decisions on scientific and technological issues are 
not made without involving those concerned. This argument led to the view that 
deliberative processes on science and technology should be opened up, and opportunity 
should be granted to non-professionals to participate in debates and represent their own 
opinions in a constructive way. 
 
Having considered the theoretical background of PTA, the next step in our discussion is 
to examine the main components in a technological assessment mechanism. Although 
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there is no such method in itself as technological assessment, since it is a summary of 
various methods, still all processes – be they the traditional or the participatory version – 
include the following components (ITA, 2006)17:  
 
Problem definition 
Description of the given technology  
Prediction of future technology development  
Description of the society and persons affected  
Prediction of possible social developments alternatives 
Identification, analysis and evaluation of consequences 
Analysis of different regulatory options  
Communication and dissemination of the results in a generally accessible form 
 
As it is apparent, one of the main characteristics of technological assessment is the 
definition and forecast of technological and social development alternatives. Nevertheless, 
the participatory version puts great emphasis on the involvement of the groups concerned 
and the dialogue between experts, politicians and citizens. Several participatory methods – 
like the Scenario Workshop for instance – aim to have the various actors cooperate in 
developing a scenario in order to solve a given problem or a draft of law for the statutory 
regulation of a technological (genetic engineering) or scientific (stem-cell research) 
development. In the case of PTA, as it has already been indicated, the emphasis is shifted 
from the problem of forecasting to stakeholder engagement and to technological and/or 
scientific regulation. That is what happened in the MoM project, a participatory 
technological assessment process which took place in 2005-2006. 
 
It may be worth mentioning that in my opinion, PTA is a part of the bigger category of 
participatory methods and initiatives. PTA, therefore, is not a method as such but an 
17 ITA’s components of technology assessment based on the web-site of the Austrian Institute of 
Technology Assessment (ITA, 2006) 
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approach applying participatory processes so as to involve citizens in debates on science 
and technology. In the following section I will present and compare the Consensus 
Conference and the method of MoM but they will both be represented as special 
arrangements of the PTA approach.  
 
2.2. Introduction to the Project  
 
Meeting of Minds was a two-year-long pilot project. The primary aim of the project was 
to involve citizens in a process, in the course of which they had the opportunity to 
publicly discuss questions arising in connection with the area of brain science with 
scientists, legal experts, ethical thinkers and with representatives of European decision-
making bodies. 
 
The official web-page of the project presents a list of arguments explaining why it was 
specifically in the area of brain science that it became necessary to set up the conditions 
for a public, supranational discussion. Although brain science is not in the centre of 
attention as much as gene- or nano-technology, still it will be acquiring an increasingly 
great social significance over the following years. There are a number of interrelated 
reasons for this which are as follows (MoM, 2005A).  
 
On the one hand, the scientific community specialising in brain science – thanks to new 
image and information-processing technology and methods – is standing on the threshold 
of being able to understand the operation of the brain in a new, revolutionary, efficient 
and scientific way.  
 
On the other hand, in the last decades life expectancy has significantly increased in 
European countries. It also means that these societies are ageing, i.e. health care systems 
will have to cope with more and more neuro-degenerative diseases like Parkinson’s- and 
Alzheimer-disease. Also, several other depressing scientific reports have been published 
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recently on the psychological condition of the European population. Due to these facts it 
is safe to suppose that in the near future there will be a burning need for curing or at least 
alleviating brain diseases.  
 
Since the topic can be regarded as universal, as a Dutch citizen put it, „everybody has a 
brain”, it seemed to be ideally suited to lend itself to a project in the centre of which there 
was a 126-strong civic panel. Citizens of nine countries constituted the European panel, 
with fourteen people being delegated from every country. 
 
The topics for disputes and discussions were what effects the present and future 
achievements in brain science exert on our everyday life as well as on the whole of 
society. The outcome of these discussions was a compilation of citizens’ 
recommendations which the members of the national panels drew up concerning areas, 
issues and topics they regarded important. The national reports were prepared by the 
panels of all the nine countries, then they drew up a joint final report for the European 
decision-makers.  
 
The Meeting of Minds project has outstanding significance for two reasons. Firstly, it was 
the first technological assessment process which took place in Hungary (too), with the 
participation of Hungarian citizens. Unlike North-European nations, the citizens of 
former socialist countries are far less accustomed to forming and putting forth opinions 
on public issues and to discussing them with strangers. The process was significant for 
another reason as well, namely, it was also interesting to observe how the Hungarian 
panel reacted to such a situation, how they managed to ‘hold their own’ in the 
international arena.  
 
Secondly, this was the first participatory process at a European level. Participatory 
mechanisms usually take place at local or national levels. So, this was the first initiative, 
the outcome of which looked rather uncertain at its commencement, to go beyond 
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national, linguistic and cultural boundaries. Therefore, this project can be conceived as a 
pilot project of further initiatives aiming to involve European citizens. There is a 
participatory project in progress of an even larger scope called European Citizens’ 
Consultation on Europe’s Future.18 Moreover, even more deliberative programmes are to 
be expected under the 7th Framework of the European Union. 
 
As it is, the programme was innovative and experimental in both senses. It was also 
innovative in its structure, since it was conducted both at national levels and in the 
European arena.  
 
The structure of the process  
 
First, it might be useful to give a short overview of the structure of the Consensus 
Conference in order to demonstrate in what sense the Meeting of Minds programme was 
special. The Consensus Conference is one of the oldest and most frequently used 
participatory techniques, so the structure of its mechanism should be compared to the 
structure of the international initiative, Meeting of Minds. 
 
Figure 2. The Structure of the Consensus Conference 
18 The website of the project is: www.european-citizens-consultations.eu   
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First of all, the Consensus Conference can be regarded as a public meeting based on a 
dialogue about a previously defined problem concerning society as a whole or about the 
issue of regulation conducted among citizens, the civic organisations concerned, experts 
and politicians. On the other hand, the whole process is seen as part of the Consensus 
Conference, in the course of which citizens also prepare for the public meeting itself. 
During the preparation period they identify issues they are interested in, formulate 
questions and gather information on the particular topic. The overall process will be 
outlined in the next passage (Andersen & Jæger, 1999). 
 
The first step in organising the conference is the selection of the citizens’ panel. While 
taking into consideration the gender, age, social position and place of residence, a 
representative group is formed, then later it becomes an active panel with its engaged 
members debating on the dilemmas and pertinent questions of a particular issue, at least 
that is what the organisers hope for. Organisers also need to set up an expert panel. When 
selecting the experts, project organisers aim to ensure that all views, all important 
opinions should be represented in the discussion process. 
 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the process itself has three main phases: the introductory meeting, the 
preparatory meeting and the conference. The first two meetings can be seen as preparatory 
meetings for the events of the conference. In the course of the introductory meeting citizens 
discuss some information material handed out in advance and aspiring to objectivity as 
much as possible to familiarise themselves with the topic, the aims and the structure of 
the process. The main consideration on this meeting is not immersing themselves in the 
topic but rather getting sensitised to social issues arising in connection with it. In the 
course of this phase, the members of the panel are presented with the topic and perceive 
how the problem is connected to the dimension which is the most obvious and easiest for 
them to interpret, i.e. their own everyday life. This connection with the tangible reality is 
supposed to be enhanced through the information material. For instance, the preparatory 
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material of the Meeting of Minds contained various personalised case studies, as shown 
by the following extract: 
 
“The story 
Happy? I am incredibly happy! I passed my exams. Not simply passed. I got a first with distinction! 
Now I am sure to get my scholarship for next year. The other candidates are miles behind me. And yet 
something is bothering me. I had a very difficult time during the exam period. I had problems 
concentrating and was often tired – very tired. I resorted to taking pills. The medication allowed me to 
continue studying, sometimes for the entire night. I was able to absorb the material better than I ever could 
before. No-one noticed a thing, neither the professors nor my friends. I feel a bit like a top athlete who has 
taken performance-enhancing drugs. I am standing on the winner’s podium, but in the back of mind, I 
am haunted by the thought: ‘I hope no one finds out that I have cheated.’ 
 
The facts 
While it is perhaps not a direct aim to develop medication to improve ourselves, it is likely 
that drugs created to treat illness will also be able to enhance our natural abilities. 
Medication to treat Alzheimer‘s disease is likely to improve considerably normal memory 
function as well. Stimulating medicines, now used to treat children with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, also increase the ability of the ‘normal’ brain to concentrate (...). 
One‘s emotional state can also be improved. The new generation of pharmaceutical drugs 
to treat depression also have an effect on people who do not suffer from depression: 
people who take them are less concerned with small everyday worries and live life more 
optimistically and with more confidence. Instead of being used for therapy, these drugs 
might one day be employed for enhancing the normal body, brain and psyche (Slob & 
Rondia & Raeymakers, 2005, Wp., p. 27-28).” 
 
After a few weeks following the introductory meeting, it is time for a new phase of the 
process, the preparatory meeting, when the participants narrow down the topic to specific 
issues and areas they find interesting. They formulate questions for the expert panel about 
those specific areas which they are to ask them at the next meeting, the conference. It is 
worth noting that the experts are very often present even at this phase of the process, in 
order to help with formulating the relevant questions and to answer questions arising 
during the panel discussions.  
 
The conference is a meeting open to the public, the media and the audience as well, based 
on the dialogue among the parties engaged in the particular topic, i.e. the experts and the 
members of the panel. The experts present their views on the basis of the questions and 
topics specified by the citizens beforehand, then their presentations are followed by a 
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discussion which allows the citizens to get a balanced view of the topic and form their 
own viewpoints. Afterwards, the part open to the public is finished, the participants 
withdraw in order to draw up their recommendations, which must be based on 
consensus. This closing report will be submitted to politicians and presented to the 
engaged parties following the conference.  
 
Figure 3 shows the structure of the Meeting of Minds. It can be seen that the structure of 
its process is very similar to that of the Consensus Conference. Focussing on the 
differences, however, it is worth emphasising that the process was complemented with 
the dialogue of the national and the international levels. 
 
The Meeting of Minds consisted of five meetings, whose three national phases were in 
essence identical to the attributes of the Consensus Conference mentioned above. 
However, there were European meetings wedged in between the national meetings, where 
the members of the panels discussed the problems raised by brain science not only with 
their own compatriots but with citizens from other countries as well. 
 
It means that the introductory meeting was followed by a European Meeting, where 
citizens had simultaneous interpreting at their disposal helping them to discuss the issues 
they were interested in. Due to this facilitating environment, they were able to jointly 
elaborate the topics that served as a basis for the next step in the deliberative process.  
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Figure 3. The Structure of the Meeting of Minds (MoM, 2005A) 
 
The subsequent two meetings were national meetings, not significantly different from the 
traditional method of the Consensus Conference. Accordingly, by the end of the second 
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national meeting, all the groups of the nine countries laid down their own 
recommendations, which they subsequently handed over to their own parliaments. 
 
This was not the end of the process, however, as the participants met up again to discuss 
their recommendations at the European level as well and to draw up a common final 
report containing the recommendations of the European panel. This step made the 
process international and European as the final report is more than the summary of 
national recommendations. It was created by the members of the various nations together 
in a joint discussion process.   
 
At the very end of the process the so-called Policy Advice Workshops were held, where 
the decision-makers and the professionals were informed about the recommendations 
and the methodology of the project.  
 
Topics for the Meeting of Minds programme 
 
At the end of the passage describing the project a short account is given of the topics 
defined by the citizens. The topics that provided the backbone of the discussion process 
were defined at the 1st European Meeting, where a large number of other problems and 
issues were raised. The topics were arranged in a common list and the participants voted 
for the ones that were considered to be the most important and interesting for them.  
 
At the 2nd National Meeting and the 2nd European Meeting the six groups of topics the 
citizens judged to be the most important determined the direction the discussions was 
taking. The topics under discussion were as follows (MoM, 2006, p. 12):  
 
- Regulation and Control:  
In this case participants focus on identifying what areas would need to be regulated 
or rather where the boundaries of control are and as such what should be 
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regulated by society and what should be within the decision-making competence of 
the individual or family.  
 
- Normality vs. diversity:  
The main point of this topic was the question as to where one could say is the limit 
of normality. If the concept of normality is fixed and drug treatment is deemed to 
be necessary in the case of any deviance from it, there might be a risk that diversity 
used in a positive sense will be oppressed in our societies. 
 
- Public information:  
Citizens were discussing what can or could be thought to be an objective source of 
information, and what are the areas the general public should be informed about at 
all costs.  
 
- Equal Access to Treatment:  
The central issue was a little bit extended to the issue of health care as a whole and 
the question of social position when it affected equality in terms of access to 
medical treatment and also the question of how this situation can be alleviated. 
 
- Freedom of Choice 
The central issue here was the doctor-patient relationship, namely, how to ensure 
the access to the necessary information for the client so that he/she could make a 
free choice from among the possible treatments.   
 
- Pressure from Economic Interests: 
The title is self-explanatory. The discussions regarding this issue questioned the 
role of economic interests in setting the aims of research. There were heated 
debates especially about the differences in interests between the health industry, 





The description of the Meeting of Minds project will only be complete if there is at least a 
short reference to the citizens’ most important recommendations. It is worth noting, 
however, that the final report produced at the closing of the project is more than one 
hundred pages that presents in great detail the issues raised and the detailed 
recommendations broken down by topics. The description and analysis of this final report 
would deserve an independent study. This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper 
and, instead, there is a brief account given of the most important recommendations 
produced by the citizens:  
 
The citizens considered the following issues important: 
 
- Improvement of the ethical regulations of research.  
- The acceptance of diversity instead of a narrow and excluding concept of 
‘normality’ which is dependent on the historical situation and social position. 
- Providing access to information on the latest achievements in brain science, 
dilemmas and ethical issues to the general public on an ongoing basis  
- Supporting alternatives to drug treatments and prevention. 
- Clarifying the question of resource allocation in health care, which is linked to the 
previous recommendation as very often alternative treatments are cheaper than 
expensive procedures promoted by powerful lobbies.   
- Promoting the practice of informed agreement in the doctor-patient relationship. 
 
In the following passage the theoretical framework of Habermas and the ANT are used to 
interpret the Meeting of Minds. Habermas’s model of ideal speech situation is especially 
important in order to understand what kind of communication situation the organisers 
aimed to create. On the other hand, the laboratisation concept of the ANT presents the 
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process and tools of creating and maintaining socio-technical situations. This theoretical 
framework will be used for the analysis of the Meeting of Minds.  
 
2.3. The Meeting of Minds as a laboratory 
 
In the next passage an approach attempting to grasp the complex interrelationships 
between science, technology and society will be described. This approach can be 
described by introducing the concept of laboratisation of ANT. The concept can be 
illustrated through three interrelated examples. It may be worth mentioning that the term 
laboratisation is only explicitly used in the first, the Pasteur example (Latour, 1983). 
Nevertheless, all three examples can be closely related to laboratories and the creation of 
ideal conditions in an ‘imperfect world’. So, while using Latour’s term ‘laboratisation’ 
(Latour, 1983) I both draw on his work and expand the concept so as to encompass all 
the important aspects needed for the analysis of the MoM process.  
 
Firstly, Latour uses Pasteur as an example to illustrate how the complexity of reality is 
converted in a laboratory and how laboratory processes shift between micro and macro 
spheres. This approach is going to be especially significant in understanding how aspects 
of social reality are modelled in the MoM and how the project shifts between various 
levels of government (local, national and European). 
 
Secondly, Latour in another example introduces the idea of mobilising the world by 
describing the work of soil scientists at Amazon Rainforest (Latour, 1999B). Latour is 
particularly interested in the question of how the things (soil samples) are translated into 
signs (sophisticated data and diagram) and eventually into a text in academic literature. 
The example is not only very interesting because Latour illustrates how scientists 
transform the chaotic features of the rainforest into an ordered and transparent laboratory 
but it also shows how local and context-dependent matter becomes universal immaterial 
knowledge. In a similar fashion, in the MoM process the way through which individual 
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viewpoints ‘aggregated into’ a European Final Report is full of ‘translations’. In other 
words, there were a set of mechanisms incorporated in the process which transformed 
and translated local, context-dependent and individual opinions to a European and 
collective set of ‘semi-official’ statements. 
 
Thirdly, Callon (Callon, 1999A) gives an example of the construction of a clear market 
situation. The case study presented by him highlights what kinds of tools (human and 
non-human alike) are needed to ensure the ideal conditions for the process. Following 
this logic, the analysis examines what kind of tools might be required to fix the conditions 
of the ideal speech situation. There is another issue raised by Callon’s example and that is 
the issue of identity. In other words, this example suggests that the construction of the 
clear market situation presupposes a certain type of actor who is committed to his own 
interests and maximising his benefits. In the course of the analysis of the MoM, I will 
reflect on this issue, that is, what kind of identity construction is necessary for the project. 
 
Habermas and the ‘ideal speech situation’ 
 
Before starting the actual discussion of laboratisation, it is important to mention that the 
MoM process draws on Habermas’ idea of ‘ideal speech situation’ (Habermas, 1998, Wp.). 
This concept itself is anchored in Habermas’ concept of lifeworld (Habermas, 1985). For 
Habermas, lifeworld is the scene of everyday communication among people in which and 
through which the members of society create their everyday social reality. People meet 
and discuss the issues they are interested or involved in. Accordingly, the basic logic of 
the lifeworld is the pursuit of mutual understanding between members of society. Actors 
do not try to dominate or to delude each other but strive to understand each other and 
reach consensus in contentious matters. However, even Habermas accepted that this type 
of human behaviour cannot be considered typical even though it had become more and 
more common and institutionalised in the course of history. This is the reason why later 
he strives to define this ideal speech situation in his later papers on language philosophy.  
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“Thus the rational acceptability of a statement ultimately rests on reasons in conjunction 
with specific features of the process of argumentation itself. The four most important 
features are: (i) that nobody who could make a relevant contribution may be excluded; 
(ii) that all participants are granted an equal opportunity to make contributions; (iii) that 
the participants must mean what they say; and (iv) that communication must be freed 
from external and internal coercion so that the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ stances that participants adopt 
on criticizable validity claims are motivated solely by the rational force of the better 
reasons.  
 
If everyone who engages in argumentation must make at least these pragmatic 
presuppositions, then in virtue of (i) the public character of practical discourses and the 
inclusion of all concerned and (ii) the equal communicative rights of all participants, only 
reasons that give equal weight to the interests and evaluative orientations of everybody 
can influence the outcome of practical discourses; and because of the absence of (iii) 
deception and (iv) coercion, nothing but reasons can tip the balance in favor of the 
acceptance of a controversial norm. Finally, on the assumption that participants 
reciprocally impute an orientation to communicative agreement to one another, this 
‘uncoerced’ acceptance can only occur ‘jointly’ or collectively (Habermas, 1998, Wp).” 
 
In accordance with the excerpt above, it is possible to define the following preconditions 
of the ideal speech situation. 
 
1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.  
2a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.  
2b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.  
2c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.  
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as 
laid down in (1) and (2). (Georgetown, 2006, Wp.)  
 
These conditions ensure that each individual participating in a discourse can ask for and is 
granted the opportunity to speak and can freely express him or herself. Under these 
conditions, according to Habermas, the best arguments which are formed in the course of 
communication will prevail instead of the power games behind the discourse.19 In the 
19 Lakeland (Lakeland, 1993, Wp.) describes ideal speech situation in one of his articles as follows: 
„For Habermas, the attempt to communicate directly with other human beings rests on a set of mutual 
assumptions: there is something comprehensible to be heard; the speaker is sincere; the speaker seeks 
truth; the hearer will listen; and so on. Even someone who attempts to deceive another can only hope to 
do so because the hearer will assume the speaker is acting according to the rules of open communication. 
Thus, the communication community is oriented in principle towards the ideal speech situation, that is, a 
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analytical section I will show that the MoM project can be understood as a complex 
laboratory where the organisers strived to create and stabilise the conditions of the ’ideal 
speech’. 
 
However, before moving on, it is important to reflect on the fact that both Habermas’ 
ideal speech situation and the participatory processes based on it are widely criticised by 
various scholars. In the analytical section the main focus will be on the question of how 
the conditions of ideal speech situation are constructed by different means and less on the 
appropriateness of Habermas’ idea.  
 
However, I shall discuss the main critical points of Habermas’ model here briefly. Since 
the debate between different theoretical standpoints is manifold and complex, I will but 
reflect on the main critical points of this concept here. Drawing on the works of 
Dahlberg, Dryzek, Mouffe and Young (Dahlberg, 2005; Dryzek, 2005; Mouffe, 2000, 
Wp.; Young, 2001), these main critical points are the exclusion of non-rationalist 
arguments from the discussion, the question of power in the discourse and the question 
of consensus  
 
So, one of the most significant critical points of Habermas’ concept is that it excludes 
aesthetic-affective modes of communication from the discourse and hence certain groups’ 
voices. The ideal speech situation described above posits a reflexive, impartial, reasoned 
exchange of validity claims where only the better argument ‘wins out’. This particular 
rationalist form of discourse encourages accuracy, logical expression of ideas, coherence, 
and a dispassionate contestation of opinion (Dahlberg, 2005). This is a style of 
context of distortion-free discourse in which all have equal access to the conversation, and all seek 
consensus on norms for action. Though such an ideal speech situation may never exist, it operates 
regulatively to draw communication onward. And what is assumed about the importance of truthfulness 
and sincerity, and about the dignity of other speakers and hearers, makes communication, which is after all 
the fundamental structure of human sociality, intrinsically emancipatory. The pathologies of personal, 
communal, and political life become interpretable in terms of systematically distorted communication, and 
overcoming them becomes a matter of restoring the contexts in which communicative praxis can occur 
(Lakeland, 1993, Wp.).” 
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communication valorised within modern Western philosophy and academic style or, to 
put it more bluntly, it is a style of a ‘gentlemen’s club’. So, rationalist style is defined 
against and to the exclusion of other styles like aesthetic-affective styles which are 
considered non-rational, and in this way it can be called elitist since it prefers one style of 
communication over others (Dahlberg, 2005; Mouffe, 2000, 2002). Because this type of 
communication is characteristic of members of higher classes, preferring this mode of 
discussion creates an unbalance between people with differing social status (Young, 
2001). As this unbalance both stems from and creates new inequalities of power relations, 
this criticism of exclusion can be clearly related to the second critical remark, the question 
of power. 
 
The second main critical point usually associated with the ‘ideal speech situation’ is about 
the assumption that power can be separated from public discourse. Critics of Habermas 
argue that this image of power masks exclusion and domination. It seems that Habermas 
conceives the operation of power as negative, transparent and capable of being removed 
from communication. This conception of power presupposes that in the process of 
communication insincerity, manipulation, coercion, domination can be exposed and 
summarily removed and hence understanding achieved (Dahlberg, 2005). According to 
critics, this idea of power is naïve at best given that power cannot be fully identified and 
removed from discourse (Mouffe, 2000), and it acts positively (to constitute subjects) as 
well as negatively (to exclude others). This critical remark is related to the third one which 
stresses that because power is an inherent characteristic of public discourse, any attempt 
to reach consensus will always favour those who have more power. 
 
So, thirdly, the critics of Habermas argue that the promotion of consensus as the purpose 
of deliberation marginalises voices that are not ready to agree. Mouffe for example 
criticises those democratic theories which do promote consensus without adequately 
considering confrontation between strong ideological positions. She argues that there can 
never be a true consensus in our ‘imperfect’ societies since power cannot be separated 
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from communication. As a consequence, distortions in everyday communication will lead 
to false consensus (Mouffe, 2000, 2002; Elam & Bertilisson, 2003). 
 
“Consensus in a liberal democratic society is – and always will be – the expression of a 
hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. The frontier that it establishes 
between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one, and for that reason it should 
remain contestable. To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to present the 
frontier as dictated by rationality and morality, is to naturalize what should be perceived 
as a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of ‘the people’ through a particular 
regime of inclusion-exclusion (Mouffe, quoted by Elam and Bertilisson, 2003, p. 244).” 
 
According to Mouffe, the idea of political questions susceptible to being decided 
rationally, and in accordance with an impartial standpoint that is equally in the interest of 
all, speaks against the cultural logics of democratic politics. It abstracts ‘the political’ out 
of politics, leaving us in a realm of universal human equality that suggests that there could 
be a ‘democracy of mankind’, when in practice there can only ever be a ‘democracy for ‘a 
people’ (Mouffe, 2000; Elam and Bertilisson, 2003, p. 244). Mouffe does not reject the 
need for degrees of consensus in political life, yet she emphasises that this consensus will 
and also should always remain of a conflictual and contestable nature. 
 
As the reader will be able to see, these issues will come back in the analytical section, 
especially the questions of power and of styles of communication. The role facilitators, 
interpreters and the whole setting played in the process showed that power (framing and 
channelling) the discussion is an inherent aspect of a situation. This is the case even if the 
process is intended to operate according to the preconditions of Habermas’ ideal speech 
situation. These preconditions cannot just emerge but need various means, tools and 
steering in order to work in a more or less appropriate manner.  
 
As far as consensus is concerned, it is important to mention that the Steering Committee 
of the MoM decided against a process whose results would be based on consensus 
possibly for the very reasons outlined above. However, the final report has the 
appearance of a text based on consensus and there is no indication of dissent. The 
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ANT argues that science, technology and society are inseparable from the world 
surrounding us. They are inseparable to such an extent that they were constructed 
together and in the course of socio-technological changes they have been intertwined to 
such a degree that the elements of science, technology and society cannot be placed into 
their own little theoretical boxes, such as social, scientific or technical, even with the 
benefit of hindsight. This could be demonstrated by the concept of laboratisation. 
 
Latour uses Pasteur’s example to explain that although laboratory research is often seen as 
work in an ivory tower producing pure, scientific facts unaffected by society, social 
dimension is a part of this job from the very beginning (Latour, 1983; 1988). On the other 
hand, the laboratory is also the place where the very substance of society is modified and 
restructured.  
 
Thus, society is part of the scientific research procedure conducted in the laboratory but 
society also undergoes modifications in line with the models developed in the laboratory, 
a process which is called laboratisation by Callon and Latour (Callon, 1999B; Latour, 
1988). This duality, instead of simple causality explaining change in one element by 
dependence on the other, suggests a dynamic interaction between social and laboratory 
practices.  
 
Latour expounds in his Pasteurisation of France how French animal husbandry was inflicted 
by a horrible epidemic, Anthrax in Pasteur’s time. In order to bring the spreading of the 
disease under control, Pasteur created a network made up of farmers, microbes, 
63
laboratory practices and farms. He solved the problem through a series of steps which are 
as follows: 
 















First of all, Pasteur left his sterile laboratory in Paris to join the unclean world of 
stockbreeders in the country. He spent his days with the stockbreeders so as to 
understand their life and everyday activities. Then, he took this knowledge and the 
samples taken at the key locations of the farms back to his laboratory. Due to his 
observation of the farmers’ life, he managed to translate the activities on and operation of 
the farms into the language and practice of the laboratory.  
 
Pasteur then got down to modelling the outbreak of the epidemic on a much smaller 
scale. The fact that he reduced the operation on the farms to micro processes „reversing 
the scale”, as Latour put it, had two advantages. On the one hand, laboratory practices 


























reactions to changes in the various physical environments readable. On the other hand, it 
was possible to cause the outbreak of the epidemics on any number of occasions on this 
‘laboratory farm’, which allowed researchers to manipulate time. In other words, time 
became their friend. While in real life, it would have taken an enormous amount of time 
for the epidemic to come to an end, within the walls of the laboratory it was possible to 
observe the whole process in a few days and register changes in petri dishes.  
 
This modelling allowed Pasteur to identify the weak points of the microbes and find out 
how they could be weakened to the point where they became suitable for vaccination. 
French scientists, in turn, had to convert farms into laboratories, that is, they had to 
create those conditions in the stock-yard which allowed reversing the balance of forces in 
the laboratories. This meant that the technological procedure of vaccination could only be 
successful if the conditions in the stock-yard were the same as in the laboratory. 
 
The conclusion to be drawn from this example, says Latour, is that scientific facts are in a 
sense not universal but rather resemble trains which cannot get off the tracks. Just as 
trains are inert if they are derailed, scientific facts are only true under certain specified 
conditions. If the hierarchy of forces prevailing in the laboratory are not guaranteed, then 
they are not „valid”, not universal and simply do not work. Using Latour own words: 
 
“The specificity of science (…) is in the special construction of laboratories in a manner 
which reverses the scale of phenomena so as to make things readable, and then accelerate the 
frequency of trials, allowing many mistakes to be made and registered. (…) 
 
…there is no outside of laboratories. The best thing one can do is to extend to other 
places the ‘hierarchy of forces’ that was once favourable inside the laboratory [emphasis 
added by G.K] (Latour, 1983, p. 165).” 
 
The end of the story is that Pasteur managed to overcome the epidemic. To win this 
battle, stockbreeders had to be „tamed” so that the scientist could change the structure of 
farms according to the „reality-model” constructed in the laboratory. The victory over the 
Anthrax epidemic convinced politicians and the hygienic movement, which was started at 
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the time, to transfer the „idea” of laboratory to other spheres, which led to dramatic 
changes in social and political life. Pasteur and his microbes increased the population of 
France and made it healthier; allowed the colonisation of tropical countries, which until 
then was prevented by grave tropical diseases; and created new industries. France was 
pasteurised, says Latour. The microbiological laboratory is „one of the few places where 
the very composition of the social context has been metamorphosed (ibid. p. 158).” 
 
This example clearly illustrates how a scientific practice became the technological process 
of vaccination and also how the laboratory shifts between the outside and the inside. Both 
science and technology include the relationships of certain forces and actors of the 
outside world. However, it can still be a model only because the world is too complex to 
be described with a simple formula. Consequently, the laboratory has to fix the conditions 
modelled inside in the outside world as well if it wants its products to work. In other 
words, it has to describe the constellation of the forces which are favourable for both 
technological means and technological processes.  
 
In another example, Latour describes a similar story in the case of contemporary scientists 
but focusing more on the question of how things become signs and how ‘local’ becomes 
‘universal’. He joined a group of scientists visiting the Amazon Rainforest to observe how 
a botanical mystery is investigated at the edge of the rainforest. Several small trees that 
usually grow only in the savannah around the forest had been found a few metres inside 
the wood. This phenomena instigated a debate on whether this was a sign that the forest 
was advancing (the tree was a scout) or retreating (the tree was left over by a shrinking 
forest) (Latour, 1999B; Boulton, Wp.). Latour follows the way of soil samples from their 
position at the edge of the Amazonian jungle to their eventual resting place in the 
academic literature (Szabari, 2005, p. 34-37).  
 
In his description, after arriving to the scene, the scientists divided the area into 
numbered squares with labels on them rendering, or using Latour’s expression, translating 
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the complex world of the rainforest into a clearer and less messy collection of trees and 
plants (Szabari, 2005, p. 34). After this, they took samples of the leaves and soil; 
numbered them so as to link all samples to their particular square respectively. Then the 
soil samples are placed into a briefcase-sized grid called pedocomparator mimicking the 
square structure of the area (Hoakster, Wp.). Soil samples from adjacent sites were placed 
next to each other in the boxes making the pattern of change in soil type visible and 
transparent. This translation enabled the comparison of samples and the representation of 
a large area of soil in a small and closed space provided by the pedocomparator.  
 
The ‘soil’ has certainly undergone specific transformations on its way to the comparator. 
It is still the same soil but it has been selected and acted upon. The pedocomparator then 
brings to the fore certain properties of the soil so as to make comparison possible. It is 
also important to stress that each stage of these translations stands for a rupture between 
the ‘thing’ and the ‘sign’ through step by step modification, transformation and in a way 
by recreating the matter into an altered, less tangible substance. Translation, therefore, is 
not a simple switch between different ‘vocabularies’. As Latour describes it: 
 
“Translation does not mean a shift from one vocabulary to another, from one French 
word to one English word, for instance, as if the two languages existed independently. I 
used translation to mean displacement, drift, invention, mediation, the creation of a link 
that did not exist before and that to some degree modifies the original two (Latour, 
1999B, p. 179)”. 
 
In line with this, through another translation, that is, through the process of inscription, 
the soil samples become data and figures in a single diagram representing all that has been 
found out about the rain forest. Although its connection to the living environment of the 
Amazon Basin forest/savannah interface could not be easily identified, it is possible to 
trace back the research process, through tables, grids, discussions and recreate the original 




”When the researchers divide the area into numbered squares it is by the means of the 
forms made by the science of geometry and arithmetic. When the researchers collect 
samples of the foliage and the soil, the leaves and the lumps of soil are not just leaves and 
earth. They have taken on the form given to them by the researchers. They have taken on 
significance beyond being just leaves or pieces of earth - they have become 
representatives of some part of the area. They re-present the forest and the lumps of 
earth and the leaves can again be re-presented in the graphic table and the graphic table 
can be re-presented by descriptions in texts, etc. (Hoastaker, Wp.)” 
 
On the one hand, this chain of translations reduced the complexity of the reality of 
rainforest leaving aside all its rich contextuality, locality, particularity and all extraneous 
information (such as the alkalinity or acidity of the soil). One the other hand, the soil is 
not only reduced but at the same time received new properties allowing it to better fit in 
with pre-existing scientific systems (Garraway & Technikon, Wp.). In this fashion, certain 
properties of the soil are amplified and concretised placing the soil more in the field of 
science than it was in the forest. Therefore, the process of successive transformation takes 
away certain properties (reduction) of the soil and at the same time gives properties to it 
(amplification) (Garraway & Technikon, Wp.). However, these additional properties 
render the soil more compatible with already existing systems of scientific knowledge. As 
a consequence, the soil becomes more cosmopolitan than local, more sign than matter. 
 
To sum it up, the pedocomparator made it possible for the scientists to assess the 
qualities of the soil at a glance and it made possible to produce a graphical representation 
of the soil in the area. At a later date soil samples in the pedocomparator were moved to a 
laboratory in Paris for further analysis and the results entered the scientific literature in 
the form of reports and papers. Once the soil samples have ‘become’ signs, they can be 
transmitted and reproduced with ease (Latour, 1999B, p. 54), transforming and mobilizing 
the complex reality of a rainforest to a database which can be investigated and analysed 
anywhere in the world. 
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Apart from the process through which things were transformed into signs, the local and 
context-dependent soil samples became universal knowledge, ‘certainty’ although in a 
local milieu this might not have been the case. One example of this move from uncertain 
to certain, described by Latour, is when two scientists rubbed the soil in their hands with 
spit in an attempt to mould it. They did this in order to determine the characteristics of 
the soil whether it was sandy-clay or clayey sand. “Lacking any kind of gauge, Armand 
and Rene rely on a back-and-fourth discussion on their judgement of taste, as my father 




























went on back and forth whether it is sand with a little clay in it or just the opposite. Once 
the scientists made the decision they gave a code to the sample. This code no longer 
pointed to the uncertainty in the process. This code was just a sign at the end with no 
reference to the process of determination (Boulton, Wp.). 
 
All in all, Latour argues that through the process of mobilisation discussed above the 
outside world is brought into the laboratory. But in the course of doing this scientists are 
obliged to engage themselves in a range of often technically demanding labours designed 
to render the natural world suitable for the ordeals of modern scientific practice 
(Garraway & Technikon, Wp.). Latour argues that scientists must construct, name and 
mobilise the worlds they appear merely to observe.  
 
Last but not least, Callon’s (Callon, 1999A) example regarding the pure market situation 
highlights other aspects of laboratisation. It does not follow the complex interactions 
between the outside world and the laboratory but identifies what human and non-human 
elements are required to insure ideal market conditions. At the end of the case study 
Callon reflects on the construct of ’homo economicus’, that is, on the fact that conditions 
’reinforced’ by objects and humans determine the identity and behaviour of participants 
in a given situation. 
 
Consequently, in his case study Actor-network theory – the market test Callon focuses his 
research not on the laws of science or engineering but on the axioms of a social science, 
to be more precise, on those of economics. According to Callon, the market is not 
something given but constructed through various processes. But how can we define the 
market? Callon uses Guesnerie’s definition, which perceives the market as a means of 
coordination where:  
 
a) the agents pursue their own interests and to this end perform economic 
calculations which can be seen as an operation of and/or maximization;  
b) the agents generally have divergent interests, which leads them to engage in 
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c) transactions which resolve the conflict by defining a price (ibid. p. 183) 
 
This type of definition emphasises the significant elements of the neoclassical theory of 
economics. Above all, however, it underlines the rational attributes of the main actors, 
that is, the fact that actors make calculations in order to increase profits. In addition, the 
above definition regards actors as those who do not know each other and emerge from 
the mutual unknown just for moments and sink back into the unknown after concluding 
the contract. However, to ensure the markets coordinating role it is insufficient if 
anonymous, rational actors constitute the world. For rational actors to make rational 
decisions, they need information on the possible states of the world. Namely,  
 
„…if market co-ordination is to succeed, there have to be not only calculative agents but 
also agents with information on all the possible states of the world, on the nature of the 
actions which can be undertaken and on the consequences of these different actions, 
once they have been undertaken (Callon, 1999A, p. 184).”20 
 
But according to Callon, the market is not a given fact or a natural phenomena but a 
construction of various means and processes. He bases his argument on a study written 
by Marie-France Garcia, an anthropologist of economy in order to present the process 
which constructs the market’s mechanism of coordination and its rational actors. 
According to the study, the table strawberry market was radically changed in the region of 
Sologne, France in the early 80’s. This change led to the construction of a pure market 
whose attributes fulfilled the conditions described in textbooks. They were as follows: the 
perfectly qualified product, an easy to follow supply and demand relationship and an 
arrangement of transactions which made equilibrium price possible. 
 
20 The proponents of the neoclassical theory were also aware of the fact that it is more an exception than a 
rule for the above conditions to be met, therefore, they produce different answers to the questions of how 
the actors can make more or less rational decisions if they do not possess sufficient information about the 
future. It is not possible to give an account of all these answers here as they are not closely linked to the 
subject of this paper, so I would prefer to go on to Callon’s case study, which seeks an answer to the 
question of what can ensure that the above conditions are met. 
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Garcia analysed all investments which could provide a framework for the construction of 
the market. These investments are demonstrated in Figure 6. Firstly, material investments 
were required, says Callon, for example the construction of a warehouse which had room 
for all the suppliers of the countryside. Due to this development, impersonal transactions 
replaced those transactions which lacked coordination and were based on the personal 
relationships of suppliers and distributors. The impersonal transactions were carried out 
in a warehouse which was built solely for this purpose. 
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The suppliers transported their product daily packed in baskets, and exhibited it in 
batches. Every batch displayed had a corresponding data sheet attached to it which was 
handed over to the auctioneer immediately. The auctioneer entered the data into the 
computer and prepared a catalogue for the customers. Next, the suppliers went into the 
auction hall which was designed in a way which prevented the suppliers and customers 
from seeing each other but everybody could see the auctioneer and the screen which 
displayed the prices. The display of strawberries in the warehouse and the catalogue 
helped the parties to obtain an accurate picture of the supply both in terms of quality and 
quantity. On top of that, the units in the warehouse were displayed close to each other, 
which highlighted the differences in quality and quantity between the suppliers. It served 
as a kind of feedback for the suppliers too, who, in this way, had the opportunity to 
compare their own products with those of their competitors. Earlier, when purchases 
were made on the farms of the producers individually, they had no chance to do so. 
 
All these various elements and means contributed to the framing of the transaction which 
excluded the network of personal contacts and established a framework where each entity 
was subject to the market forces. It was this framework which made calculation possible, 
the technique of degressive bidding, the display of transactions on screen, the 
classification of units of strawberries on the data sheet and knowledge of the domestic 
market – all those contributed to the calculability of the transactions. 
 
The case study above demonstrates how material elements and processes interact in the 
construction of the actor on the one hand, and in that of the social world on the other. 
According to Callon, the issue is not what is the essence of man, in other words, its real 
identity but rather how interaction between human and non-human elements defines a 
given identity. As it is, the homo economicus is neither a historical construct which is 
characteristic of a given era, nor the true nature of people but an element of a frame 
stabilised by material and social elements in order to create a pure market situation. 
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„This case provides an outstanding example in that it enables us to follow the birth of an 
organised market. Above all, it is the purest and most perfect example of market 
organization. The conclusion that can be drawn from it is extremely simple yet 
fundamental: yes homo economicus does exist, but is not an ahistorical reality. It does not 
describe the hidden nature of the human being. It is the result of a process of 
configuration, and the history of the strawberry market shows what this framing consists 
of. Of course it mobilizes material and metrological investments, but we should not 
forget the essential contribution of economics in performing the economy (Callon, 1999A, 
pp. 191-193).” 
 
Like Pasteur’s facts about the microbes, the last point of the excerpt refers to the fact that 
economics does not merely describe the operation of the market but plays an active role 
in its construction. Neither are the laws of economics universal since they are only true in 
very specific situations and under precisely defined circumstances. In the case study 
presented by Callon, the process of laboratisation can be found again, in the sense that it 
ensures the conditions of a social scientific model on reality through material elements in 
a well-defined enclosed space. Although all three examples convey the same massage they 
emphasise different aspects of laboratisation.  
 
Latour, in the example of the scientists conducting research on Amazon Rainforest, 
describes how the things (soil samples) are translated into signs (sophisticated data) and 
eventually into a text in academic literature (Latour, 1999B; Szabari, 2005). Following this 
example, the very process becomes traceable through which local and context-dependent 
matter becomes universal immaterial knowledge. In this process, which contains many 
contingent elements, the rainforest becomes a laboratory of small units of soil with labels 
on them. Taking samples from them and giving them codes is not just a technically 
demanding task but also makes things movable, transparent and comparable, that is, 
becomes the act of turning them into signs, data. 
 
Similarly, the example about Pasteur highlights the fact that scientific facts are not universal 
truths but rather models of the outside world which can be made universal if the hierarchy 
of forces characteristic at the micro level can be transferred to the macro level. Microbes 
function as vaccine only under those conditions which were defined by researchers in the 
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laboratory. Callon states that if we are to create such a system of conditions in the outside 
world, several objects, design guidelines and specific technology are required. They will 
provide the framework in which the model is operational. In other words, this framework 
will fix the previously given conditions. 
 
The Callon example is particularly interesting for another reason too, as it raises the 
question of identity in connection with the construction of ‘homo economicus’. In his 
opinion, human substance cannot be defined this way as it is the given framework which 
determines whether the actors’ behaviour makes it possible for them to pursue their own 
interests and gain maximum benefits. Other frameworks suppose other types of 
behaviour and identity. In one case, microbes caused epidemic, in another case they 
functioned as vaccine. Under certain conditions, people can behave as ‘homo 
economicus’, in other cases they are altruistic and self-sacrificing. Consequently, people, 
microbes, objects, technologies do not have a stable identity according to this theory, 
instead, the other elements in the network of interactions will determine their behaviour. 
In summary, the different aspects of laboratisation are as follows: 
 
1. Modelling social-natural processes (e.g. farms, epidemic) 
2. Fixing the balance of forces in the model through various means (technologies, 
objects, furniture, the interior set-up of buildings) 
3. Construction of identity (microbes as vaccine, farmers as ‘advocates of science’) 
4. Turning contingencies and the ‘local’ into a universal and decontextualised 
knowledge 
5. Translating the results into the social level (making facts ‘universal’, pasteurisation 
of France) 
 
The process of the MoM will be analysed along these five characteristics of laboratisation, 
underlining that the initiative can be regarded as a laboratory, that is, as a pre-constructed 
micro environment, in which the conditions of deliberation are fixed by the framework. 
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Modelling social-natural processes  
 
The models constructed in both the microbe example and the strawberry market example 
can be traced back to some other level. In the first case, French farms served as a basis 
for the model, in the second case, however, it was the axioms of economics and a model 
of the ideal state of the economy. In other words, in the first case laboratory processes 
were determined by the conditions observed in the world ,whereas in the second case it 
was a theoretical idea about the operation of the economy and the behaviour of the 
economic actors. 
 
In a sense, the MoM can be said to be a sort of mixture of the two processes. The basis 
for its model is provided by existing social phenomena and theoretical elements. The way 
people communicate on an ongoing basis, when they share their experience, plans, fears, 
in other words, their whole world with each other can be regarded as an existing social 
process. At the same time the basis of the model also comprises the abstract principles 
and conditions in the light of which Habermas defines the ideal speech situation.  
 
People discuss and dispute issues which interest and concern them as members of the 
family at home, or as citizens at a public hearing, or as members of any community, which 
is obviously a common and everyday phenomenon. In general, these discussions have an 
explicit and implicit part where partners in a dialogue define what kind of world and 
environment they want to live in, and what kind of values they are willing to internalise. 
In addition, they define what kind of possible future states they are worried about. In 
short, they share their experience, thoughts and opinions.  
 
This communicative act, in which human beings share their world with others, is usually 
performed in an informal manner without paying particular attention to it or making a 
special effort. The process aims to model this informal discussion, the discussion of 
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common issues. However, it is different from the unstructured everyday communication 
in that it focuses on a specific subject around which these discussions, debates, opinions 
range.  
From a different angle, this process corresponds to Habermas’ theory on the ideal speech 
situation.21 The most important attribute of the speech situation is that participants can 
enter into a communicative relationship without being restricted by power or any other 
disrupting elements. Anybody who has something to say about the issue can take part in 
the discussion without any threat of repercussion. Everyone has the right to question 
other people’s views but his/her opinion is also subject to criticism from the others.   
 
According to Habermas, decisions taken in this communicative situation are rational 
because the situation itself determines that the best arguments will prevail irrespective of 
the power relations outside the speech situation. It is not the subject of the present paper 
to judge whether Habermas’ idea is justified or not. In the following passage, it will be 
demonstrated what efforts were made to fix this ideal state with the help of various 
mechanisms, technologies and objects during the process. Prior to that, however, it 
should be examined what is happening in a deliberative laboratory or, better to say, what 
attributes of reality are enlarged and enhanced in this constellation. 
 
It could be seen in Latour’s example how Pasteur manipulated time in the laboratory. He 
subjected the microbes to various experiments, which would have taken a very long time 
in the reality of farms. Similar processes can be observed in the MoM initiative. Naturally, 
it does not mean that the organisers made experiments with the citizens subjecting them 
to various influences. Nevertheless, it is true that they accelerated the time which would 
have been needed for such a debate to spontaneously develop in social reality. 
 
21 It is worth noting that the idea of ideal speech situation, too, can be traced back to everyday, face-to-
face, uncoerced communication. However, it is not discussed here.  
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There is a chance that such a debate could take place in the public sphere over the years.22 
There are articles being published about brain research, neuro-degenerative and 
psychiatric diseases every week. If many people are concerned with this issue over the 
years, a debate could develop at a social level about possible solutions, directions of 
development and the values and ethical principles linked to research.  
 
In the MoM all this took place within a short period of time and its intensity was 
enhanced by the fact that citizens came across a huge number of articles, studies and a 
great deal of information. After the lectures given to them on the subject, they had the 
opportunity to ask the experts questions. All the information, which an average citizen 
could collect only over several years, was available to the participants during this process 
and they were given the opportunity to have discussions with each other and with the 
experts.   
 
Just as Pasteur was breeding microbes in a closed isolated environment and made the data 
on them visible and recordable, in this process personal discussions and debates became 
recordable and readable. Otherwise, these discussions and debates would have taken place 
in people’s private sphere and in everyday situations in life.  
 
Fixing the framework 
 
Callon’s example demonstrated the fact that in order to maintain a certain state in which 
participants behave in a predetermined way, a large number of objects, technologies, 
interior design principles have to be deployed. The case was similar in the MoM too. The 
greatest challenge was to find the constellation of means needed to maintain this type of 
situation where the habermasian conditions of the ideal speech situation are partly 
fulfilled. 
22 Naturally, it is true only at a national level, since we cannot yet speak about a real public sphere at the 
European level, so the development of a similar public debate cannot be expected.  
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Since the organisers utilised several participatory mechanisms during the project and it 
would be impossible to analyse them all, I have chosen the ‘carousel’ mechanism as one 
of the most important methods. The carousel was chosen because it can be considered to 
be one of the most innovative and unique mechanisms in the whole process. In the 
passage below, first the carousel procedure will be discussed, then the means needed to 
ensure that a dialogical situation be established on the basis of uncoercive, symmetrical 
communication.     
 
The carousel technique provided the opportunity of deliberation between national and 
between international panel members at the same time. The operation of the procedure is 
illustrated by the following figure: 
 




















There were about 40 citizens participating in the discussion on a particular topic in the 
carousel session. Members of all the nine country panels, two experts, support staff and 
observers helped to manage the process. Each carousel session was led by a lead 
facilitator with three or four support facilitators.  
 
The basic idea underlying the method was to ensure that each citizen could speak in their 
own language. The session consisted of three stages (MoM, 2006, p. 19-20): 
 
In the first stage of the mechanism citizens were sitting in small monolingual table groups. 
Each group had three to seven participants who all spoke the same language.23 It did not 
mean of course that fluent speakers of another language could not take part in the 
discussion at the table where that language was spoken if they wanted to.  
 
In the second stage tables delegated representatives to the central round table to continue 
the discussion. In different rounds, different members represented their group at the 
central table. Discussions were interpreted simultaneously into all the eight languages. 
  
The arrangement of the rooms is illustrated by Figure 7.. In each carousel there were nine 
small monolingual tables and a central round table set beforehand which was used only at 
certain stages of the session. The small tables were arranged in a circle around the central 
table so that it was easy to shift from group discussions to the discussion taking place at 
the central table (MoM 2006, p. 20 ). 
 
The third and final stage of the process was the plenary session where all the 126 
participants were present and were able to express their opinions about the 
recommendations. Thus, those who could not take part in the discussion of the given 
theme because they had been discussing another theme in another carousel now had the 
23 By no means does it mean that they were the citizens of the same nation, as the group at the Flemish 
and French table had Flemish speakers from the Netherlands and French speakers from Belgium as well.  
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opportunity to become involved in the plenary discussion. Again, simultaneous 
interpretation was provided so participants could directly follow the discussions (MoM, 
2006, p. 20). 
 
At the 2nd European Convention three carousel meetings were run simultaneously 
involving all the 126 participants (with about 40 people working in each carousel). The 
basic idea behind the carousel method was to prepare draft recommendations in the six 
themes they themselves had defined previously.24 Each carousel was assigned two of the 
six themes as their primary focus. Citizens could indicate before the Convention in which 
carousel they wanted to take part. Then, they worked in that carousel for the whole length 
of the Convention. 
 
As one can see, the arrangement of the sessions allowed each member to express his/her 
views and represent the opinion of his group both at the small national table and at an 
international level at the central table. The same principle governs the arrangement of the 
rooms which ensured the transparency of the process for the citizens on the one hand but 
also facilitated the shift from international to national dialogues and vice-versa during the 
process. 
 
There were several other means facilitating and framing citizens’ dialogues besides the 
arrangement of the rooms. Figure 8. below, completed with additional elements, shows 
what else was considered important for the situation and what is missing from the above 
figure used in official records. These ‘background elements’ will be analysed underneath.  
 
24 The six main themes of the discussion on brain science can be seen above. 
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Figure 8. ’Carousel’ complemented 
 
The facilitators were very important components of the process as they were the conductors 
of the dialogues. They did not compose the music of the discourse but helped it to be 
realised, to have the appropriate tempo and prevented certain musical instruments, that is, 
participants of various nationalities from dominating the joint production. In other words, 
facilitators were responsible for the time management of each theme and made sure that 
the dialogue did not turn into monologues unconnected with each other and the central 
theme.25 Also, they asked questions to guide discussions and from time to time rephrased 
and summarised the arguments with the help of rapporteurs (see below). 
25 The employment of the facilitators was a strategy consciously applied in order to maintain the 










All this would not have been possible without approximately sixty microphones, the same 
number of headsets and several hundred meters of cables. Technological transmission 
also meant that it was not possible for very many people to talk at the same time. 
Generally, there was one person who was speaking and elaborating on his thoughts while 
the others were listening to him with headsets on in their own language thanks to the 
interpreters, which, considering the fact that there were altogether forty people in the 
same room, was a remarkable performance.  
 
At first sight, interpreters do not seem to have played any important role in the process, 
apart from translating the participants’ utterances word by word and simultaneously. 
Luckily, I was present as a participant observer for the whole duration of the process, and 
at the 1st  European Convention I worked as a rapporteur at a table where there were 
Hungarian, Italian and British citizens. Thanks to this arrangement, I had the opportunity 
to hear both the original Hungarian opinions and views and their English versions. It 
became quite obvious that interpreters do a lot more than just translate. The interpreter is 
a special individual who makes a living from his/her language competence, whose stock-
in-trade is his clear, easy to understand style of speech.  
 
Habermas’ theory on uncoerced communication was heavily criticised because his 
critiques claimed that from the very first moment the partners start speaking in a 
communicative space the power relations and the social differences will be perceived. 
People belonging to different social class will have different accents, different language 
competences and different styles of argumentation, which are immediately decoded and 
power structures beyond the communicative space will start operating. 
 
etc.) There are unplanned influences in the process, too, such as the effect of interpretation on the 
interaction between the citizens (See below). 
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However, social differences are excluded from the process due to simultaneous 
interpretation. As it has been mentioned before, the interpreter makes a living from 
conveying the utterances of the speaker in a clear, articulate, intelligent and coherent way. 
Thus, the interpreters could not and probably would not convey regional accents or an 
overly simple mode of expression. They could not convey the incoherency of thoughts 
either, as they had to wait to see what the speaker in fact wanted to say, thus, what they 
interpreted was coherent and logical. The interpreters in simultaneous interpretation 
translated not just words and sentences, but they brought the different language 
competences to the same level by turning the restricted code into an elaborated code.26 
Consequently, differences in language competences disappeared and the power elements 
always inherent in communication became insignificant.  
 
As a result of technological transmission and simultaneous interpretation, the participants 
had to wait for what the others wanted to say without interrupting each other. If they had 
not done that no comprehensible conversation would have been possible. Interpreters 
would not have been able to interpret the line of thoughts uttered at the same time 
simultaneously. The process greatly benefited from international communication and the 
obstacles of technological transmission as they literally forced participants to establish a 
‘communication oriented towards understanding’ in the habermasian sense. All 
participants waited for their turn to come and to add something to what the others had 
said. Had it not been the case the whole discussion would have become an 
incomprehensible noise of monologues without any conclusions or other outcomes. 
 
In the process there was one additional staff member, the so called rapporteur who was 
taking notes of the main arguments and recorded the main points of the discussion. 
26 After studying the language usage of students in several schools in London in the 1950’s, Bernstein 
distinguished two main groups (or as he called them ‘codes’), the elaborated and the restricted ones. The 
restricted code uses concrete terms, the meaning is made implicit depending on the context. In contrast, 
the elaborate code is abstract, explicit, and independent of the context. Berstein explained the contrast 
with the difference between the modes of upbringing arising from two family types and social classes. In 
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These arguments and discussion points were input into the computer so they were 
immediately displayed on the screen, which all participants in the room could see. It 
contributed to the fact that the course of the debate and the direction of the arguments 
were easy to see and follow during the long and often exhausting sessions. Also, it 
allowed partners to revisit a point mentioned earlier without seriously impeding the 
course of the session. In summary, the work of the rapporteur and the display on the 
screen facilitated the transparency of the process. Since later the recommendations were 
drawn up on the basis of the rapporteurs’ notes, the participants were able to check 
whether the notes in fact expressed their points of view.   
 
The description and presentation of all these components are interesting not only because 
the background elements which help to maintain undistorted communication are 
highlighted but also because they make it obvious that the two seemingly contrasting 
theoretical trends, the habermasian trend and the ANT, obviously overlap in this process. 
The presentation of the above means emphasises the fact that constructing a situation in 
which the citizens involved are more or less one another’s equals and have the same 
chance of participating in the discourse is only possible if several means are used. 
 
The habermasian ideas of the ideal speech situation do not and cannot work ‘just by 
themselves’, for this a specific constellation of human and non-human elements are 
required. Some of these elements, such as the human (interpreters, facilitators) and non-
human ones (microphones, computers, beamer) did not merely transmit and facilitate 
communication, but also influenced its direction and process. A more precise explanation 
could be that their specific constellation allowed certain types of communication to be 
realised, for instance the struggle for understanding, while it hampered others (for 
example the practice of interrupting others).  
 
simple terms, the elaborate code is characteristic of the middle classes, while the restricted code belongs to 
the working class.  (Burke 2002) 
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The support staff and the technical devices did not have a merely auxiliary role, they 
constructed the framework for the dialogues of the participants, that is the framework 
which provided the scope for the realisation of the habermasian principles. The analysis 
above concludes that the discourse between equal parties must be very thoroughly 
prepared and its framework constructed through a multitude of means. Nevertheless, it is 
true that the complexity of the procedure is partly due to its international nature, still I 
would assume that these statements are valid even in a monolingual medium. 
 
The identity of the discourse situation 
 
The example of the strawberry market clearly indicated that the attributes of the 
individual striving for maximum benefits cannot be regarded as human essence, nor as a 
historical phenomenon. According to Callon, the homo economicus is a member of a 
network constituted from human and non-human elements, and this constellation 
inspires a certain type of behaviour. In this aspect, its identity is a construct. If we 
perceive the Meeting of Minds along these lines, we can ask what characterises the ideal 
participant envisioned by the organisers of the process. What kind of identity is 
constructed on the basis of the above mentioned conditions?  
 
At all events, it can be stated that he/she must be an open, freely responding individual 
who is interested in others’ opinion in order to participate in the process in a constructive 
way. He or she should be interested in new information and acquiring new experience as 
well as willing to understand others’ opinions, experience and thoughts. In summary, the 
process was designed for committed, politically active citizens who are willing to take part 
in social discussions and immerse themselves in a given theme so that their participation 
can be meaningful.  
 
However, this is not all as this whole programme has a distinctive international character 
which also supposes the kind of personality who is capable of coping with national 
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differences. The kind of personality who can find his or her way on an international 
platform, does not have difficulty in establishing contacts with people of other nations 
and is not afraid of negotiating in an international milieu.  
 
The attributes of a politically active, socially sensitive and international person are further 
enriched by the fact that the theme of the programme is brain science. On top of the 
above mentioned attributes, citizens should also be interested in science and technologies, 
especially in their social, environmental and health effects. The person who is politically 
active and freely moves in an international milieu and is interested in scientific themes can 
be called a post-national scientific citizen (Habermas, 1997, 2001; Delanty, 1995, 2000; Callon, 
1998B; Irwin, 1995, 2001; Barry, 2001; Tambini, 2001). Later chapters in the paper will 
deal with the concept in greater detail analysing its theoretical, political and social aspects 
respectively. In the following chapters, the thesis will at the same time touch upon the 
scientific and transnational character of the citizenship concept and the identity construct 
closely connected to the MoM project.  
 
Turning contingencies into knowledge 
 
When Mesman (Mol&Mesman, 1996) did fieldwork in a neonatal ward she was faced with 
difficulties as to how to grasp the essence of the innumerable pieces of information 
present and how to find the main thread which could lead her through the social, 
technical and emotional labyrinth called ‘hospital’. She decided that instead of trying to 
follow the actor (Callon, 1986, 1987; Latour 1987) she would follow the food prepared 
for the babies. This seemingly insignificant move helped her to find the ‘thread’ and by 
pursuing it helped her to reveal the hidden social, technical and power structures (Mol & 
Mesman, 1996). In line with this, in the example about the Amazon Rainforest, Latour 
followed the lumps of earth and leaves, that is, the samples thereby unfolding the process 
through which things became signs and uncertainty translated into certainty.  
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In this section I shall argue that the way through which individual viewpoints are 
‘aggregated into’ a final report of the MoM process is full of translations just like in 
Latour’s example when the soil and earth itself translated into codes, figures and data. 
These translations were mechanisms which transformed and translated local, context-
dependent and individual opinions to a European, collective set of official statements. To 
be able to disclose these translations, the train of thought of this section attempts to 
follow the way of ‘samples of opinion’ in the MoM process just as Latour followed the 
destiny of the soil samples and Mesman followed the trail of baby food. 
 
So this section will trace the way of citizens’ viewpoints and opinions through the process 
and unfold the sequence of translations by which these fragmented and divided 
perspectives have become a united European collection of statements. The following 
description is but an oversimplification of the process but can give the readers a general 
idea about how the procession and distillation of the ideas took place.  
 
Both organisers and participants knew that by the end of the process there should be 
something which is a clear and understandable expression of what the citizens think about 
brain science. But usually the man in the street does not really think about brain science 
except if she or he or a close relative suffering from a brain injury or has a brain disease. 
So, first and foremost, the most important task was to provide something about which 
panel members could form opinions and elaborate their own perspective.  
 
Consequently, the organisers of MoM involved brain scientists, resource persons and 
stakeholders to give input for the project and identify the main ethical dilemmas, 
problematic points and threats concerning brain science (Raeymaekers, Rondia & Slob, 
2004). Their perspectives and ideas provided inspiration and direction for scientific 
journalists who wrote a collection of fictional case studies. This ‘introductory material’ 
was then given to citizens who could read and process it and thereby understand what 
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stakes are in brain science and research. This was in the preliminary phase of the project 
so these steps are indicated with grey in Figure 9.  
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When the citizens arrived at the 1. European Convention they were ready to express their 
ideas about the case studies which they had already been discussing in a national context 
(see Figure 3.). As it has been described above, the opinions and thoughts of the citizens 
were translated by interpreters so they could understand each other in a multilingual 
situation. However, as it has also been indicated above, the interpreters did more than just 
translate, they also reformulated, processed and many times put the ideas of the citizens 
into a more coherent structure. Something is lost in translation (accents, traits of social 
class and incoherent speech) but something was also added (interpreters’ own style and 
language code). The effects of this everyday translation mechanism, now in a literary 
sense, may seem insignificant for those who work in multilingual environments but the 
very fact of translation deeply affected the discourse situation between citizens. Moreover, 
this interpretation was constant in the process so it exerted a profound impact all the way 
through. 
 
As it has already been shown, the rapporteurs also had special tasks since they were 
responsible for summarising and going over the main points discussed by the citizens. 
Using their computers and their communication skills, they also reformulated and 
logically rearranged the ideas expressed to grasp the essence of the debate. However, it is 
also true that from time to time they checked if the citizens were in agreement with the 
summary (in Figure 9. this feedback is represented by fragmented arrows). If they did, they 
sent it through an internal network to the Theme Team. The Theme Team then read 
through the summarised opinions and attempted to identify regularities and common 
points in them so as to create categories for voting.  
 
These categories then were projected onto a screen where all the panel members could 
see them and they could cast their votes for the ones which seemed important to them. 
So by the end of the 1st European Convention six themes were given the status 
‘significant’ although the number of themes were not fixed by the organisers in advance 
and therefore there was a contingency in this matter whether the upper limit should be 
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drawn at six, seven or eight themes. Nevertheless, the six topics, which this paper already 
introduced above, served as a basis for the further steps of the process both at national 
and at European levels. Ironically, the opinions expressed by individuals and discussed by 
groups were translated, processed, aggregated and distilled to such an extent that at the 
end the outcome resulted in slightly more than vague categories corresponding to the 
main problematic points articulated in the ‘Introductory material’. It also has to be said 
that the citizens had the right to express their dissatisfaction with the categories as they 
were projected onto the screen (this feedback is indicated by fragmented arrows) but 
either because they were content or unsure about the process they did not do that. So at 
this point of the process it seemed that despite all the different ‘translation mechanisms’ 
the citizens felt that their ideas were more or less well articulated and represented by the 
six themes.  
 
After this stage all the national panels left for their own countries and, using this 
categorisation, elaborated the national final reports. Of course these steps of the method 
were also quite significant and contained many important ‘translations’ but for the sake of 
simplicity I will not discuss the stages of this particular process. Instead, to cut a long 
story short, the description continues at the 2nd European Convention where the 
European panel met again to discuss the themes created and write a collection of 
European statements on brain science. The role of the interpreters and rapporteurs and 
the translations they made of the opinions have already been described. However, in the 
2nd Convention a new type of group was also formed partly by scientific journalists, partly 
by citizens in order to write the final report pertinent to the discussions among the panel 
members. These discussions were structured by the carousel method described above 
(Figure 7.). 
 
So, the citizens and the scientific journalists worked together in the writing groups to 
create a document through joint effort which would be both applicable as a policy 
document and would represent the ideas of the citizens. It should be noted that the 
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presence of scientific journalists also represents a translation since they guarded the 
coherence, structure and eloquence of the citizens’ discourse. But again this additional 
translation in the process did not cause any difficulty or discontent as far as citizens were 
concerned. The trouble in the 2nd European Convention started when the output of the 
working group was shown on a screen at a plenary session. It seemed that the translations 
in the process were just one step too many.  
 
Just as it has been mentioned above, translation, using the term in a Latourian sense, 
always changes something. Something is always lost but also added in translation. In any 
case, Latour emphasises that if there are too much changes those who are involved in a 
‘project’ tend to lose faith because they feel that they are not well treated and represented. 
For Latour it does not make a difference whether these ‘participants’ are human or 
nonhuman. In this fashion, Pasteur had to accurately represent both the French farmers 
and the microbes. If it had not happened, either the French farmers or the microbes 
would have rebelled against the ‘project’, or using a latourian expression, against the 
actor-network.  
 
In the case of MoM, just as in European history, the French started the revolution when 
one French citizen, who was formerly involved in the writing group, pointed out that the 
text in the screen was not the same as that which they had written together in a joint 
session. After that, several other citizens joined the chorus saying that the text had been 
changed significantly since they had edited and approved it. At the end, it turned out that 
the text would have to be rewritten and the citizens would not be granted the opportunity 
to give feedback on the final text just on the main points. It became clear that the 
scientific journalists were going to work on the final report even after the whole process. 
This instigated an expression of general dissatisfaction and doubt in the transparency of 
the whole process.  
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However, after a long discussion, the citizens decided that they would be willing to finish 
the process because, they argued, even if the process they had participated in so far was 
not flawless this could be a first step in the practice of European democracy based on 
citizens’ voices. So at the end, a common European final report was handed to European 
politicians in the next morning which did not contain reference to contingencies, hurdles 
or possible doubts about the process on the part of the citizens. The final report was 
written with clear structure, eloquence and style and possibly could represent a valuable 
policy input. The ‘rest’ is left out from this side of the equation.  
 
The lesson to be drawn from the story is that it was a long way leading from individual 
opinions to a European final report. However, this long way contained many steps where 
the opinion of the citizens were aggregated, condensed, distilled in order to create from a 
mass of diverse ideas a manageable discourse and finally a coherent and readable text. Just 
as scientists mobilised the rainforest in Latour’s example, the organisers of the process 
mobilised the ‘minds met’ of the participants to get the final results. Just as scientists have 
to meticulously select, order and transform the soil of the rainforest so as to render it 
compatible with larger super-systems of science, the diverse opinions and ideas of the 
participants also have to be translated step by step into a ‘semi-official’ document. Again, 
some aspects of these ideas were reduced, some aspects were amplified making the final 
text into a common European collection of statements. 
 
Nevertheless, there was also a point in the process where the citizens had to stand up for 
their rights because they felt that they were not represented and treated fairly. 
Translations thus cannot be done in an endless sequence. As Latour argues, if only one 
link in the chain of representation is questioned, then the relationship between 
representation and object, here the relationship between the participants’ ideas and the 
final report, crumbles. Although one of the most important goals of the process was to 
provide policy input, it seemed that the severe exertion for it resulted in too many steps 
93
of translation and the reduction of the complexity of ideas which harmed the 
transparency of the process in the eyes of the citizens. 
 
Translating the results into the social level  
 
If the conversion of the outcomes into the social level is considered, it is noticeable that 
Callon’s and Latour’s examples markedly differ from each other. In his example Callon 
referred to the construct of the laws of the market and that of the identity of ‘homo 
economicus’ to a very closely confined space: the strawberry market in Sologne. The laws 
of the market presented by him work only within a pre-defined framework which is 
sufficient for the process. There is no need to convert the market laws to a further level, 
as businesses are conducted at this level, in this space, so the ‘outcomes’ of the process 
are meaningful only within this framework. This approach can be characteristic of the 
MoM project as well. If its organisers and designers had only meant the initiative to be a 
‘social experiment’ where citizens had the opportunity to discuss brain science, then the 
outcomes are not necessarily expected to go beyond the framework of the experiment. In 
this case, however, the identity construct formed in the process is meaningful and valid 
only within the framework of the process.  
 
Latour’s example suggests a completely different approach. The outcomes of the process 
begun with the help of the microbes can be translated into the ‘macro’, that is, into the 
social level. Due to the spreading of vaccines, it was not only the behaviour of the 
microbes that had changed but the farms specialising in animal husbandry were changed 
and finally, the whole of France was ‘pasteurised’. In other words, the social structure of 
the macro-level was also deeply affected and changed by the outcomes of the process. 
Naturally, what was needed for that was the appropriate change of the outside conditions 
in accordance with the conditions in the laboratory. Namely, for Pasteur to be able to 
preserve the identity constructs of both the microbes and the farmers, the outside 
conditions had to be made ‘ideal’ for their existence.  
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The conclusion drawn from Latour’s example are true for the MoM programme as well. 
So as to make the outcomes of the process and the citizenship construct formed during 
the process operational, the operation of the macro-level should also be modified. 
Following the example of pasteurisation of France, European politics and science should 
be ’deliberalised’. If this does not happen, the project stays at the level of a one-off 
experiment and the participants do not feel ‘European scientific citizens’ any more. They 
return to their everyday life and everything will go on as if nothing had happened  
 
The conversion of outcomes into the social level is the most crucial aspect of the MoM 
process, as it was an experimental project and it is not at all certain what will be the effect 
of the outputs. What are those outside conditions that should also be changed at the 
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macro level in order to have a real impact and preserve the newly-formed identity 




The chapter described a European deliberation process, which is unique in its class. On 
the one hand, the MoM was so special because it was the first initiative that aspired to 
create a public ‘micro-sphere’ in a transnational space, where citizens were able to meet, 
discuss the issues of a theme they were interested in and they had the opportunity to draw 
up recommendations for the decision-makers. At a time when the ‘quasi-state’ of the 
European Union seems to be abstract, non-transparent, unreachable for the ‘quasi-
citizen’, all those initiatives that attempt to find a solution to ease the problem of 
democracy deficit are very important. On the other hand, the process can be regarded as 
unique in that it offers a theme – the issue of development and regulation of brain science 
– which is very difficult to comprehend for the man in the street. For the citizens it is not 
just the establishment of the EU that is non-transparent and uncontrollable, but the 
development and operation of science and technologies as well.  
 
At the same time or perhaps for this very reason, life is more and more permeated by the 
findings of sciences and new technologies. It might be claimed that we live in a hotbed of 
incomprehensibly complex technological systems. Therefore, all initiatives are of primary 
significance that attempt to bridge the gap between the expert and the man in the street 
and which assume that they still have something to say to each other. Another way to 
look at it would be that everyone who is expert in a given field would be a lay person in 
all the others. Therefore, it is necessary to prompt public discussions on sciences and 
technologies which have considerable social impacts or serious side-effects. 
 
The analysis in the chapter showed how the organisers of the initiative tried “more or 
less” consciously to set up the communication between citizens in accordance with the 
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framework of the ideal speech situation. Nevertheless, a large number of human, 
technical, material and interior arrangement guidelines were utilised. The conclusion of 
the present analysis is that an ideal speech situation can only be established by jointly 
utilising material and human elements. The association of these elements will establish the 
framework which makes communication among participants symmetrical and attempts to 
realise a construct of identity which can be called post-national scientific citizenship.  
 
The following chapters will give a more detailed description and analysis of this model of 
citizenship outlining theoretical, policy and citizen perspectives. First, the next chapter 
will analyse the theoretical space around citizenship in connection with science and 
Europe. This introduction to the academic discourse in the first place is essential because 
the models developed are more than just futile ideas of highbrow scientists. These 
citizenship models based on different models of political thought also deeply influence 
how policy makers construct the subjects of or at least strive to impose certain social 
identities on a political community.  
 
Therefore, as a second step, the paper will analyse the policy discourse of citizenship with 
a focus on the connection between science, Europe and the citizens. The chapter will not 
only analyse the identity constructions embedded in the texts in question but will also 
attempt to show connections between the academic and the policy discursive layers.  
  
Finally, the focus will come back to Meeting of Minds to investigate how citizens perceive 
themselves in terms of their role in the project. It will be possible to trace not only 
different roles but also different connections and visions of Europe. Since interviews 
were conducted with both Hungarian and Dutch participants, the question of how 
participants from different political cultures could find their place in the process will be 
touched upon.  
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This way, the analysis of the citizenship discursive layer will complete the collection of 
samples from discursive layers. This collection attempts to describe all the important 
perspectives around citizenship, science and Europe. It might be argued that both 
European policy documents and the MoM project favour a special kind of identity 
position, namely, post-national citizenship. As it has been indicated above in connection 
with the ‘translation of results into higher levels’, both the viability and the minimal 




3. ACADEMIC DISCURSIVE LAYER ON CITIZENSHIP 
 
As we could see in the previous chapter, the relationship between citizenship and science 
is intensively discussed nowadays among scholars, politicians and among citizens and 
scientists themselves. It seems that the boundary between politics and science and 
technology is getting blurred and this also has some bearing on the role of citizens in this 
process.  
 
According to Barry (Barry, 2001), we are living in a technological society because both the 
problems that government and politics must address, and the solutions that we must 
adopt  refer to specific technologies. Science and technology, therefore, at the same time 
bring new topics to the political arena and serve as a model for politics.27 This aspect of 
technological society has two further implications. 
 
Firstly, the space of government is changing due to the intersection of technological 
artefacts, social practices and networks. Traditionally, the space of government has 
referred to national territory and population. Nowadays, this has been supplemented with 
a further dimension, that is, the government of technological zones which cannot be 
defined and demarcated by geographical or territorial boundaries but by the circulation of 
technical practices and devices.  
 
Secondly, in a society like that the emphasis is on the technical skills, capacities, and 
knowledge of the individual citizen.28 Moreover, to live in a technological society one 
27 For Barry, technological society is one which perceives technical change as a model of a political 
invention. Here, we should consider not only the importance of evidence-based policies and the prevalent 
practice of expert advice in various policy areas but also the emergence of techno-scientific expressions in 
policy context such as networking and inter-activity. In that sense, science and technology serve as models 
for politics. (Barry 2001) 
28 Barry uses the term ’technological’ citizenship. However, in the course of this essay I will stick to the 
question of ’scientific citizenship’, yet acknowledging the difference between science and technology like 
Irwin did:  
„…I generally employ ‘science’ in the broadest sense so as to encompass a whole worldview and a set of 
institutions within society. At times also, ‘science’ encompasses areas of knowledge and application which 
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needs much more than just to be able to make judgements about prices of commodities 
or decisions about parties and politicians. The citizen has to be informed and updated 
about the scientific and technological aspects of her life as well.29 To use Barry’s own 
words:  
 
“She has to be knowledgeable about the multiple intersections and connections between 
her body and pollutants, drugs and technical devices, and the dangers and possibilities 
such possibilities may open up. (...) Technological innovation forms new artefacts. The 
government of a technological society implies the formation of new human capacities and 
attributes (ibid. p. 4).” 
 
The perspective of technological society raises many questions about the role of the 
citizens. How can they have an impact on decisions which affect their lives? What rights, 
responsibilities can they assume facing the political and ethical implications of scientific 
research and those of science-based innovations? What are the relationships between 
‘traditional’ citizenship concepts and the emerging characteristics of a ‘scientific 
citizenship’? And if government more and more includes the government of technological 
zones what is the level of polity at which citizens can intervene?  
 
The aim of this theoretical section is to show the different levels on which the Meeting of 
Minds project can be and possibly should be interpreted. I am not going to answer all the 
above mentioned questions whose complexity is far beyond the scope of this thesis, 
rather the focus is on the issue of how the Meeting of Minds project is trying to address 
these questions. 
might more properly be referred to as ‘technology’. I am aware of the distinction which can be made 
between ‘scientific’ and ‘technological’ forms of understanding but have at times used the former as a 
succinct way to describing both (Irwin, 1995, p. 8).” 
29 In a sense, life also becomes more complicated with the technologies which aim to ease the burden of 
everyday existence. As a stand-up put it in BBC4’s Now Show: “…money is getting so complicated. Once 
upon a time, you buy something and are asked: ‘Will you be paying cash or cheque, sir?’  Now you buy 
something and its: ’Will you be paying cash, cheque, direct debit, electronic credit transfer, by post, by 
phone, at the post office, at the bank, online, online via our website, online via your bank’s website, online 
via something that looks like a website but it’s in fact a bloke in Nigeria…’ With a big grin on his face… 
‘Will you be using pay-point, cash-point, credit card, debit card, store card, oyster card or I will accept two 
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However, these questions will serve as guidelines in this section where three different – 
the liberal, the republican and the deliberative – approaches to citizenship are introduced 
in relation to scientific citizenship. In my view, the different kinds of scientific citizenship 
ideal-types reflect the age-old debates over the nature and characteristics of political 
citizenship.30 Also, these debates determine the theoretical space around European 
citizenship. 
 
On the other, we can also emphasise the difference between political and scientific 
citizenship if we consider the fact that the debates over citizenship are often concentrated 
around problems such as common good and legitimacy. These problems traditionally had on 
no condition referred to science or to technology and only recently, that is, for the past 
thirty years have started to become central to the debates over sciences and scientists.  
 
Before that, no shadow of doubt was cast on the significance of science and technology 
because they had been considered as the representatives of the master narrative of 
modernity, that is, progress. Accordingly, there was no question about the fact that 
science and technology contribute to common good, nor was their legitimacy ever 
questioned. This privileged position has been challenged along many different lines by 
environmental, feminist and consumer movements, just to mention the most important 
ones. The members of these movements were the first ‘scientific citizens’ as they called 
into question the legitimacy of science and technology and challenged their underlying 
values. These movements showed that the ‘common good’ produced by science and 
technology can also raise the ‘common bad’ or that not all members of the society can 
goats and your daughter…’ And all this just to buy a latte at Starbucks” (The Now Show. BBC4. 
08/12/2006). 
30 Before the lengthy discussion, it may be worth mentioning that my aim is not to show that the questions 
of scientific citizenship could be easily reduced and conflated with the time-worn positions in the debate 
over the ideal political subject in a polity, that is, over political citizenship. As Barry’s above discussed 
ideas show the political subject in a technological society must cope with a messy world, which consists of 
unclear relations between her body, technologies, chemical substances and social structures. This implies 
new capacities and attributes which were not part of the traditional ideas on citizenship. 
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partake equally from new developments. So, to sum up the last two passages, the very 
concept of scientific citizenship designates this new relationship between science, politics 
and the political subject. However, in my opinion the theoretical discussion in Science 
and Technology Studies (STS) rests on the positions of different political theories on 
citizenship.31  
 
In line with this, in the following section I would like to highlight three different 
approaches, the liberal, the republican and the deliberative ones. These can be considered to 
be dominant accounts in the debate over the meaning of citizenship. These approaches 
are the models created by Callon in order to analyse the role of lay people in relation to 
scientific knowledge. These models are called the ‘public education’, the ‘co-production of 
knowledge, and the ’public debate’ model.32 
 
3.1. Models of citizenship 
 
Citizenship in its most common sense is about group membership, or to put it more 
bluntly, membership in a very special group of the political community (Delanty, 2000). 
Most debates about citizenship are concentrated around the issue of the nature of group 
membership (Isin & Turner, 2002). According to Burchell, there is persistent dichotomy 
between two rival streams of thought on citizenship: one of them classical or neo-classical 
and the other early modern or modern (Burchell, 1995). Quoting Turner he writes that 
with the rise of the market society in early modern Europe the classical ‘active’ or 
‘republican’ ideal was increasingly replaced by a modern ‘passive’ or ‘liberal’ ideal which 
31 I was not the first to ’suspect’ these relationships between political theory and science and technology 
issues. Laird already wrote an article in which he elaborates the question of citizens’ involvement in the 
issues of science and technology in relation with two political theories, namely, pluralism and direct 
democracy. In this respect I follow his line of thought although I will discuss three different political 
approaches and three forms of citizens’ involvement respectively. (Laird, 1993) 
32 This categorization is in many aspects parallel to Irwin’s model on three policy responses: the expert-
based (let facts decide), the democratic (let people decide), and the pragmatic (let common sense decide) 
approach. However, I will not use his ideas directly but on many points I will draw on his book in the 
following section. (Irwin, 1995, p. 62-80)  
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weakened the original civic impulse (p. 541). Apart from these two approaches, in the 
following section I shall discuss a third, the deliberative approach which tries to combine 
elements of the different traditions.  
 
Firstly, we can identify the tradition of modern liberal thought as the dominant form of 
citizenship based on particular relationships between rights and duties related to the market 
or to the administrative state. Citizenship entails a formal and legally coded status which 
reduces citizenship to a privatistic and pre-political status. As for scientific citizenship, 
this account can be closely related to the model which Callon calls ‘Public Educational 
Model’. In this model the citizens do not take part in science and technology in the 
making but only steering them by expressing their preferences on the market or to the 
state. These preferences to different scientific or technological achievements are pre-given 
and the only task for the state or the market is to collect and aggregate them and shape 
the trends of future developments accordingly. Thus, there is a clear-cut boundary 
between citizens and specialists without the possibility of real dialogue.  
 
Secondly, the tradition called republican grasps citizenship not as a formal and static concept 
but as an active, more substantive dimension of participation in the civic community. In 
this form, the emphasis is less on legal rules and more on norms, practices, meanings and 
identities. In the same way, citizenship must be defined as a social process through which 
individuals and social groups engage in claiming, expanding and losing rights (Isin & 
Turner 2002). According to this account, the community of citizens is considered to be 
self-governing because after common discussion they create and impose laws on 
themselves.  This approach is akin to what Callon calls the ‘Co-production of Knowledge 
Model’. In this model, citizens take part in the making of knowledge or in the innovation 
process and work in a close relationship with specialists. This way, they create their own 
scientific understanding or technological device for themselves, so the gap between 
citizens and scientists is getting blurred in this model.   
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Thirdly, following the work of Habermas, the concept of deliberative citizenship33 is an 
attempt to reconcile the contradictory elements of these two different approaches. 
According to his viewpoint, in a complex and plural society it is not possible to go back 
to the republican ideal of the self-governing community, yet he strives to keep meaningful 
participation under conditions of the systematic characteristics of modern society. He 
argues that this is possible via the dispersed networks of public spheres where the 
opinion- and will-formation of the citizens can take place by discussing common matters 
with each other. The question is how the results of these deliberative discussions can be 
channelled into the political system shaping and giving legitimacy to decision-making. 
Correspondingly, Callon offers a third model, that is, the ‘Public Debate Model’ in which 
citizens take part by discussing scientific issues and forming their own opinion in the 
course of a deliberative process. The gap between citizens and scientists is neither wide as 
in the ‘Public Education’ nor dissolved as in the ‘Co-production of Knowledge’ model.  
In the ‘Public Debate Model’ this gap remains but is bridged by these public debates 
which have the capability of keeping diverse fields of knowledge together. 
 
3.2. The Challenges to National Citizenship 
 
Until now, the debate between the positions outlined above about the right form of 
citizenship mostly took place at the level of nation-state. However, this debate is getting 
even more ‘knotty’ because the traditional, unquestioned relationship between nation-
state, nationalism and citizenship is under strain along different lines. The nation-state as 
the sole source of authority and citizenship are being challenged both from below due to 
the emergence of plural, multi-cultural societies and above as the emergence of 
transnational entities such as the EU. Therefore, the blurring boundaries of nation-states 
33 The concept, however, ’deliberative citizenship’ cannot be found in the works of Habermas. I created it 
in order to show the differences between the other two and this approach. In the course of the discussion 
of the ’deliberative citizenship’ I tried, however, to be as faithful to the original ideas of Habermas as I 
could. 
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brought citizenship on the intellectual and political agenda in addition to the questions of 
scientific citizenship (Isin & Turner, 2002). 
 
Among the different challenges to the nation-state – and in close relation to the 
institution of national citizenship – we can identify, following Tambini (Tambini, 2001), 
four aspects as the most important and most challenging ones such as economic globalisation, 
cultural denationalisation, migration and the emergence of transnational institutions. These interrelated 
processes are undermining the traditional position of the nation state. While economic 
globalisation reduces the state capacities of controlling the national economy to deliver 
welfare to all nationals and to assist social mobility, the fragmentation of the national 
culture along ethnic, religious and different life forms make it difficult to sustain 
monocultural ‘offering’ in the public broadcasting. In addition, labour mobility has also 
contributed to the increased cultural diversity and complexity as migrants are media 
literate and able to bring their own culture with them. Moreover, argues Tambini, the 
existence of transnational institutions and discourses on human rights and legal 
institutions offer new channels of citizen participation apart from the nation state. 
European integration is particularly considered to be a process which undermines the 
national monopoly on rights and practices of citizenship (Tambini, 2001, p. 198-200). 
 
Because of these interrelated phenomena and the fact that societies are forced to manage 
cultural difference and associated tensions and conflict, there will be necessary significant 
changes in the processes by which states allocate citizenship and differentiate categories 
of citizens (Isin & Turner, 2002). Due to the phenomenon of migration, questions that 
multicultural and settler societies had to answer have now become the questions of states 
that originally saw themselves homogenous (Sperling, 2002). Moreover, the emergence of 
transnational institutions such as the EU poses a different question, namely, how the 
participation of citizens can be ensured at a higher level of polity. 34   
34 Because the aim of this theoretical part is to show the possibilities of citizen participation in science and 
technology issues in the in depth discussion below I will focus on this question partly neglecting the 
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However, these discussions on the devaluation of national citizenship in connection with 
the blurring boundaries of nation states do not take into account the questions of science 
and technology. They do not consider either that science and technology have a great role 
in these processes or that the question of participation at a transnational level is also on 
the agenda in relation with science and technology issues.  
 
Of course, one can also raise the question of whether scientific citizenship can be other 
than transnational. Both the production of scientific knowledge or the innovation of 
artefacts and their effects on their social and natural environment have been and 
increasingly are trans- and international. However, if we think about the ‘Meeting of 
Minds’ project, this raises the following questions: If we cannot draw the line either for 
the production of scientific knowledge or for the effects of that knowledge why should 
issues on science and technology be discussed at a European level and not at other levels? 
What is the reason then behind the decision of the polity level at which these discussions 
can and should take place? 
 
On the one hand, it is impossible to give a clear answer to this question because it is 
obvious that new developments of brain science involve scientists and will affect people 
also outside Europe. On the other hand, we can witness a number of efforts in the EU 
which aim to create an even and integrated techno-scientific space or ‘technological zone’ 
to use Barry’s expression (Barry, 2001). In that sense, Europe is currently being invented 
(Misa & Schot, 2005), a European technological zone is being created and governed by 
harmonisation, intellectual property rights and (scientific) networking. As Barry puts it:  
 
“Technological zones take varied spatial forms which may both reinforce or cut across 
and subvert formal political boundaries; they may even create new ones. Their ends are in 
principle contestable; and due to the importance with which they are invested, they may 
be contested and reconfigured. They serve both to prevent and to establish sites for 
question of diversity and plurality. However, the articles and books on which my argument is based 
discuss both questions at the same time.  
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political conflict, and they reinforce and undermine zones of military domination. As we 
shall see, technological zones are the objects of developing forms of transnational 
regulation. In what follows I examine a series of remarkable attempts to reconfigure 
different technological zones: those associated with environmental and health and safety 
regulation, communication and information technologies, and security and defence. This 
has been the process of European integration (Barry, 2001).”  
 
However, these phenomena are not discussed in great depth here but it is obvious that 
the discussions of scientific citizenship also have to take the transnational level into 
consideration. Because my fieldwork is about a ‘European Citizens’ Deliberation’ I shall 
focus and restrict the analysis to the dimension of European citizenship in relation with 
scientific citizenship. So in the following section I will discuss three trends in political 
thinking and how these trends are connected to the question of scientific citizenship. I 
will also reflect on the question of how scientific citizenship can be grasped at a European 
level. Since, in my opinion, the Meeting of Minds project has been launched according to 
the deliberative citizenship ideal I will examine that topic more thoroughly than the 
others.    
 




Basically every kind of liberal theory begins with the individual. Accordingly, the primary 
value of liberal citizenship is to maximise individual liberty. Because of that, liberal theory 
focuses on the individual’s relationship with the state on two interrelated dimensions. 
Firstly, individual liberty and state action tend to be inversely related, that is, increasing 
the latter would reduce the former. Secondly, a fundamental distinction can be made 
between activities that affect ‘chiefly’ individuals’ own interests and those that also affect 
the interests of others. That presupposition implies that the pursuit of one’s own interests 
that do not affect others is entirely the province of the individual, in other words, the 
private sphere and should be protected against the state. In the sphere of the public, that 
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is, where others’ interests are affected the state may be justified in regulating the activity 
(Shuck, 2002).35 However, it is not easy to make a distinction between private and public 
and it may be renegotiated over and over again in relation with different issues (Gering, 
2002). 
 
Furthermore, as I mentioned above, the dominant tradition of citizenship has been this 
market-base model in which citizenship is related to the emergence of civil-society that is 
basically privatised and pre-political. In liberal theories the meaning of civil-society refers 
to the sphere of market exchange where formally equal citizens pursue their interests and 
which should be protected from state intervention. So, the civic body of citizens is seen 
under threat from the government which, on the other hand, is also necessary in order to 
secure the conditions of market exchange (Shuck, 2002).  
 
Subsequently, due to the emergence of welfare systems the emphasis from the market has 
been shifted to the state.  This shift can be clearly seen in T. H Marshall theory of 
citizenship rights (Marshall, 1992). According to Marshall, we can distinguish different 
kinds of rights such as civil rights, political rights and social rights. Each of these sets of 
rights were achievements, respectively, of the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century 
and the twentieth century. In this theory the shift from civil to political and then to social 
rights represents an evolutionary process which helps to reconcile democracy and its 
requirement of formal equality with capitalism rendering citizens unequal.  
 
According to Marshall’s theory this was a gradual process in which citizenship embraces 
more and more fully the whole existence of social life (Marshall, 1992). For Marshall, 
social rights brought to completion the purely formal rights of civic and political 
citizenship by alleviating the structural inequalities of capitalism on the one hand, and by 
35 It may worth mentioning that in the different arenas of political thought the concept ‘civil society’ as 
well as the relationship between ‘the private and the public sphere’ varies. I shall not discuss these 
differences in depth. However, interesting they may be, it would mean a diversion in the train of thought 
here.  
108
ensuring a minimal material independence for citizens to practise their civic and political 
rights, on the other.  
 
However, Marshall’s hypothesis about the mitigating effect of social citizenship levelling 
off differences between different members of the society had not been proven by the 
second part of the twentieth century. Delanty argues that we can see nowadays that neo-
liberal theory pulls back citizenship from state to the market. According to him, the 
concept of citizen in neo-liberal discourse replaces the citizen with the consumer (Delanty, 
2000). 36  
 
Educational scientific citizenship 
 
From the scientific citizenship perspective, we can see how these concepts linger on and 
determine the debates on the role of citizens. The liberal account of citizenship is very 
similar to the role of citizens in the ‘Public Educational Model’ (PEM) (Callon, 1999B). In 
this model citizens are totally excluded from the realms of science and technology and 
their relationship to these spheres is not of political nature in the strictest sense. They are 
clients of the state apparatus or consumers of the market. If they are not satisfied with the 
developments of these fields they can only reveal and stress their preferences toward the 
state or in the market. 
 
So as liberal thought is the dominant trend of citizenship, according to Callon, the PEM is 
also the simplest and most widespread model. In this model scientific knowledge, which 
is objective and universal, is considered to be the opposite of lay knowledge characterised 
by beliefs and superstitions. Accordingly, Hamlett argues that the experts’ and the average 
36 This process can be seen as the extension of social citizenship into the world of consumption. 
Citizenship thus loses its equalizing function and becomes a highly privatised matter. In line with this, 
Warren highlights that neo-liberal theories of democracy argue that the self is defined by preferences that 
are formed pre-politically and reflects interests. Democracy therefore is primarily a means for aggregating 
pre-political preferences. Political institutions aggregate preferences without fundamentally changing them. 
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citizens’ concepts are constructed as mirror images (Hamlett, 2003). On the one hand, the 
public is depicted as apathetic, uninformed or driven by biased information, as illegitimate 
and undesirable participants in policy-making decisions. On the other hand, expert 
rationality can assess risks and problematic situations objectively by disclosing objective 
facts and providing unbiased information. Experts are thus an essential part of policy-
making processes as far as science and technology issues are concerned. 
 
Accordingly, a top-down information distribution is needed to dispel mistrust that is due 
to the illiteracy and ignorance of the public. The only antidote is to intensify educational 
and informative actions on behalf of the citizens themselves who are prisoners of their 
own false beliefs. Consequently, there are calls for enhanced and expanded science 
education, “so that the quality of the public’s thinking can be elevated and their 
impressionable vulnerability to such confusion may be reduced” (ibid: p. 125). 
 
Because of this information deficit (Irwin, 2001) citizens cannot participate directly in 
scientific and technological innovations but must be represented by the state or by firms. 
So, the ties between scientists and the public are indirect. Citizen demands are mediated by 
the state, which represents citizens and their will, and of firms, which comply with these 
demands. Science and technology are thus autonomous but not independent; individuals 
also take part who, either as citizens or as consumers, delegate the satisfaction of their 





These thoughts on liberal and scientific citizenship still stay at the level of the nation-
state. However, the role and capacities of the nation-state are also highly contested in 
Therefore, politics is an allocative or economic kind of activity, operating in a world of scarce values. 
(Warren, 1992) 
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liberal thought.  Along these lines of liberal thought we can also identify a recent trend in 
European citizenship which perceives the political subjects of the European Union as 
workers (Rumford, 2003, p. 29) and as consumers (Carlos, 2001, p.197). According to 
Schnapper, the proponents of this ‘new citizenship’ stress the idea that the participation in 
a political community is no longer essential but what has become important in the life of 
the community is economic and social participation. Accordingly, true membership in the 
community is no longer defined by political participation but by economic activity 
(Schnapper, 1997). The purely political nature of citizenship has been linked to the time 
when nationalism and nation-states were established. At those times, that is, in the 19th 
century the national states and their ‘new’ citizens were freed from the bonds inherited 
from a feudal society. In a similar manner, states Schnapper, the proponents of “new 
citizenship” argue that the construction of Europe today means liberating economic 
actors from the restrictions imposed by national borders. National citizenship thus no 
longer provides legal status and rights by itself. European institutions today are building a 
new citizenship which is based on economic and social rights and, in turn, the impact of 
these rights also affects the political status of the individual (ibid. p. 206). In the light of 
this position, a new conception of citizenship is being elaborated, which is no longer 
based on the juridical and political relationship between individuals and the state but is 
founded instead on the set of social values and practices and guaranteed by EU 
institutions.  
 
We could see that while discussing liberal political citizenship, scientific citizenship in the 
‘Public Educational Model’ and ‘new citizenship’ in relation with the European Union 
they all share a common ground in devaluing the political side of citizenship and offering models 
for participation which are more akin to a client or consumer relation. Accordingly, the most 
common critical remark on liberalism is that it gives too much attention to privacy and 
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individual rights and too little to fostering the public virtues that lead people to do their 
duties as citizens.37 
 
However, it also has to be acknowledged that liberal theory recently has also given much 
prominence to the strong propensity of individuals to combine into groups to constitute a 
civil society that is more or less distinct from both individuals and the state (Schuck, 2002, 
p. 134-136). Consequently, individuals sharing common interests and values coalesce into 
groups to further their private interests and shape governmental decisions. The ‘pluralist’ 
idea, however, remains in the framework of market-based understanding of politics 
conceiving the interaction as a bargaining process between groups.  
 
By the same token, citizens can also take a more active part and organise themselves 
around issues connected to science and technology to see their preferences fulfilled. In 
this model it would be possible through collective action by which people can promote 
their interest more effectively than they could as individuals (Laird, 1993). Therefore, 
individuals, who already share a broad sense of values and preferences, work together to 
develop a coherent voice. As we can see, these voluntary groups presuppose a more 
active type of citizenship but in this model citizens essentially remain ‘consumers’ outside 
the realm of science and technology in the making. As Hamlett puts it:  
 
“In political science terminology, these are forms of interest aggregation and interest 
articulation, that is, ways in which individuals who share common points of view can find 
each other, discuss their common concerns, and organize to influence policy. 
Contemporary disputes about science and technology – and most other areas of policy 
conflict – often involve such advocacy groups, each pressing its own position, values and 
preferences (Hamlett, 2003, p. 121-122).” 
 
37 It means that it may also be that liberal cultures tend to discourage certain forms of political 
participation. Liberal polities do not merely permit their citizens to retreat into their private pursuits; 
liberal ideology affirmatively valorises the privatisation of personality, commitment, and activity. Liberal 
market economies, moreover facilitate the pursuit of wealth and the indulgence of material pleasures. This 
does not only leave less time for politics but also diminishes the social prestige that such activities enjoy 
relative to wealth-seeking and consumption. 
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We can see how these ideas about civil society and voluntary association open a door to 
political intervention even in the liberal theory which presupposes the self and the 
preferences of the citizens as pre-given and pre-political. However, the challenges of 
European integration, in particular, and globalisation, in general also mean difficulty to 
these groups. Markoff argues that although the European Union shows a strong 
commitment to democratic values, this body nevertheless poses a challenge to 
democratisation (Markoff, 1999, p. 21). 
 
“This is because the developments of democratic freedoms and social practices have, 
since the eighteen century, been accompanied by the activities of social movements that 
have placed pressure ‘from below’ upon government bodies, making them accountable to 
the people. As more governmental power shift upwards, above the level of the national 
state, the capacity of social movements to exercise influence decreases (ibid. p. 21).” 
 
The question of how organised groups of scientific citizens can stress their interests at a 
transnational level still remained unanswered. Although the concept of ‘civil society’ does 
appear in various EU documents with high expectations attached to it38, the European 
civil society is embryonic and is not embraced to the same extent as nationally contained 
civil societies (Rumford, 2003, p. 33). So the movements of ‘scientific citizens’ are faced 
with the same challenges as other movements that strive to reinvent democracy and the 
possibility of shaping policies at a transnational level. So the task to find an answer to the 
question of ‘how can the shift of power from national to European arenas propel the 
reorientation of strategies, tactics, organization and identities’(Markoff, 1999, p. 40) is 
given to these movements.  
 
38 „The development of a European civil society has been identified by the EU as a solution to the 
problem of democratic deficit and a means through which transnational governance can be secured. The 
role allotted to civil society is to mediate between the national and the supranational, thereby connecting 
national society to transnational governance.” (Rumford, 2003, p. 32) 
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Dagger argues that the republican theory is based on the premise that in a republic the 
government of the state or society is a public matter, and people rule themselves. 
Therefore, there are two essential elements of republicanism which are publicity and self-
government (Dagger, 2002, p. 146). 
 
Publicity generally means that politics as the public’s business must be conducted openly, 
that is, in public. However, the definition of public is as ambiguous as it is in liberal 
theory. In Dagger’s opinion, the public is a sphere of life with its own claims and 
considerations. What makes something public is that it involves people as members of a 
community or polity. Despite the unclear borders between private and public all 
republicans believe that there is something enriching about public life. Public life draws 
people out and it draws them together in a community. Being involved in public life, that 
is, practising an active form of citizenship can help hidden capabilities and talents to 
appear. 
 
Self-government means that if citizens are to be self-governing, they cannot be subject to 
absolute or arbitrary rule. Citizens therefore must be subject to rule of law, in other 
words, the government of laws. But what makes republican citizens self-governing is that 
they have a voice in making these laws. They do not just pursue their own personal 
interest but as law-makers and at the same time addressees of these laws they take an 
active part by shaping the life of the community actively. Therefore self-government is 
marked in the republican theory as a form of freedom. This kind of freedom, however, 
39 It is important to note that the expression of ’co-production’ in STS generally signifies the co-
production of scientific-technological and social elements of our world. Here, however, the concept is 
used in a narrower sense only referring to a specific kind of knowledge co-produced by both lay-people 
and specialists. For the general use of the concept see: (Jasanoff, 2004) 
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requires dependence upon the law so that citizens may be independent of the arbitrary 
will of others (ibid. p. 147). 
 
In line with these principles, from the republican point of view, citizenship has an ethical 
as well as a legal dimension. In contrast with liberal thought, republican theorists regard 
citizenship as an ethos: as a way of life which requires commitment to the common good 
and active participation in public affairs, in other words, it requires civic virtue (ibid. p. 
149). 
 
That is not to say that republicans denigrate the legal aspect rather they stress that it is 
necessary but not sufficient. It requires the supplement of the ethical dimension, arguing 
that every citizen ‘holds an office’, that is, they hold a position of public responsibility. 
This largely neglected ethical dimension means that there are standards which can be built 
into the concept of citizenship. The republican form of citizenship therefore is not an 
empty form like the liberal one in which liberal citizens can decide what kind of citizens 
they want to be when they fill in the legal framework of rights. The republican ideal 
contains an explicit commitment to standards stressing the public nature of citizenship. 
These standards can be found in two different principles. The first one is mainly 
concerned with the ideal-type of good citizen who is a public-spirited person putting the 
interests of the community ahead of personal interests. The second one refers to civic 
involvement, that is, citizens should take an active part in public affairs and try to take a 
well-informed and public-spirited part in the conduct of the public’s business, in other 
words, in politics (ibid. p. 150). The republican standards embedded in the ethical 
dimension of citizenship thus provide an implicit ideal of what a citizen should be. In 
contrast, the liberal citizens must decide what kind of citizens they want to be, including 
the possibility that they will forswear political activity all together (Schuck, 2002, p. 137). 
 
As we can see the republican ideal stresses the importance of participation in politics in 
which participation is contributing to the publicity of this business and enhances the self-
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governing capacity of the political community. Apart from this, argues Dagger, two 
further dimensions of citizenship must be highlighted here the integrative dimension on the 
one hand, and the educative dimension on the other (Dagger, 2002, p. 150).  
 
Dagger states that participation in republican theories is conceived as an integrative 
experience which brings together the multiple role activities of the contemporary person 
and demands that the separate roles be surveyed from a general point of view. That 
means that one should simply set aside personal interests to follow the general will one 
has as a citizen, that is, one has no interests except as a member of the public. To be able 
to do that we have to have at least some kin of understanding of the personal interests of 
the people involved. The activity of citizenship is helped by debates and the exchange of 
views and ideas in order to provide this understanding and it enables the individual to 
integrate the various roles he or she plays, and it integrates individuals to the community 
(ibid. pp. 150-151).  
 
The educational dimension is focusing on the process of how active citizenship educates 
people by drawing out abilities that might otherwise remain untapped or unfulfilled. 
Active citizenship widens individuals’ horizons and deepens their sense of how their lives 
are involved with others’, including the lives of people who are unknown to them (Laird, 
1993, p. 349). This way participation works to overcome individualism by fostering the 
individual’s sense of himself or herself as a part of, rather than apart from, the public 
(Dagger, 2002, p. 151). What should be emphasised about these two dimensions is that 
the autonomy of the people here is not presupposed as conceived in liberal theory as a 
pre-political capacity and maximised by clear separations of private and public sphere. 
Rather, they stress that democratic participation has a unique capacity to foster and 





Co-productive scientific citizenship 
 
This account is very much in line with ‘Co-production of Knowledge Model’ developed 
by Callon (Callon, 1993). In the ‘Public Educational Model’, there was a clear-cut 
boundary between specialists and citizens who can only influence the developments of 
science and technology through the state or the market. In contrast, argues Callon, this 
model “tends to overcome these limits by actively involving lay people in the creation of 
knowledge concerning them” (ibid. p. 89). In this sense, this model is reminiscent of the 
self-governing community of the republican thought by depicting a situation in which 
citizens work in close collaboration with specialists and can investigate problems which 
are important for them and produce situated knowledge (Haraway, 1999) or devices 
(Verheul & Vergragt, 1995) for themselves. 
 
Callon acknowledges, however, the differences between diverse fields of knowledge but 
he argues that these differences can be integrated in this model (Callon, 1999B). The 
creative tensions between the standardised and universal knowledge on the one hand, and 
the knowledge that takes into account the complexity of singular local situations on the 
other, are put into play in a situation which is laden by the authority of scientists. The two 
forms of knowledge are the common by-product of a single process in which the different 
actors, both specialist and non-specialist, work in close collaboration. Accordingly, there 
is constant dynamic interaction between lay people and specialists, yet this does not mean, 
argues Callon, that there is no division of tasks between them (ibid. pp. 89-90). Scientific 
knowledge production continues to play a dominant role but it is not separated from the 
citizens like in the ‘Public Educational Model’.  
 
Accordingly, in this case the public does not mean the uninformed and ignorant masses 
of people but the association of a group of volunteers involved in collective actions. The 
members of a ‘concerned’ group share a specific kind of identity due to their common 
fate like human beings struck by the same disease. So for Callon, the exemplary 
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relationship of this model is between patient and specialist who are striving together to 
find the cure for a special disease. Because the patients are so important in the process of 
knowledge production through their collective action they can change their roles from 
passive participants to active agents, becoming ‘obligatory points of passage’ in the 
research process. Callon argues that “Being directly involved on a necessary collective 
basis these activist groups may, in certain circumstances, play a leading role in the 
production, orientation and evaluation of knowledge” (ibid. p. 91). Under these 
circumstances, it is possible to talk of collective learning, since the different knowledge is 
reciprocally enriching throughout the course of its co-production.  
 
In the STS canon there are many case studies related to the ‘Co-production of Knowledge 
Model’, however, in the following passages only two case studies will be touched upon. 
The most widespread example is probably the case study of AIDS patients written by 
Epstein (Epstein, 1995). These patients are reported to have changed the course and 
procedures of medical research and transformed it in order to reflect their interests, 
values and life situations. However, Epstein also underlines that there were growing 
tensions in the movement between “lay-expert” activists who acquired scientific 
knowledge in order to put across their arguments and the “lay-lay” activists whom the 
former represented.40 Some felt that their fellow activists were ‘going native’ and start to 
40 At first sight, in this case study we can see the general problem of ‘representation’. There are appointed 
people, spokespersons and those on behalf of whom they speak. When the spokespersons meet the needs 
of their job, the gap between them and those whom they represent is widening. So the basic question is 
whether the spokespersons always truly represent the group on whose behalf they speak. However, in STS 
and particularly in Actor-Network Theory the situation is a little bit more difficult because both things, 
both people can be represented, sometimes even by the same person. As Latour puts it:  
“The spokesperson is someone who speaks for others who, or which, do not speak. For instance a shop 
steward is a spokesman. If the workers were gathered together and they all speak at the same time there 
would be a jarring cacophony. No more meaning could be retrieved from the tumult than if they had 
remained silent. That is why they designate (or are given) a delegate who speaks on their behalf, and in 
their name. (…) For everything that follows, it is very important not to limit this notion of spokesperson 
and not to impose any clear distinction between ‘things and ‘people’ in advance. (…) …in practice, there 
is not much difference between people and things: they both need someone to talk for them. From the 
spokesperson’s point of view there is thus no clear distinction to be made between representing people 
and representing things. In each case the spokesperson literally does the talking for who or what cannot 
talk” (Latour, 1987, pp. 71-72). 
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represent the values of science more than the interests of the members of movement 
(Epstein, 1995).41 
 
Iles (Iles, 2004) also writes about a co-production process between two chemical plants 
industry and local people.42 In this case, citizens were able to convert the standardised, 
quantitative information into site-specific information that plants could use for pollution 
prevention. At the end of the shared work of the specialists and the local people, both 
plants “reluctantly” decided to reduce the emissions targeted by activists to demonstrate 
progress and improved relations.  
 
In addition, Callon emphasises that the participation in these collective actions has effects 
on one’s self (Callon, 1999B). In contrast with the stable and pre-political subject of 
liberal theory, in this model participation also constructs a new, reconfigured identity 
which gives access to social recognition. This constructed and negotiated identity, 
together with the knowledge and techniques compromising it, maintain a completely 
original relationship with science.43 Therefore, the legitimacy of this common enterprise, 
through which new knowledge and new identities are jointly created, relies entirely on the 
ability of the groups concerned to gain recognition for their actions.44 
This case study thus can also be interpreted from an ANT point of view as a shift of representation from 
people to the things in the laboratory. According to this perspective, the spokespersons became so 
immersed in the scientific claims and arguments that they started to represent the ‘things’ which are 
visualized on the shop floor of the laboratory instead of holding out for their fellow-members of the 
movement. 
41 Also it might be interesting to read Feenberg’s interpretation on this case study in: (Feenberg, 1999)  
42 A similar, more theoretical approach in relation with these issues: (Frankenfeld, 1992) 
43 See also: (Lee & Roth, 2003) 
44 Similarly, Ellis and Waterton examine the recent attempts to enrol volunteer naturalists in the United 
Kingdom into biodiversity action planning which can be based on the exchange of knowledge of nature 
among the different communities involved (policy makers, naturalists, lay citizens). However, according to 
the authors, the project was not successful in terms of integrating different knowledge forms because the 
rich ascetic and ethical relationships between nature and volunteer naturalist were not taken into account 
from an official point of view. Moreover, these volunteers were not certain how the information gathered 
by them would be used. However, Ellis and Waterton concluded that: “…it is not necessary for the policy 
domain to attempt to incorporate all the rich diversity of knowledge/practices amongst the contributing 
citizenry. It is important, however, that the policy domain find ways of recognising the selective nature of 
its appropriation of its parts of volunteer identities/knowledge/practices. This is because such recognition 
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We could see the similarities between the republican ideal of the self-governing 
community who create their own laws and live according to them and to the ideal of the 
‘Co-production of Knowledge’ in which citizens produce scientific knowledge for 
themselves. Both accounts emphasise the importance of participation for individual self-
development. Moreover both approaches presuppose small, homogenous communities. 
These communities must be organised around a local site or around a similar life situation 
like in the case of people who are involved in a medical experiment and who are struck by 
the same disease. However, the question emerges whether we can perceive our societies 
as the sum of small, homogenous communities.  
 
Consequently, republican theories are usually criticised on the grounds of complexity and 
plurality. It can be argued that republican conceptions of citizenships are no longer 
realistic because they presuppose the existence of small, homogenous communities which 
can literally come together to discuss the problems at issue and elaborate common 
solutions which are acceptable for all. This picture is no longer true for societies which 
are complex, fragmented along different heterogeneous subcultures and, therefore, 
inherently pluralistic. Therefore, a common critique against republican conceptions is that 
they pose a threat to an open, pluralistic and egalitarian society. Republican attempts to 
establish a ‘civic public’ can be seen as a denial of difference on account of the practical 
prerequisite that every participant should leave behind his particularity and difference, to 
adopt a universal standpoint identical to all citizens, the standpoint of the common good 
or general will (Dagger, 2002, p. 154). Liberal accounts can be seen as a good solution for 
preserving difference and plurality by aggregating preferences without trying to unify 
them into a common, singular standpoint. 
 
itself would help to maintain the tenuous balance between subjective identities and the wider senses of 
belonging and constraint that make up ‘citizenship’.” (Ellis&Waterton, 2004, p. 103) 
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In a similar manner, De Wilde (De Wilde, 1997) criticises the advocates of 
democratisation of science and technology issues. Firstly, he argues that the whole 
“strong” democracy project is hopeless because it is not clear how a society that is the 
product of social transformation showing no respect for place can become strongly 
attached again to local settings. Secondly, he argues that those who believe in the 
compatibility of democracy, community and technology mix a ‘territorial’ meaning of the 
community with a ‘relational’ one. However, he continues, conflating relational and 
territorial meanings of community makes it difficult to shy away from “romantic 
localism”. Thus, in his opinion, ‘local’ loyalties are more important than others for pro-
democrats. However, in his view, democracy in our age, which is not attached to this kind 
of pastoral meaning, means managing the co-existence of differences and preserving 
pluralism in a society. 
 
Reconsidered national citizenship 
 
If these republican accounts have been criticised because of their insensitivity to the 
complexity and plurality of modern societies even at the nation-state level, we can 
understand that they are ‘out of the game’ when debates are about the ideal form of 
European citizenship. Nobody argues along classical republican lines of argument because 
the implementations of its ideals are no longer feasible. This way, the self-governing 
character of local, small, homogenous communities is remarkable and exemplary but one 
suspects that these communities will remain exceptions rather than become the general 
rule. 
 
However scholars, like Schnapper (Schnapper, 1997) and Miller (Miller, 1995), argue 
against the decoupling of the nation state and citizenship because the relationship 
between them ensures the participation in a more or less definite political community. 
Schnapper, for example, stresses the point that citizenship must today remain both a 
principle of legitimacy and a source of social bonds, because it is the only one to conform 
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to the characteristics and requirements of modern democratic society. This is only 
possible if citizenship keeps its national character even if it integrates population 
otherwise divided by their different ethnic, religious, and cultural origins (Schnapper, 
1997, pp. 212-218). 
 
Schnapper also points out that there is actually no European citizenship existing 
independently of national citizenship. For example, he argues, European elections 
currently carry a political significance that is primarily national in nature. The creation of a 
truly European citizenship would imply that a European public realm needs to be 
established first in which individuals would consider themselves full-fledged citizens. This 
political arena common to all European citizens would be needed, organised around 
European stakes, debates and institutions.  
 
Nevertheless, according to Schnapper, this is far from becoming reality and the possibility 
of realising it in the foreseeable future is questionable. So, although the nation-state and 
national citizenship does not meet the requirements of the republican ideal of a self-
governing community at least to some extent it guarantees the possibility of participation 
for citizens. Schnapper argues that the civic principle might fade away in the course of the 
construction of Europe and that the ensuing depolitisation will weaken the political will 
of Europeans (p. 217). Yet, the question for them is not how to create a new citizenship 
at a transnational level but how the relationship between nationalism, state and citizenship 
should be reconstructed to rescue national citizenship (Tambini, 2001, pp. 211-212). This 
may be true for the ‘scientific citizens’ who have less means to affect decisions at a 
transnational level than at the national political arena. However, two points are worth 
mentioning here. 
 
Firstly, while it may seem that local homogenous communities are exceptions in a 
pluralised, complex society, the significant part of Feenberg’s theoretical work deals with 
the problem of participation (Feenberg, 1999). He does not question that local 
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communities have less and less power to affect the development and operation of large 
technological systems. Yet, he argues that new homogenous communities are emerging in 
these very technological systems that are able to reformulate and change these systems 
from the inside. The systematic character of modern technology which makes political 
action unavailing at a local level, on the flip side of the coin, helps new communities45 to 
organise themselves and protest effectively against the present form of these systems and 
change them. Accordingly, Feenberg argues that dispersed though these homogenous 
communities might be, they are still able to muster and allocate political power by using 
technological systems (Feenberg, 1999). This can represent one way of how the 
republican ideal can be preserved under the conditions of a complex and diverse 
transnational society like the EU. It is conceivable that the Internet will become a means 
of ‘self-organisation’ and ‘self-government’ for these communities even across language 
barriers and national borders of emerging transnational entities such as the EU. 
 
Secondly, Jasanoff and Martello (Jasanoff&Martello, 2004) depict a completely different 
situation about the dynamics of the local and the transnational. Far from suggesting that 
local communities are losing political power against transnational institutions or 
technological systems they show how local communities and locality in general is gaining 
new power in the transnational arena. This does not mean, however, that locality remains 
the same in this process. In transnational negotiations, locality itself becomes a discursive 
token which is used by various actors to put across their points. Moreover, the irony of 
the process is that while local communities strive for preserving their local culture or their 
local environment, they have to present their case and stress their interests in 
transnational arenas.46  
 
45 Feenberg, for example, stresses the important role that the Internet and the mailing lists played in 
helping people in a similar life position/problem to find each other and organize themselves. 
46 This was the case in the Zeng  debate as well which was about a radar system intended to be installed in 
a nature reserve area and close to local communities. The local community first commenced local 
demonstrations, then prompted a national debate and finally the issue was at a transnational level taken up 
by members of the European Parliament. (Kiraly, 2005) 
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So, one of these two views stresses that local communities are no longer able to have any 
effects on or change technological systems; while the other shows how these local 
communities, by virtue of their being local, are increasingly becoming empowered in 
transnational negotiations. However they have one thing in common, namely, they both 
show that local, homogenous communities take a different form under conditions of a 
technological society. This way, both approaches stress that the republican ideal for 
‘scientific citizens’ takes a different form in complex societal constellations. These two 
accounts express two different forms of how these ‘scientific citizens’ can instigate 
political action on the basis of the homogenous communities even at the complex level of 
a diverse transnational society like the EU.   
 




In the following part I shall discuss how Habermas tried to deal with the tension between 
the liberal and the republican account.48 He suggests that the main problem with the 
republican account is that it is too idealistic and that it makes the democratic process 
dependent on the virtues of citizens. It is often said that there is a moral overburdening of 
the citizen in this theory considering the fact that the members of a political community 
have to meet time to time to discuss, debate and thereby give legitimacy to decisions and 
laws which have bearing on them. In line with this, only those decisions can be 
47 In this section I will also discuss Habermas’ ideas  and relate them to the issues of science & technology. 
However, it is important to mention that Habermas’ Between Facts and Norms is about law and based on the 
assumption that law is anchored in the lifeworld. This implies a special problem since although complexity 
can be understood as a characteristic of both law and science & technology, the latter represents a totally 
different logic and understanding of the world and seemingly has neither direct nor indirect relationship 
with the lifeworld. I shall not reflect on this problem in depth since it is outside the scope of this paper.  
48 Habermas’ work is very complex and discusses the problems of deliberation and legitimacy on many 
different levels. However, here I cannot do justice to his internally complex and sophisticated account. I 
would only restrict myself to show how the theorist tries to solve the problem of participation in a 
differentiated and complex society. Moreover, because of space limit I would not discuss concepts such as 
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considered legitimate with which everyone who is affected by it would agree. In contrast, 
the liberal account interprets the process of politics as mere aggregation of pre-given 
interests ignoring the question of legitimacy, which cannot be administratively produced 
but can only emerge discursively from the everyday life contexts of the members of a 
political community. In this way, Habermas distinguishes between two kind of political 
power: communicative and administrative. According to his ideas, political processes 
should be analysed not just from within an action-theoretical but also a systems-
theoretical perspective.  
 
On the one hand, the action-theoretical perspective, related to the republican ideal, would 
consist of the discussion about the role of citizens in influencing the political system via 
opinion- and will-formation. The communicative power emerges from the public sphere 
where discussions take place about the issues of everyday life connected to the wider 
socio-political context.   
 
On the other hand, the system-based perspective, which can be related to the legal liberal 
account, would show the projects by which legislature, judiciary and administration are 
dealing with every day. From this perspective we can see the self-propelling nature of 
political processes in complex societies in which citizens only take part by casting their 
vote which, in turn, serve as a basis for the aggregation of their preferences reflecting 
their interests. Therefore, the tension is between the systematic, self-maintaining character 
of our political-systems, on the one hand, and the question of meaningful participation, 
on the other (Habermas, 1997).  
 
At the same time, these two contrasting approaches form a part of his theory of 
procedural democracy with a view to answering the question of how the complexity of 
’ideal speak situation’ and the ’facticity and normativity of law’, concepts which are at the centre of his 
work and characterise the basis of the following model. 
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modern societies can be reconciled with participation and the ideal of a self-governing 
community?  
 
Regh and Bohman (Regh&Bohman, 2002) while introducing Habermas’ ideas on 
procedural democracy, argue that if a theory wants to deal with this complexity, in other 
words, if it wants to link deliberation and decision-making with the citizenry, it must hold 
together three terms in a certain tension. The first problem refers to the situation when 
deliberation relegated so much to representatives that it would be difficult to call the 
account “democratic”. Secondly, the opposite error would be to underestimate 
complexity and locate deliberation primarily in the public sphere.  A third problem would 
be to overestimate the possibilities of bureaucratic control, thereby undermining popular 
sovereignty and the public control of decisions. The problems of complexity are best 
represented by the dilemma of the deliberative approach: 
 
“…either decision-making institutions gain effectiveness at the cost of democratic 
deliberation, or they retain democracy at the cost effective decision-making. In either 
case, citizenship, deliberation, and decision-making fail to be linked, so that the public 
sphere becomes powerless or the power of political institutions become reified (ibid. p. 
37)” 
 
To reconcile the different notions of political process, Habermas argues that the 
democratic process must be connected to the peripheral network of political public 
sphere in pursuing legitimacy (Habermas, 1996). What does this claim mean? According 
to his theory, deliberative politics extends beyond the formally organised political system 
to a vast communication network which is called public sphere. This model of 
deliberative politics tries to grasp the process of opinion- and will-formation as a “two-
track” process in which there is a division of labour between “weak” publics and “strong” 
publics (Baynes, 2002).  The “weak” publics refers to the informally organised public 
sphere ranging from private association to the mass media located in civil society and the 
“strong” publics formed by the parliamentary bodies and other formally organised 
institutions of the political system. 
126
 
“The constitutionally structured political system is internally differentiated into spheres of 
administrative and communicative power and remains open to the lifeworld. For 
institutionalised opinion and will-formation depends on supplies coming from the 
informal contexts of communication found in the public sphere, in civil society, and in 
spheres of private life. In other words, the political action system is embedded in 
lifeworld contexts (Habermas, 1996, p. 352).” 
 
In this division of labour the role of the “weak” publics is not to take over the steering 
functions of the administrative organs of the “strong” public but to bear the responsibility 
of identifying and interpreting social problems in a way which is translatable into the 
language of formally organised political institutions. As Habermas puts it: 
 
“To this extent, the public sphere is a warning system with sensors that, though, 
unspecialized, are sensitive throughout society. From the perspective of democratic 
theory, the public sphere must, in addition, amplify the pressure of problems, that is, not 
only detect and identify problems but also convincingly and influentially thematize them 
in such a way that they are taken up and dealt with by parliamentary complexes. Besides 
the ‘signal’ function, there must be an effective thematization. The capacity of the public 
sphere to solve problems on its own is limited (Habermas, 1996, p. 352).” 
 
The central concept here therefore is problematisation which means that the dispersed 
networks of the public sphere are able to perceive, discuss and redefine problems in a 
new way. This is not possible for administrative complexes with their operation logic 
oriented towards effectiveness due to the fact that these are 
 
“…institutions that decide under time pressure have a weak capacity to detect latent 
problems (…) And they have little initiative to stage newly emergent problems in a 
successful and dramatic manner (p. 358).”  
 
The model in which all these different aspects of modern political life could be integrated 
is called ‘sluice-gate’ which introduces a more fine-grained analysis of this relation 
between publics with a distinction between “center” and “periphery” which can be 
identified with the “weak and strong” publics respectively. Processes of communication 
and decision-making thus lie along a center-periphery axis, they are structured by a system 
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of “sluices”. The idea of discourse democracy is that for decisions made at the core to be 
legitimate, they must be steered by communication flows that start at the periphery and 
pass through the sluices of democratic and constitutional procedures situated at the 
entrance to the parliamentary complex or to the courts (Habermas, 1996, pp. 354-359). 
 
For the most part, operations in the core area of political system proceed according to 
routines following established patterns (ibid. p. 357). The decisive question in the model 
is whether the periphery is capable of discovering, identifying and thematising in a way 
which can disturb and, in turn, change the normal pattern and procedures of operation of 
institutions in the core (Némedi, 2004). This could happen when perception of problems 
and problem situations have taken a conflictual turn and controversies in the broader 
public sphere primarily ignite around the normative aspects of the problems most at issue. 
 
To sum up, Habermas tries to solve the problem of participation by locating popular 
sovereignty in the diffuse network of public spheres.49 The public distribution of 
information and perspectives could be viewed as harbouring a kind of communicative 
rationality, but not in the idealised sense that requires complete understanding on the part 
of each citizen. The complexity of public spheres suggests a plethora of loosely connected 
and fragmented discourses in which various groups of individuals achieve partial insights 
into issues through discussion (Regh & Bohmann, 2002, p. 40). This account presents 
public reason as an emergent property of a diffused network of discourses. The 
programmatic message of this theory therefore to foster processes of communication and 
design institutional procedures that at least make it more likely that the political decisions 
49 For Habermas the preconditions of the emergence of public reason are the ’ideal speak conditions’ 
which basically refer to a set of conditions such as unbiased communication, the freedom from coercion, 
the openness of the debate to all those who are affected and so on. A decision can only be rational if all 
those who are affected would agree with it under conditions of the ’ideal speak conditions’. This is the 
principle of universalization.  
These ideal conditions are contrafactual in the sense that they cannot be found in real life, however, 
according to Habermas they are anchored in language and can be partly found in the lifeworld, to put it 
more clearly, in the communicative practices of public sphere. 
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“will be based on reasons that would contrafactually correspond to those emerging from 
a discourse both open to all and free of coercion” (p. 41).  
 
To link this back with the question of citizenship, it is obvious that Habermas’ main goal 
is not to introduce a new kind of citizenship50 but to understand how the ideal of a self-
governing community can be preserved under conditions of complex, differentiated 
societies. To be able to do this he locates popular sovereignty in the communication flows 
of the dispersed networks of the public sphere. By doing this, he can address three 
theoretical problems. Firstly, he does not have to identify a “body” of the citizens who 
discuss the decisions affecting their life but he can transpose this task to the operation of 
this ‘subjectless communication’ (Habermas, 1997, p. 58). 
 
“This fully dispersed sovereignty is not even embodied in the heads of the associated 
members. Rather, if one can still speak of ‘embodiment’ at all, then sovereignty is found 
in those subjectless forms of communication that regulate the flow of discursive opinion 
and will-formation in such a way that their fallible outcomes have the practical reason on 
their side (p. 58-59).” 
 
Secondly, this way he can also deal with the question of plurality by presupposing 
different public spheres along the lines of different life circles, subcultures and social 
situations. The dispersed but connected network of public spheres can deal with the 
question of participation in fundamentally heterogeneous communities which characterise 
modern societies. 
 
Thirdly, because he presupposes that public spheres are not organised by the goal-
oriented logic but by the communicative logic of mutual understanding, he depicts these 
spheres as relatively open for everybody who wants to take part in discussions about 
problematised issues. This way, he also gives an answer to the question of equal 
50What I mean here is that Habermas’  main focus is not on the attributes and the virtues of individual 
citizens instead he constructs them as members of a special community, that is, as members of the 
dispersed network of public spheres. The characteristics of individual citizens can only be re-constructed 
indirectly from his texts. 
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participation of citizens because, theoretically, via the networks of public spheres 
everyone can affect the decision and policy-making in issues which are important for him 
or her. 
 
Accordingly, Habermas’ theory calls for ‘deliberative citizens’ who participate in these 
communication networks which partly possess the prerequisites of the unsubverted and 
unbiased communication situation. Citizens have to take part in the public deliberations 
to develop active citizenship. In the course of these deliberations different problems can 
be identified and solutions can be proposed. The outcome of these deliberations are being 
channelled into the political centre which needs these deliberations to justify its decisions, 
thereby gaining legitimacy for them. The deliberative citizen can and should, therefore, 
generate communicative power linked to problematic issues which can counter-balance 
the self-maintaining character of the administrative power. This way, the centre of his 
theory is not the actual relationship between citizens and the administration but the 
relation between public spheres and the administration. So the main question is how 
institutions which can affectively channel in opinions generated in the public spheres can 
be established. 51 Using Habermas’ own words: 
 
“According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depends not on a 
collectively acting citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding 
procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on the interplay of 
institutionalised deliberative processes with informally developed public opinions 






51 “According to discourse theory, the success of deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting 
citizenry but on the institutionalisation of the corresponding procedures and conditions of 
communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalised deliberative processes with informally 
developed public opinions.” 
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Debating scientific citizenship 
 
As far as science and technology are concerned, various ‘participatory technology 
assessment’ projects52 are faced with similar problems and dilemmas (Castro & Menédez, 
2003). Nonetheless, Callon (Callon, 1999B) elaborated his third model53 in relation with 
these initiatives. He calls this model the ‘Public Debate Model’ referring to the dialogical 
nature of these participatory arrangements. As Hamlett (Hamlett, 1992, p. 122) argues, 
these processes involve individuals who have diverse values and preferences. These 
deliberations do not refer to the position of an interest group but rather reflect a 
reasoned, informed, consensual judgment. The participants are trying to reach a 
consensus from the initial situation which is dominated by diverse and disparate 
knowledge, values and preferences (Hamlett, 2003, p. 122). Apart from this, this model 
also emphasises the educational and psychological effects that the process of deliberation, 
that is, the participatory activity has on the participants. According to Laird: 
 
“Direct participation theory (…) places a strong emphasis on the effects of participation 
on those who engage in it. Truly democratic participation changes the outlooks and 
attitudes of the participants. (…) Interests are not seen as unchanging black boxes; they 
are affected sometimes profoundly, by the experience of participation. Democratic 
processes should engender in people longer time horizons and broader scope in thinking 
about what their interests are. In short, democracy enables people to become fully 
developed citizens (Laird, 1993, p. 354).” 
 
Furthermore, this model emphasises dialogue and proposes richer relations between lay 
people and scientists. Callon argues that in this model the public is depicted as a container 
of specific, particular and concrete knowledge and competencies. When citizens mobilise 
(Habermas, 1996, p. 298)  
52 In the past decades we have seen a growing interest in establishing these kinds of deliberative 
institutions in relation with science and technology. The general idea behind it was to establish institutions 
which can help to channel the citizens’ opinions to help the process of decision-making and legislation. 
The vanguards in this trend were the Danish and Dutch ‘Participatory Technology Assessment’ projects 
whose models have spread all over Europe by now (EUROPTA, 2000). 
53 Originally it was the second model in Callon’s article but because of the line of argument in my essay I 
changed the order. 
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these fields of knowledge in the public arenas they can enhance the abstract and inhuman 
knowledge of the scientists. 
 
While scientific knowledge has a universal value here as well, it is incomplete and 
restricted because it is constructed under controlled circumstances and the conditions of 
its validity are restricted to the laboratory. Accordingly, reality is always overflowing 
laboratory-produced knowledge which cannot absorb the full complexity and richness of 
the world. In that sense, scientists are also limited by the narrowness of their specialty and 
are therefore as powerless as the laypersons when addressing ethical, social or economic 
issues. Since, Callon argues, science is at best incomplete, at worst unrealistic, it is 
advisable to open forums for discussion and deliberation to allow for a broader 
perspective to be incorporated (Callon, 1993, pp. 85-86). Deliberation thus can serve as a 
process which keeps diverse fields of knowledge together and allows for actors to widen 
their own limited and fallible perspectives by drawing on each other’s knowledge, 
experience and capabilities (Elam & Bertilisson, 2003). To use Irwin’s expressions, these 
political forms might help to steer expert-based science to the direction of a more ‘citizen-
based science’ (Irwin, 1995).  
 
So, these procedures by establishing public arenas for debate tend to muddle the usual 
boundaries between specialists and non-specialists. Firstly, because deliberation is itself 
seen as a process for becoming informed and for receiving continuous education and 
training so as to become ‘better citizens’ by the very act of participation (Elam & 
Bertilisson, 2003, p. 242) Secondly, because this viewpoint calls for knowledge which is 
generated by the comparison of opinions, knowledge and judgements which are mutually 
enriching instead of knowledge stemming from an allegedly unerring and self-confident 
science. In this manner, the construction of public forms of discussion might profoundly 
transform the process of private and public decision-making. They can provide the 
opportunity for the different stakeholders to express themselves and establish a minimum 
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right of access to information. The legitimacy of decisions stems essentially from the 
consultation and open debate led beforehand (Callon, 1999B, p. 89).  
 
We could see that projects of citizens’ involvement may or may not draw on the work of 
Habermas. Yet, there is a link between the general political theory on deliberation and the 
theory on deliberations about scientific and technology issues.  Apart from this, three 
parallel points are worth mentioning both in connection with the discursive democracy 
theory of Habermas and the ‘Public Debate Model’ of Callon. 
 
It seems important to highlight that both models try to deal with the complexity of our 
societies by keeping the division of labour between (administrative or techno-scientific) 
specialists and citizens. The question is, therefore, not about how to dissolve the borders 
between knowledge fields but how to guarantee the dialogue between them and that the 
citizens’ opinions can become part of and affect the decision-making and legislation 
processes. In short, the problem is how to keep the option for participation in highly 
complex societies open without reducing the citizens to consumers or clients. From the 
viewpoint of these models, it is too idealistic to suppose that the complexity of the 
political system or of science and technology can be reduced and ‘tamed’ in order to let 
‘ordinary’ citizens take over the decision-making or the knowledge production. However, 
my point here is not to query the possibility of these ways of practising general or 
scientific citizenship. Still, in the contemporary world those processes tend to become 
even more complex and distant from the context of everyday life instead of losing 
intricacy.  
 
The second point is the self-restricting54 character of theories (Baynes, 2002, pp. 18-19). 
Habermas argues that the democratic practice must respect the boundaries of the 
political-administrative and economic subsystems that have become relatively free of the 
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everyday life context and in this sense “autonomous”. He does not mention science and 
technology but it is more than likely that he also considers them as partly autonomous 
sub-systems.55 So, according to his theory, the goal of radical democracy is not the 
democratic organisation of these subsystems, but rather a type of indirect steering of 
them through the mediation of law. The reason for that lies in the fact that the complexity 
of these subsystems does not allow for direct intervention of those who lack the 
necessary knowledge for that. Therefore, Habermas argues that: 
 
“Various symptoms of such a cognitive overburdening of deliberative politics lend 
support to the assumption (…) that discursive opinion- and will-formation governed by 
democratic procedures lacks the complexity to take in and digest the operatively necessary 
knowledge. The required steering knowledge no longer seems to penetrating the 
capillaries of a communication network whose structures are predominantly horizontal, 
osmotically permeable, and egalitarian (Habermas, 1996, p. 320).” 
 
Citizens in this way can never directly steer processes either in economy or in science or 
in technology but can only form opinions about the decisions to be made in the political 
core.  
 
The third problematic point is that while Habermas criticised the moral over-burdening 
of the citizen in republican theory he himself morally over-burdens the public spheres. 
These do not only have to provide access for equal participation to all citizens regardless 
of social classes, gender, race but they should also be undisturbed and unsubverted from 
the administrative and economic power. Habermas is aware of this shift of weight in the 
54 Baynes does not use the expression ‘self-restricting’ to refer to the epistemic standpoint of deliberative 
theories but as an indication that the political arrangements they promote can only have an indirect effect 
on the economy. 
55 In his classical essay titled ‘Technology and Science as Ideology’ Habermas defines technology as the 
underlying logic of the system in contrast with the logic of mutual understanding characterising the 
lifeworld. This encourages me to presume that science and technology are also partly autonomous 
subsystems consisted by the system in general.  
However, the “real” picture is a little more complicated than this statement in the case of sciences. In one 
of his early books he distinguishes between the ‘empirical-analytical’, the ‘hermeneutical’ and ‘critical 
sciences’. According to this distinction only the empirical-analytical sciences could be defined as part of 
the system because of their close relationship to technology and technological logic. The other two could 
be more closely related to the lifeword. See more about this matter: (Habermas, 1971, 1972) 
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normative framework of his theory but he maintains that public spheres have the 
potential to meet these high expectations.  
 
“As we have seen, democratic procedures should produce rational outcomes insofar as 
opinion-formation inside parliamentary bodies remains sensitive to the results of a 
surrounding informal opinion-formation in autonomous public spheres. No doubt this 
second assumption of an unsubverted political public sphere is unrealistic; properly 
understood, however, it is not utopian in the bad sense. It would be realized to the extent 
that opinion-forming associations developed, catalyzed the growth of autonomous public 
spheres, and, in virtue of the natural visibility such associations enjoy, changed the 
spectrum of values, issues, and reasons (Habermas, 1997, p. 60).” 
 
As it has been mentioned above, the main question remains how institutions of 
deliberation, which help to bridge the gap between citizenry and decision-making, can be 
established. As for science and technology, there have already been various experiments 
to understand and improve the processes of citizens’ involvement in science and 
technology issues. However, the phenomenon of European integration means a new 
challenge for these experiments as well and calls for a more complex and more extended 
version of these arrangements. This is why we can analyse the project of Meeting of 
Minds as an exemplary project of this approach. But before coming back to further 





Theorists such as Habermas or Delanty argue that a post-national citizenship has to be 
fostered. Citizenship thus must retain all its political meaning and translate the values that 
are common to European democracies as expressed through their commitment to human 
rights (Schnapper, 1997, pp. 209-210). The situation today, that is, the political 
construction of Europe and the presence of stable and permanent foreign residents forces 
us to separate the historical link between nationality – as a community of culture – and 
citizenship – as political practice. Habermas argues that the realm of patriotism should be 
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separated from the realm of citizenship, thus dissociating the “nation” (the realm of 
affectivity) from the “state” (“realm of the law”) (Habermas, 2001). He is in favour of the 
creation of a “constitutional patriotism” which refers to abstract processes and principles 
presupposing that national identity could be separated from a civic and political 
participation based on reason and human rights (Schnapper, 1997, p. 210). In this way, 
both Habermas and Delanty (Habermas 2001; Delanty, 1995) want to create a form of 
democratic political organisation that would be protected from national and nationalistic 
passions. 
 
Schnapper is critical of their theories regarding post-national theory as a pure civic 
practice. She is strongly sceptical of the assumption that a purely civic society, founded on 
abstract principles, could have the strength to control passions born from allegiances to 
ethnic and religious groups. Her question is as follows: “Up to which point can 
intellectual commitment to abstract principles replace the affective and political 
mobilisation aroused by the internalisation of the national political and cultural tradition 
(Schnapper, 1997, pp. 211-212).” However, Delanty gives post-national citizenship a 
different interpretation: 
 
“Post-national citizenship is not to be understood merely as a formal constitutional right. 
It also embraces a substantive dimension, which empowers citizens with the right to 
participation in the democratic polity. In this sense it is fundamentally different from 
national citizenship, which is purely formal. Purely formal notions of citizenship are 
dangerous since they leave open the possibility for their contents to be filled with populist 
ideology. Citizenship should be the ultimate basis of legitimation for institution building, 
not ambiguous cultural identities. It is important that it be linked to participation in the 
new political institutions that are being create (Delanty, 1995, p. 163).” 
 
In accordance with these thoughts, the construction of Europe could become the forum 
for democratic political practices, separate from national feelings and passions. This can 
only happen if a transnational democratic society creates a “communicational” or 
intersubjective “space” for itself (Schnapper, 1997, p. 217). This implies that, as we could 
see at a national level, spaces need to exist at a transnational level where citizens, 
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politicians, and experts can talk to each other about dealing with the problems of 
community life and arbitrating conflicts between individuals and groups. While Schnapper 
argues that these spaces, that is, public spheres can only exist if participants at least share 
a common language, culture, and values, Delanty stresses that the participation in a 
common democratic polity itself can create a bond between citizens from many different 
cultural background. 
 
In this case, the scientific citizen’s role at a transnational level is not so different than her 
role at a national level. She has to be informed about and become engaged in discussions 
and debates about the role and effects of different scientific achievements and 
technologies on her personal life. The most striking questions are the same as the above-
mentioned problems with post-national citizenship. Can participation in common 
democratic polity transcend national and ethnic affections? Apart from this, the question 
of the public spheres is even more important. Can public spheres be invented and 
established at a transnational level where citizens can discuss issues of science and 
technology? Barry’s words implies that they can:  
 
“Public spheres are not just spaces within which opinions and argument can be expressed 
concerning matters of public importance. Nor they to be valued for their own sake. They 
are as Habermas's early work suggests, artefacts of certain, no doubt historical specific 
forms of practical activity. They can be invented, reinvented and disinvente (Barry, 2001, 
p. 179).” 
 
The project of ‘Meeting of Minds’ is important not merely because it is the first 
Technological Assessment project at a transnational, that is, at a European level. It is also 
very important because it aims to create a common communicative space where citizens, 
scientists, policy-experts can meet and discuss issues about brain science. This way the 
projects overall aim is to establish a European public sphere and, as such, refers to the 
broader political and institutional context of the EU. More precisely, one can even say 
that the project refers to one way in which the institutional and political context of the 
EU can be opened up to the wider public, can become more transparent and hence more 
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democratic. Nonetheless, it is another matter whether it is beneficial to supplement the 
self-organising characteristics of public spheres with officially organised institutional 
arrangements. This goes back to Markoff’s question of whether democracy organised 
from ‘above’ can truly be democratic (Markoff, 1999). However, coming back from social 
theory to practical arguments, one has to note that this is a small pilot project, thus its 
significance and effects are limited. The emphasis, therefore, is not on what this project 
could achieve but rather how the project can deal with problems which are clearly present 




In this part of the thesis I attempted to introduce three different kinds of model of the 
’academic layer’ of citizenship discourse. The three underlying political theories were 
those of the liberal, the republican and the deliberative models. As far as citizenship is 
concerned, the chapter provided the description of three strata of each of these models, 
namely, that of the political, the scientific and the transnational citizenship. This three by 
three matrix can be clearly illustrated by the extracting diagram below. 
 
Figure 11. The Matrix of citizenship types and theories 
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To make the further reading easier and easier to understand there is also a short summing 
up in a written form below about what has been written hitherto. First of all, the liberal 
model begins with individual freedom which has to be protected from the state and from 
the actions of other individuals. Thus, citizenship in this model does not contain strong 
normative values but it is a formal-legal position or framework which can be filled with 
various value-sets and lifestyles. This model conceives citizens as clients or consumers 
whose preferences are mirrored by their choices made at the market or at an election. The 
main task, therefore, is to collect and aggregate these preferences on the one hand, and to 
get the citizens informed about the possible options on the other. The ‘Public Education 
Model’ discussed by Callon (Callon, 1997) is very similar regarding these aspects and 
translates them to the spheres of science and technology. This model emphasises the 
‘information deficit’ and the problem of citizens’ ignorance, which has to be addressed.  
Moreover, similar ideas also emerged about the issue of transnational citizenship. ‘New 
citizenship’ is considered to be a purely economic relationship between the citizen and the 
governing body of the actual political territory where he or she lives. In their most 
extreme forms, liberal theories on transnational citizenship regard citizens as merely 
taxpayers.  
 
Although these citizenship images are closer to consumers or clients than to a politically 
engaged actor, the political aspects are not missing altogether from the liberal theory. The 
lobbying activity of voluntary organisations is not at odds with the pluralist versions of 
liberal theory. Accordingly, these civil organisations are also considered to be important 
actors at a transnational political level, although one cannot speak about a transnational 
civil society yet. 
 
Secondly, the republican tradition grasps citizenship not as a formal and static concept 
but as an active, more substantive dimension of participation in the civic community. 
According to this account, the community of citizens is considered to be self-governing 
because after common discussion they create and impose laws on themselves.  This 
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approach is akin to what Callon (Callon, 1999B) calls the ‘Co-production of Knowledge 
Model’. In this model, citizens take part in the making of knowledge or in the innovation 
process and work in close relationship with specialists. This way, they create their own 
scientific understanding or technological device for themselves, so the gap between 
citizens and scientists is getting narrower in this model.   
 
There is no appropriate translation of these ideas to the transnational level because 
republican ideas in their traditional meaning can only work in the case of small, 
homogenous communities. However, proponents of a ‘reconsidered national citizenship’ 
argue that the only way to save the republican ideals of an active, engaged citizenship is to 
maintain the link between nation-states and citizenship.  
 
Thirdly, the deliberative model elaborated by Habermas (Habermas, 1996) attempts to 
reconcile the contradictory elements of these two different approaches. According to this 
theory, in a complex and plural society it is not possible to go back to the republican ideal 
of the self-governing community, yet it is essential to keep meaningful participation under 
the conditions of the systematic characteristics of modern society. Habermas argues that 
this is possible via the dispersed networks of public spheres where the opinion- and will-
formation of the citizens can take place by discussing common matters among 
themselves. The question is how the results of these deliberative discussions can be 
channelled into shaping the political system and giving legitimacy to decision-making. 
Correspondingly, Callon (Callon, 1999B) offers a third model, that is, the ‘Public Debate 
Model’ in which citizens take part by discussing scientific issues and forming their own 
opinion in the course of a deliberative process. The gap between citizens and scientists in 
the ‘Public Debate Model’ is bridged by pubic debates, which have the capability of 
keeping diverse fields of knowledge together. 
 
Similarly, post-national citizenship developed by Habermas and Delanty (Habermas, 
2001; Delanty, 1995) refers to a political practice independent of national affectivity. This 
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form of transnational citizenship, therefore, implies abstract processes and principles 
presupposing that national identity could be separated from a civic and political 
participation based on reason and human rights. According to this form of citizenship, 
citizens in a new transnational polity would not be linked by race, language or by a culture 
but by their involvement and participation in the same political community. 
 
After unravelling the ‘academic layer’ of the citizenship discourse, I will move on to 
discuss the recent trends in fostering a European (scientific) citizenship by focusing on 
the ‘official discursive layer’. This chapter will not only analyse the identity constructions 
embedded in the texts in question but will also attempt to show connections between the 
academic and the policy discursive layer.  
 
The following chapter will turn back the attention to Meeting of Minds by investigating 
how citizens understand themselves in terms of their role in the project. By analysing 
interviews, it will be possible to trace not only different roles but also different 
connections and visions of Europe. Since both Hungarian and Dutch participants were 
asked to set forth their ideas, the question of how participants from different political 
cultures could find their place in the process will be also touched upon. 
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4. OFFICIAL DISCURSIVE LAYER ON CITIZENSHIP 
  
This section highlights the recent trends in fostering a European citizenship by focusing 
on different documents. The focus will be on four different but interrelated issues. Firstly, 
drawing on the articles of Chris Shore there will be a section on the conventional 
strategies to construct the European citizen. After that, I shall discuss and analyse the 
‘White Paper of Governance’, which represents a shift from a legal passive citizenship 
discourse to a more active citizenship ideal. In this paper citizens are conceived to be the 
active participants in the process of integration and participation in the political decision-
making system at all levels. Participation is considered to be a central question and 
expected to play an essential role in the future European polity. Thirdly, both the ‘Science, 
Society and the Citizen in Europe’ and the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ refer to this 
document and try to translate and employ the main ideas of governance to the specific 
areas of Science and Technology. I shall discuss these in detail highlighting the recently 
emerging interest in participatory arrangements. Fourthly, in connection with these recent 
trends this part of the essay will also reflect on the project of ‘Meeting of Minds’ and how 
the aims and rhetoric of the organisers draw on the broader political context of the 
European Union.   
 
4.1. Inventing Europeans 
  
In the early years of integration, the questions of European identity and citizenship were 
not raised. This can be explained at least by two different factors. Firstly, identity and 
citizenship have crucial importance in a community which is political in its nature. 
However, integrating Europe was not intended to be a political integration but gained a 
political dimension later when the economic and legal integration process had already 
been set in motion. The political dimension has put identity and citizenship on the agenda 
when high-ranking bureaucrats and leaders understood that Europe could not be built 
without the consent of their tenants, the European citizens who only exist in official 
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documents and as a legal status but not in a lived social reality. Secondly, in relation with 
this aspect, because the integration was mainly imagined as creating a common economic 
and legal space, it also seemed logical that after the completion of this project people 
would see each other as partners who work, trade, live and communicate with each other 
in this common homogenous space. Therefore, citizenship existed as a legal category, as a 
citizen worker but not as a political category.  
 
Yet, Chris Shore, in his article titled ‘Inventing Homo Europaeus’, argues that however 
impressive legal, economic and institutional advances toward a united Europe may 
happen to be, EU elites significantly failed to create a ‘European people’ (Shore, 2001, p. 
55). There is no such thing as ‘European identity’ which could provide a basis for 
cohesion and solidarity in the emerging European state (p. 55). Along with many other 
theorists, Shore argues that without a ‘European public’ as a self-recognising category 
there is no use speaking about democracy and democratic governance in the EU. 
 
“The EU is thus an embryonic state without a nation; an administration without a 
government. It aspires to be a democracy, but cannot become one until there exists a self-
identifying European people or demos. And democracy without a demos is simply cratos 
(power) masked by telos (idealism) (ibid. p. 57).” 
 
However, the interest in the cultural integration of Europe and the questions about the 
role of the citizens in it is far from new. Shore presents how these problems become the 
domain of special interest in the ‘80s when there were many different initiatives to 
construct the European political subject. Before that these problems were put aside as 
marginal sides of the integration process. The general belief was that the neo-functionalist 
strategy56 would also help to address the problems of cultural integration and European 
56 The ’neo-functionalist strategy’ expression refers to the ‘traditional’ approach of the EU’s architects and 
founding fathers. This can be described as a process to create a common legal and economic framework 
for Europe which can be filled with the social-political content later. Moreover, the traditional architects 
of Europe also thought that it is enough to create this framework and the social-political integration will 
naturally occur along the lines that they had prescribed beforehand.      
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identity. The remedy for these problems would have had to emerge as a functional 
‘spillover’ of the integration of the spheres of economics and law. 
 
Nonetheless, argues Shore, during the mid 1980s, EU policy-makers had begun to 
advocate a more interventionist stance by discussing integration as a cultural issue. The 
solution which these high officials proposed was a series of public awareness and 
symbolic initiatives to diffuse greater consciousness of shared values and cultural heritage 
among Europeans. To sum up, the task was to educate and inform the public about 
Europe. 
 
Shore elaborates the different initiatives and projects which were intended to fulfil this 
task. Among these the most important ones were the EU-information policy, the attempt 
to ‘Europeanise’ national education systems and the identification of ‘women’ as the key 
target for EU culture building activities. According to Shore, the information policy was 
intended to present Europe to the public as a good product by using information as a tool 
for nurturing European consciousness. The  ‘Europeanisation’ of the national school 
curricula was most apparent in the process of constructing and rewriting history from a 
European perspective. The result was that European identity was portrayed as the end 
product of an evolutionary process, in other words, as the end product of a progressive 
ascent through history. Shore also emphasises that despite the fact that most of the 
initiatives were to create a ‘European Man’ as a new kind of political subjectivity without 
reference to gender differentiation there was also an important gender dimension to the 
cultural politics of European integration. This was the ‘Women of Europe Award’ aimed 
to “honour a woman from each Member State who, in the previous two years, helped to 
increase European integration among the citizens of the European Union.57 
57 Shore shows that this Award sometimes moved close to a comedy. For example, the overall Award 
winner in 1996 was Marit Paulsen a Swedish trade union schooled farmer with ten children who was 
chosen to represent the archetypal ’European Women’. „Living in a strongly anti-EU area, we are told that 
’Marit fights the elements of snow and cold and the anti-EU feeling with her burning devotion for the 
European Union, peace, democracy and the rights of people and animals and the preservation of our 
beautiful European countryside.” (Shore, 2001, p. 61) 
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Shore argues that these initiatives illustrate the way in which culture has become 
increasingly politicised by EU elites in order to ‘construct’ a new political subject for the 
already on-going process of European integration. These projects are also indicative of 
the EU’s characteristically top-down, managerial and instrumental approach to ‘culture-
building’ and the assumption that ‘European identity’ can somehow be engineered from 
above (p. 63). This approach was criticised on many points, yet the most important 
question was what kind of Europe would emerge along these lines. Both Delanty and 
Shore foresee the emergence of a ‘Fortress Europe’ based on officially engendered 
common “heritage” and shared cultural values (Shore, 2001; Delanty, 1995). As Shore and 
Black puts it:  
 
“Yet in order to foster a sense of ‘European identity’ the Commission and the Parliament 
must promote the values and the virtues of that ‘common cultural heritage’ which they 
say all Europeans share (however unaware they may be). (…) The result is a highly 
selective definition of Europe that is politically biased and potentially racist, where 
‘European culture’ is equated with ‘Western Civilization’ (as opposed to ‘African 
barbarism’ or ‘Oriental despotism’, perhaps) whose distinguishing landmarks are Plato, 
NATO, science and the rule of law (Shore & Black, 1994, p. 294).” 
 
These projects, however, did not prove to be successful in terms of winning the loyalty 
and affection of the EU’s would-be citizens. Still, the question of “what might form the 
political and symbolic basis for such a new pattern of identification” (p. 293) remains 
unanswered. Nevertheless, in the recent EU documents a new trend is emerging which 
attempts to find an answer from a different viewpoint. These documents, which I shall 
discuss below, do not intend to inform people about their allegedly common European 
heritage and values but to construct citizens of Europe by allowing and encouraging them 





4.2. Changing Forms of Governance 
 
To move from a more general level to more particular issues let me begin with the ‘White 
Paper of Governance’ released in 2001 (Commission of the European Communities, 
2001). After discussing that, I will move further on to the direction of issues about 
science and technology, that is, I will introduce the ideas of the ‘Science, society and the 
citizen of Europe’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2000A) working 
document and the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ (European Commission, 2002). 
These documents elaborate and apply the issues of governance in the spheres of science 
and technology. Interestingly enough, these documents signify a very recent development 
in political thinking, namely, that the question of governance and participation is raised at 
a transnational level. The emergence of issues such as participation, legitimacy and 
governance in connection with these arenas reflects a shift in understanding in the way 
that politics can be conducted. Apart from this ‘brand new’, emerging aspect of EU 
governance, it is important to note here that all papers are related to each other and all 
refer to the democratic deficit of Europe in one way or another. This way, they share aims 
and have similar means to reach them, therefore often contain similar phrases and 
rhetoric. My aim thus is not to show that these documents are related, because it is 
obvious that they are. What could be more interesting here is the introduction of the ideas 
of governance and in relation with it the presentation of the kind of citizen who would 
take part in shaping policies, form opinions and contribute to integration him or herself.  
 
The ‘White Paper of Governance’ represents politics as a multi-level process steered58 by 
many different actors. The term governance itself refers to new forms of governing and 
administering public life based on interaction between traditional political authorities and 
58 Multi-level process means a dynamic relationship between different levels of the EU’s political 
organisation. These levels are the local, the regional, the national and the European.   
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“civil society”: private operators, public bodies and citizen groups (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2000A).  
 
The paper starts with a general problem, that is, the tension between expectations of the 
people and the role of the EU. The paper argues that although the EU cannot act as 
effectively and as conspicuously as nation-states, the people expect it to do so. Therefore, 
its credibility is at stake since the Union will be judged by its ability to address people’s 
concerns more effectively at European and global level (Commission of the European 
Communities, 2001). Consequently, the people are concerned with the question of how 
the EU uses the powers given by the citizens. The ‘White Paper of Governance’ identifies 
an answer to this question by opening up policy-making and making it more inclusive and 
accountable. As the writers of the document put it:  
 
“The Union is changing as well. (…) It will not be judged solely by its ability to remove 
barriers to trade or to complete an international market; its legitimacy today depends on  
involvement and participation. This means that the linear model of dispensing policies 
from above must be replaced by a virtuous circle, based on feedback, networks and 
involvement from policy creation to implementation at all levels (ibid. p. 11)”  
 
The document also touches upon the problems of European identity and belonging. 
Important shifts in the strategies in this field can also be identified and detected. It has 
been mentioned above that, just like in problematic social situations in relation with 
science and technology, the harmonious relationship between Europe and its would-be 
citizens was conceived to be a matter of information distribution and marketing. 
Information and communication still play an important role in this document, yet it says 
that providing more information and more effective communication is just a pre-
condition for generating a sense of belonging to Europe. In order to create this pre-
condition, the document argues in favour of a more effective and a more widespread use 
of info-communication technologies. They should play, the argument continues, an 
important role in the creation of an inter-active platform for information, feedback and 
debate. This platform can be a place where citizens can identify themselves as common 
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citizens of the same democratic polity and foster a sense of belonging by creating a shared 
responsibility in the future of this community. So the ‘White Paper’ argues: 
 
“The aim should be to create a trans-national ‘space’ where citizens from different 
countries can discuss what they perceive as being the important challenge for the Union. 
This should help policy makers to stay in touch with European public opinion, and could 
guide them in identifying European projects which mobilise public support (ibid. p. 12).” 
 
Nevertheless, the document also proclaims that the central point of governance cannot be 
merely at a European level. It calls for strategies and projects which also reach out to 
citizens through regional and local democracy. Similar to the tensions between local and 
universal knowledge in debates on issues of science and technology, in the EU context 
there is also a need to reconcile decisions made at local, regional and European level.  In 
order to do so it is important to take into account local and regional knowledge in coping 
with the problem of how to create general rules which are adaptable to local conditions. 
So, besides the transnational space there is also a need for a “systematic dialogue with 
European and national associations of regional and local government, while respecting 
national constitutional and administrative arrangements (ibid. p. 13).” 
 
To sum up, future-citizens in the new democratic organisation of Europe would be 
citizens not merely by virtue of their legal status or because of their participation in the 
economy but rather because of their participation and involvement in building and 
maintaining a common political community. The structure of this community, however, 
would not be centred at a European level but would be based on a multi-level partnership 
in which national governments involve their regions and cities fully in European policy-
making. Accordingly, citizens would be able to argue and further their interest in very 
different arenas and polity levels depending on the issues, which they want to raise or 
challenge. There is also an underlying presupposition in this model, namely, that local, 
regional, national and European loyalties are not in conflict with each other in their 
nature. Instead, each of them fits within and provides a broader context for the others as 
far as the European level, respectively. Without this presupposition, which may or may 
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not be true depending on different contexts, the ‘capillary’ system of power cannot work 
so smoothly as European high bureaucrats would like to envision. 
 
One more dimension of this new system of governance is worth mentioning and that 
concerns the role of civil society. In the document of ‘White Paper of Governance’ civil 
society is considered to be a crucial actor in giving voice to the concerns of citizens and 
delivering services that meet people’s needs. In addition, it should also play an important 
role in getting citizens more actively involved and offering them a structured channel for 
feedback, criticism and protest. Consequently, the diverse network of NGOs should act 
as “an early warning system for the direction of political debate (ibid. p. 14).” 
 
What we could see from the above-mentioned arguments is that there were different 
strategies to construct the subject of Europe which can act and contribute as actors in the 
process of integration. In the initial situation the emphasis was on providing a legal and 
economic background in which citizens can recognise themselves as tenants and workers 
of the same economic space. The strategies discussed by Shore were not intended to 
change this situation but to supplement the legal and economic aspects with a cultural 
dimension. The problems with the construction of common European values and cultural 
heritage in the same manner as creating legal and economic structures are obvious. While 
the notion of culture in social theories is always referred to as something which is 
mutually created and maintained by members of a cultural group, this common European 
culture has been created by European high-ranking officials and distributed in a top-down 
manner. 
  
The ‘White Paper of Governance’ indicates an important shift in these questions. The 
creation of the subject of integration is not conceived to be a separate project from the 
process of the integration itself. Consequently, the citizens are to contribute and 
participate in a common political space which is continuously constructed by their very 
involvement. Thus, what is needed here is a “reinforced culture of consultation and 
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dialogue” (p.16). The common ground for the citizens of Europe is neither an economic-
legal framework nor is it something built upon common cultural values but rather, the 
political participation in a democratic polity by which various issues can be raised, 
challenged and debated. 
 
In relation with the academic discourses on citizenship two important points are worth 
mentioning. Firstly, it can be easily seen that the academic debate is not only academic but 
also political in nature. Looking at the above-discussed strategies of constructing the 
European subject different underlying theories can be identified. Secondly, while the 
official discourse cannot be directly explained by the academic theories there are clear 
connections between them. There is a straightforward relationship between the formal, 
legal form of the ‘new citizenship’ and the subject of integration in the initial situation of 
the economic and legal processes. Identifying, constructing and distributing a common 
European culture with shared values and heritage can also be understood as an awkward 
initiative to create a homogenous community of the republican ideal at a transnational 
level. The connection between the ideas of the ‘White Paper of Governance’ and post-
national citizenship, which are based on participation in a common political space, is also 
noticeable. My intention here is twofold.  Firstly, it is important to show the shift from a 
top-down construction of a subject to the construction of a political subject who is 
involved in policy-shaping. Secondly, it was also essential to illustrate the connection 
between the new initiatives to reform the system of governance and the ideas of post-
national citizenship. In the following section, I shall concentrate on the way in which 
these ideas appear in the spheres of science and technology at a European level.59 
 
59 It may be worth mentioning that the ’White Paper of Governance’ also deals with the questions of 
science and technology particularly reflecting on the role of experts in policy-making. However, in the 
section above I did not discuss these aspects of the ’White Paper’. The reason for that is that these 
questions also reappear and are discussed in other documents. I am going to discuss these documents in 
the following section.  
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4.3. Citizens, Science and Society  
 
In this section I shall discuss two other EU documents, namely, ‘Science, society and the 
citizens of Europe’ (Commission of the European Communities, 2000A) and ‘Science 
and Society Action Plan’ (European Commission, 2002). The former discusses issues at a 
general level and suggests directions for future change while the latter contains proposals 
and tangible strategies and projects for bridging the gap between science and society. I 
will discuss both together focusing on the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ which has 
been released recently, in 2002 by the Commission. So, while the first document is only a 
working document for generating debate, the second one is trying to convert the results 
of these debates to actual plans and projects. However, the two documents are common 
in that both refer to the ‘White Paper of Governance’ sharing its underlying assumptions. 
The following section will mainly focus on the ‘Action Plan’ while referring time-to-time 
to the ‘Working document’ as well. 
 
Accordingly, in relation with science and technology and European governance, both 
documents aim to combine new ways of involving various social actors and the 
established forms of government and representative democracy. This way, as was the case 
with the ‘White Paper of Governance’, these documents also represent a shift from 
established relations and power structures to a more inclusive network of actors as far as 
decisions about science and technology are concerned. However, it is important to 
mention that this is a ‘shift’ from one set of goals to another and not a radical ‘change’. 
My intention here is not to criticise the ‘Action Plan’ for not being radical enough but to 
show how it is balancing between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ ways of doing politics in the 
spheres of science and technology. 
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This can also easily be seen in the foreword of ‘Science and Society Action Plan 
(European Commission, 2002).60 Philippe Busquin who was the Commissioner for 
Research when the publication was released wrote this foreword. The very first sentence 
of the document is as follows:  
  
“In a knowledge-based society, democratic governance must ensure that citizens are able 
to make an informed choice from the options made available to them by responsible 
scientific and technological progress (European Commission, 2002, p. 3).”  
 
This rhetoric can be quite familiar to us from the ‘Public Education Model’ of Callon 
which presupposes that citizens can only participate in science and technology as 
consumers or clients of the state apparatus. So, this sentence alone contains three 
underlying presuppositions which are more characteristic of the ‘old’ than the new, a 
more inclusive way of managing the relations between science, technology and society. 
First of all, there is the expression of ‘informed choice from the options’ which implies 
that choices can be made easily if there is enough information with reference to the issues 
at stake. While STS researchers usually emphasise the contingency and the 
unpredictability of technological developments this sentence depicts them as clear options 
in a ‘scientific market’ from which consumer-citizens can choose. Secondly, it is not clear 
whether progress is already ‘responsible’ or planned to be due to the actions which will be 
made according to this ‘Action Plan’. If the former is true, citizens do not have to worry 
about the products of scientific and technological development but only choose what is 
most appropriate to them. So thirdly, there is another underlying assumption irrespective 
of the fact whether science and technology is responsible61 at the moment or will become 
60 The document is at the intersection of three Community debates which are as follows: Firstly, there is 
the strategic goal set by the EU in Lisbon of becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-
based economy in the world. Secondly, the initiative of a European Research Area, a process set in motion 
by the European Commission in January 2000 also gives importance to the questions about science and 
technology and the everyday life of the citizens of Europe. Thirdly, there is the aim to implement the 
‘White Paper of Governance’ and contribute to the debate about the future of Europe. 
61 Here, the expression ‘responsible’ can have different meanings. In my opinion, in this context 
responsible means an ethically sensitive science and technology. Apart from this, ‘responsible’ can also 
have a more „economic” type of meaning as being responsive and adaptive to sudden changes in a 
changeable world. 
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responsible in the future. This assumption shows that the right moment to involve 
citizens in these developments is when the products of these developments have already 
been ‘made available to them’ and not before. So, while the main aim of the document is 
to develop new ways of governing science and technology, in many aspects it reflects the 
‘traditional’ understanding of the relations between science, technology and society. 
 
This also characterises the dilemma between expert-based policy-making and disclosing 
scientific uncertainties to the public. The focal point of this dilemma is how to deal with 
and communicate uncertainties without undermining the legitimacy of the expert-based 
decision-making processes? The document offers two ways of dealing with this problem, 
first of all, by creating structured and open networks of expert bodies instead of ad hoc 
advisory boards changing constantly. Secondly, the document also argues that the public, 
more particularly the stakeholders should not be excluded. It is important to empower 
them to contribute to the debate and to challenge the experts and their advice and to 
voice alternative views on the topic. The aims of these initiatives are both to instil trust 
and to deliver policies that are more robust, argues the paper (p. 24-26). 
 
On the other hand, despite the fact that the document reproduces the traditional 
perspective concerning science, technology and society there is also a clear step away 
from the information deficit or ‘Public Education Model’ towards a ‘Public Debate 
Model’. Therefore, the ‘Action Plan’ clearly expresses that the regular flow of information 
from experts to the public is not in itself enough to enable people to form an opinion on 
issues about science and technology. However, this opinion-forming activity is considered 
to be the source of an important policy input for decision-making. As the document puts 
it:  
 
“If citizens and civil society are to become partners in the debate on science, technology 
and innovation in general and on the creation of the European Research Area in 
particular, it is not enough to simply keep them informed. They must also be given the 
opportunity to express their views in the appropriate bodies.” (p. 17) 
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So, the need for a true dialogue between science and society has been clearly expressed. 
What is still a question, though, is which are these ‘appropriate bodies’ and at what level 
these can be found. In the ‘Action Plan’ there are three different levels at which this 
dialogue can take place, namely, the local, the regional and the European level. 
  
The Commission document identifies local and regional levels as well suited to the 
“science and society” dialogue when the issues raised are of direct interest to citizens. 
These can be issues which have a direct bearing on local and regional level such as 
environment, health, safety and urban transport. In the form of Science Shops to be 
organised at local, regional and inter-regional levels the document promotes participation 
by scientists in forums and hearings (pp. 14-15). 
 
This dialogue can also take place at the European level, although new participatory 
arrangements have to be developed which are able to embrace the complexity of issues 
about science and technology at a European level. Some member states, the argument 
goes on, have a long tradition of organising participatory procedures and this experience 
can be used for elaborating transnational procedures. Participatory procedures at a 
national level aim to provide a space for scrutiny and informed debate on important 
issues of public concern, bringing together the policy makers, interest groups and public. 
In a similar manner, transnational participatory procedures are expected to complement 
the formal decision-making process, and to help pave the way for sound policies (pp. 17-
18). 
 
The expression of participation, however, has not been totally unfamiliar in the EU policy 
context. Various participatory mechanisms have been used to fine-tune research policy 
also at the Community level. Ad hoc arrangements are used to enable interested parties to 
express their views. Yet, the Commission would like to see these experiences widened and 
deepened to systematically include other sectors of civil society at all stages (p. 18). 
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In summary, even in the document itself there can be seen a clear shift from a ‘Public 
Education Model’, which has regarded citizens as consumers of science and technology, 
to a ‘Public Debate Model’, which encourage citizens to form opinions about 
developments in these spheres. Yet, with this shift important questions emerge such as: 
what would happen to these opinions after they have been expressed; and how can these 
voices be effectively channelled into ‘appropriate bodies’; and how sensitive these bodies 
are to external influences and how to make them even more sensitive? The document 
ignores these questions. Yet, if answers are not found to these problems one suspect that 
participation procedures on science and technology, instead of a “true dialogue”, will 
foster disillusionment and cynicism, from citizens who cannot see their opinion taken 
seriously. 
 
4.4. Meeting of Minds. European Citizens ‘Under Construction’? 
 
In the sections above a general shift can be perceived from a situation in which citizens 
lack information appropriate for shaping policies to a situation in which citizens take part 
as the source of useful and important information. Moreover, after the narrow-minded 
strategies of the cultural integration of Europe from above or as Shore puts it, “Europe’s 
colonisation of itself” (Shore, 2001, p. 63), there is also a hope that participation can 
foster a kind of integrity and solidarity among the community of diverse cultures and 
peoples. Apart from this, it is also worth mentioning that the initiative to involve citizens 
in issues about science and technology at a transnational level is unique and 
unprecedented. The ‘Meeting of Minds’ project is designed to meet this challenge and 
cope with the problems which can appear in the course of a participatory arrangement at 
this level. 
 
On the website of the project there is detailed information about the aims, the procedure 
and the expected effects of this initiative (Meeting of Minds, 2005A). So, it is meant to 
give European citizens a unique opportunity to learn more about the impact of brain 
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research on their daily lives and society as a whole, to discuss their questions and ideas 
with leading European researchers, experts and policy-makers. Furthermore, the website 
indicates that the project also aims to put them in touch with fellow citizens from other 
European countries and make a personal contribution to a report detailing what the people 
of Europe believe to be possible and desirable in the area of brain science and what they 
recommend policy-makers and researchers to be aware of for future developments in this 
field (Meeting of Minds, 2005A). So the overall objective of the Meeting of Minds 
initiative is to involve European citizens in assessing and publicly discussing the issue of 
brain science with relevant research, policy and ethics experts, various stakeholders as well 
as representatives of European decision-making organisations, argues the document 
(Meeting of Minds, 2005A). 
 
What is striking from the first moment when reading the objectives of the project is the 
use of the expression of ‘European citizens’ and ‘people of Europe’. While the texts on 
the website use these expressions naturally and with straightforwardness the question 
remains whether there is a self-recognising category as ‘people of Europe’ or it is just an 
overall grouping of all the people involved? Apart from the objectives above, one can also 
assume that this project is in itself expected to generate a kind of identity among people 
who are involved and to ‘find out’ if there is any kind of meaning of the ‘citizens of 
Europe’ expression. As one of the main ‘architects’ of the project, Rinie van Est said in an 
interview62: 
 
“Maybe another important thing is that if you see the European integration not only as an 
economic project but also as a democratic project, as a social-economic project, then you 
get the question is there a European citizen? I mean your intent is to find out via these 
kinds of processes.” 
 
62  The interview was conducted with Rinie van Est 29th June 2005. He works at the Ratheneau Institute 
and mainly takes part in international Technology Assessment (TA) projects. He is a member of the 
’Steering Committee’ and the ’Methodological Team’ of the project. The Ratheneau Institute is one of the 
main nodes in the European network of TA organisations as far as this project is concerned.  
 
156
Nevertheless, the procedure of the project implies one kind of understanding of 
European citizenship hence it embraces the national and the European level at the same 
time. There are national groups who discuss the issues of brain science at a national level 
and then bring these formulated opinions to the European convention where they discuss 
these issues again with people from different countries and then go back to their own 
countries to meet up again with their fellow national members two more times. After this 
they will meet again with people from other countries and discuss these topics and 
prepare a report which is intended to function as policy advice.  
 
This procedure emphasises the importance of national loyalties at the same time as it 
attempts to create a self-referential and self-recognising European citizenship which can 
transcend national affections and bonds. It can be said that the project aims to create a 
creative tension between these levels and to use this tension to stimulate further debates 
and the processes of opinion forming from diverse cultural contexts and value bases. This 
way, it can be said that the project is not meant to neglect the national contexts by 
creating a common, homogenous European cultural pattern but is designed to use the 
difference of cultures as a resource. In line with this, Rinie van Est also argued that one of 
the main goals of the project, besides getting people informed, is to encourage and 
provide means for these citizens to get into discussions from diverse cultural milieus.  
 
“I think if you look at the method we use, we try to strive for that and people (…) have 
to inform themselves and get into discussions with other people, even people at different 
levels, national level, European level, and also with people from different cultures.” 
 
In connection with this, Rinie van Est defined scientific citizenship in a unique way. He 
emphasises both the novel attributes and duties of scientific citizens and their connection 
to ‘traditional’ political practices. To the question of what kind of citizen is necessary for 
this project to work properly he answered as follows: 
 
“We can talk about ’scientific or technological citizenship’. I think it starts with 
awareness, being aware that we live in a technological society and that one is aware of the 
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effects technologies have and also vice versa that you have an idea that how and why 
these technologies are developed or not.  
 
So, you see, it is all about being informed at a proper level and then of course discussing 
it with other citizens. If we talk about technological citizenship you talk about citizenship 
apart from technology, you have added technology to this. If you talk about citizenship it 
is also about being informed and being a democratic actor in that sense. Living in a 
democracy is meaning that you have to cope with different values, different views and 
things. So, it is not only about making up your opinion but also about looking for other 
people who share that opinion and being engaged or interact with people who have 
different meaning and also try to understand why they have a different type of meaning.  
 
Well, if that is your definition of technological citizenship it is a kind of enlightened 
citizen, well-informed citizen.”  
 
From this answer we can identify three interesting points that the interviewee emphasised. 
First of all, Rinie van Est stresses that citizens have to be ‘aware’ that they living in a 
technological society in which they have to be conscious not only about narrowly defined 
politics but also about the effects and the development of technologies. This means 
something radically new compared to political approaches of citizenship. Secondly, just 
like the ‘White Paper’, he stressed the importance of making people well-informed to be 
able to take part in processes like the ‘Meeting of Minds’ but his answer also implies that 
it is not enough. They have to discuss these acquired pieces of information amongst 
themselves. They have to find others who agree with them, as well as trying to understand 
those with whom they disagree. So, thirdly, he also emphasises that this activity is not so 
different from other political activities in a democratic system. Fourthly, therefore, the 
scientific citizen is not entirely a new entity but an ordinary citizen who is concerned 
about the existing or anticipated products of scientific and technological progress. The tag 
‘scientific’ is something to be added to the general image of citizenship. So, Rinie van Est 
emphasised both the novelty of ‘scientific citizenship’ and the continuity of it with 
political citizenship. 
 
We could see that there is an emphasis on creating a self-recognising category of citizens 
with different cultural backgrounds while it was also important to maintain this cultural 
background in the course of the project. The fact that there are three national meetings 
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besides the two European conventions proves that the organisers value the importance of 
the national contexts. At the 1st European Convention citizens are expected to see each 
other as fellows of the same participatory arrangement and accept and argue with each 
others’ arguments as members of the same political community. These dimensions of the 
project fit within the strategic goals of the ‘White Paper of Governance’, while it also puts 
an emphasis on making people well-informed in addition to encouraging them and letting 
them use this information creatively in public debates. 
 
4.5. Précis  
 
After discussing the ‘academic layer’ of the citizenship discourse, the centre of attention 
moved to the recent trends in fostering a European citizenship and in creating channels 
of feedback from citizens to science. Focusing on the ‘official discursive layer’ four 
different but interrelated issues were examined.  
 
Firstly, drawing on the articles of Shore et al. (Shore, 2001; Shore&Black 1994) the paper 
demonstrated the conventional strategies of constructing the European citizen. The 
initiatives discussed by Shore are indicative of a top-down, managerial and instrumental 
approach to ‘culture-building’ and the assumption that ‘European identity’ can somehow 
be engineered from above. These strategies can be related to republican ideas in the sense 
that high-ranking bureaucrats and leaders intended to ‘construct’ a common cultural 
background for a homogenous community.  
 
Secondly, the rhetoric of ‘White Paper of Governance’ (Commission of European 
Communities, 2001) represents a shift from a legally passive citizenship discourse to a 
more active citizenship ideal. In this official paper citizens are conceived to be active 
participants in the process of integration and participation in the political decision-making 
system at all levels. Participation is considered to be a central question and expected to 
play an essential role in the future European polity. As a result, the ’White Paper’ calls for 
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a “reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue” (p. 16). Referring back to the 
academic ideas, one can argue that this rhetoric has a clear relationship to the ideals of 
post-national citizenship. 
 
Thirdly, both the ‘Science, Society and the Citizen in Europe’ (Commission of European 
Communities, 2000A) and the ‘Science and Society Action Plan’ (European Commission, 
2002) refer to the ‘White Paper of Governance’ and try to translate and employ the main 
ideas of governance in the specific areas of science and technology. They call for 
participatory arrangements which operate according to the ‘Public Debate Model’ and 
create a link between parliaments and public. In a similar manner, one can read in the 
‘Society and Science Action Plan’ that transnational participatory procedures are expected 
to complement the formal decision-making process, and to help pave the way for sound 
policies. Therefore, these kinds of transnational procedures refer to the ideas of post-
national citizenship and to the ‘Public Debate Model’ of citizens’ involvement in science 
and technology at the same time.  
 
Fourthly, in connection with these recent trends the essay also discussed the project of 
‘Meeting of Minds’ and analysed how the aims and rhetoric of the organisers draw on the 
broader political context of the European Union.  It is also worth mentioning that this 
initiative to involve citizens in issues about science and technology at a transnational level 
is unique and unprecedented. The ‘Meeting of Minds’ project is designed to meet this 
challenge and cope with the problems which may occur in the course of a participatory 
arrangement at this level. As the project is partly funded by the European Commission it 
was not a great surprise to find that there are great similarities between the above-
mentioned documents and the rhetoric of the project website. It is obvious, however that 
the organisers seem to be less confident about the impact of the project compared to 
what we can read on the website. While, this is a pilot project in many ways, it is also an 
experiment in the sense that the organisers have to find out during the process who is 
interested and from whom among policy-makers can they expect support. 
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As far as the intellectual journey leading here is concerned, this thesis has touched upon 
several aspects and perspectives of citizenship, science and Europe. The chapter 
describing the MoM process attempted to show how the organisers of the initiative aimed 
“more or less” consciously to set up communication between citizens in accordance with 
the framework of the ideal speech situation. The conclusion of the analysis was that an 
ideal speech situation can only be established by jointly utilising material and human 
elements. The association of these elements will establish the framework which makes 
communication among participants symmetrical and realise a construct of identity which 
can be called post-national scientific citizenship. This attempt of framing not only the 
channels of communication but also subject positions and identities raised many 
questions about citizenship models and policy intentions. By attempting to disclose the 
theoretic, policy and social environment in which a process like the MoM came forth, the 
questions raised in the third chapter are answered or at least cleared in a way which allows 
further investigations.  
 
So, the succeeding chapter on the academic layer analysed the theoretical space around 
citizenship in connection with science and Europe. The chapter identified certain 
citizenship models based on different models of political thought, namely, the liberal, the 
republican and the discursive schools of thought. These models also deeply influence how 
policy makers construct the subjects of or at least strive to impose certain social identities 
on a political community.  
 
For that very reason, this chapter analysed the policy discourse of citizenship with a focus 
on the connection between science, Europe and the citizens. The chapter not only 
analysed the identity constructions embedded in the texts concerned but also attempted 
to show connections between the academic and the policy discursive layer.  
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Following this investigation on the ‘official discursive layer’, the focus will come back to 
Meeting of Minds to investigate how citizens understand themselves in terms of their role 
in the project. It will be possible to trace not only different roles and relationships to 
Europe but the question of how participants from different political cultures could find 
their place in the process will be also touched upon.  
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5. CITIZENS’ DISCURSIVE LAYER 
 
After discussing and analysing the MoM process, the main goal of this section is to show 
how the citizens thematise themselves in relation with their role in the process and with 
Europe. It is important to have this ‘bifocal perspective’ since the MoM is not only 
unique in terms of the participation in a complex process but its transnational character is 
also intriguing. 
 
It may be worth mentioning that this part is closely connected to the second chapter since 
I conducted the interviews during fieldwork. However, this section also differs from the 
fieldwork section since the main goal here is not to introduce and ‘represent’ a complex 
process but to disclose the main perspectives according to which the participants 
understand and construct themselves in the project. In view of the methodologies I am 
going to use here, identity is not a fixed and given entity but variable and changeable in 
relation to different contexts and languages used. Consequently, the main focus will be 
not on the question of how to disclose the true identity of the citizens but to map out 
how they understand and depict themselves in the context of MoM. The interview 
analysis will be based on the answers of Hungarian and Dutch participants for which 
interviews have been conducted throughout the first Hungarian national meeting and the 
first European convention. 
 
As it was not possible to interview all the participants of the project I chose to focus on 
two national groups: the Dutch and the Hungarian. While the two groups might seem 
similar in some aspects, there were also differences. Two primary aspects will be 
considered here. Firstly, while participatory arrangements are more or less familiar in the 
Dutch cultural context and it is often said that Dutch culture is consensus oriented, while 
Hungarians come from a different political culture where the whole approach to the 
process represents something totally new. Secondly, Hungary has only recently joined the 
EU, while the Netherlands was one of the founding members and a catalyst of the 
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integration process. Whenever there are significant dissimilarities in thematisation of the 
same issues between the Hungarian and the Dutch participants, I am going to reflect on 
them after the analysis. 
 
The questions I used in the interviews partly referred to citizens’ role in the process and 
partly to their views about the relation between national and European citizenship. 
Therefore, the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format, which means that I 
did strive to ask the same questions but to guide the discussions in the direction of the 
topics interesting for me. I used interviewing because I worked with a small number of 
people and I was interested not only in what answer they give to a question about their 
role in the process or their national or European citizenship but also how they argue in its 
favour and how they justify these answers. Therefore, using a survey, which can be 
appropriate when one works with a big sample and with relatively simple questions, was 
ruled out from the beginning. Moreover, in interviews one can reformulate, rephrase 
questions and clarify meanings, which was very important in the current research. 
Comparing focus groups and conducting interviews allows for a sharper focus on 
individual views and opinions. All in all, in my opinion, in this case interviews represented 
the suitable methodology because I worked with a small sample and my focus was quite 
specific. Thus, in the course of the interviews I attempted to get answers to the following 
questions which I used as a checklist during the interviews63: 
 
How do you evaluate your own part in this project? 
What do you think the organisers expect from you as a citizen? 
In what capacity do you think you are involved in this project, as a 
Dutch/Hungarian citizen or as a European citizen? 
63 The purpose of asking the first two questions was to gain information about the citizens’ views on 
scientific citizenship. Using this exact term, however, would have been confusing, as it is not commonly 
used in everyday life-contexts. Therefore, I asked sub-questions steering the interviews in the direction of 
the issue of changing concepts of citizenship in relation to science and technology in general and the 
Meeting of Minds project in particular. Asking questions about the relationship between European and 
national citizenship was less problematic in that sense. 
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 What do you think is the relation between the European and the 
Dutch/Hungarian citizenship? 
 
When analysing the answers to these questions, I did not attempt to create categories with 
clear-cut boundaries but my aim was to display the dynamics of different concepts and 
the variety of discursive thematisation on participation and Europe in the answers. I 
would call these different concepts discursive repertoires because they were the central 
points of the answers. In the section below my aim is to show these repertoires through 
the arguments and justifications used in the answers.  
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5.1. Survey Results 
 
Before starting my own analysis I shall use Alison Mohr’s survey results on the 1st 
European Convention to give an overview what the European panel thought about the 
process. The advantage of this is that Mohr could get answers from all the participants 
and not just from two national teams and it can give an idea why citizens’ participated in 
such a project.64 After this short overview, the focus will shift to the Hungarian and 




What is your primary interest in the  




So, in the first diagram (Figure 12.) we can see that the vast majority of the citizens 
indicated, writes Mohr, “that the issue of brain science, rather than the process itself, was 
their primary interest for participating in the ‘Meeting of Minds’ initiative.” However, in 
the interviews, which will be discussed in depth below, the participants did not make a 
sharp distinction between these two interests. In the answers, usually those participants 
64 The questionnaire, the analysis of the answers and the diagrams were made by Alison Mohr who is a 
researcher at ‘Center for Democracy’ and member of the Steering Committee of the Meeting of Minds 
project. 
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who primarily expressed their interest about brain science very often speak about the 
novelty of and their interest in the process as well.  
 
Figure 13. 
What do you perceive to be the key goal-objective  




In the second diagram (Figure 13.), we can see that the majority of citizens attached 
primary importance to the goal ‘to encourage communication between citizens, scientific 
community and policy makers’. This implies that many citizens focused on the long-term 
effects of the project rather than its direct impact. However, there was also a significant 
group who considered the contribution ‘to policy-making on brain science issues at the 
national and European level’ as the key objective. This was the most striking in Denmark, 
“where there is a history of TA successfully influencing policy, the Danish citizens 
perceived that the initiative’s key objective was the direct contribution to policy-making.” 
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It is also worth mentioning that in the interviews many citizens expressed their doubts 
about the impact they can have on policy making. This sceptical attitude was more like a 
continuum than a single standpoint. One end of the continuum would be the answer in 
which the participants conceived the process as a tool for legitimising decisions already 
made. The other pole would be just a slight doubt expressing one’s opinion that she or he 
cannot really imagine how it could work. This attitude which was present in many 
interviewees’ answers might be caused by the fact that the panel members preferred the 
long term effects to uncertain short term goals. 
 
Figure 14. 
Do you agree that the format of the First National Citizens Meeting has 




As it has been mentioned above, the project does not attempt to transcend the 
differences of different national contexts but rather to integrate these differences of 
cultures and value-sets into the process. Therefore, the project contains three national 
meetings and two European conventions in order to create a dialogue between the two 
levels. The question above (Figure 14.) is in connection with this procedural aspect. As we 
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can see, most of the citizens strongly agreed or agreed ‘that the format of the First 
National Citizens Meeting has encouraged the development of a national group identity’.  
 
This strong attachment to national identity is in a way surprising since there was no 
particular effort on behalf of the organisers to achieve this goal. The focus was more on 
dialogue between participants from different national and cultural backgrounds and a 
national groups’ opinion was never opposed to another one’s. Unfortunately, in the 
questionnaire there was no question about European identity to trace how the 
participants’ perception changes about themselves as European subjects. 
 
5.2. Roles of Participation  
 
As it has been mentioned above, I asked questions about the role of the citizens and 
about their European-ness and European citizenship. I was able to record various 
different arguments related to these issues so I attempted to find regularities in the 
answers and this way to identify the main discursive repertoires. As far as the role of the 
citizens is concerned, these repertoires were the educational, the dialogical, and the sceptical.65  
 
These repertoires in a certain sense represent the main goals of the process except, as the 
reader will be able to see, the sceptical repertoire. It is also important to mention that the 
different repertoires cannot be clearly related to individuals but different types of 
arguments and justifications can appear in the answers of the same individuals. The 
analysis below does not try to eliminate this variability and contingency in individual 
responses but looks for regularities in all the texts together.  
 
65 When I use the word repertoire in this section I do not only mean expressions or individual attitudes 
towards participation or European citizenship. It is a more general reference to a discursive order in the 
answers which can be characterised as a constellation of meanings around a topic. When certain 
expressions, views and argumentation cropped up in different interviews showing a certain 
correspondence, I called them ‘repertoires’. 
 
169
In the ‘educational repertoire’ the emphasis was on the educational effects of the project and 
participation was considered to be a means of education. It also means that the 
participants who used this repertoire put less emphasis on the actively participating form 
of citizenship in favour of getting information or acquiring knowledge throughout the 
process. Actually, one of them, who was optimistic about the project, mentioned that the 
participation could contribute to the creation of a responsible citizen: 
 
“This is undoubtedly a learning process because one keeps learning all through his life 
until the very end of his life and if one can get well-known, I don’t mean he will receive 
more money for research, or more contribution, but well, they [people] can see what they 
pay all that social security for, or if it should cost more money they see the point in it.” 
 
Moreover, this emphasis on the educational effects was also attached to a kind of 
‘gratification’ attitude. That means that those who conceived themselves as participant in 
an educational project also felt that he or she became one of the members of a very 
‘exclusive’ group. This emphasis on exclusivity shows that the educational repertoire 
constructs participants as subjects who lack information, who have to be taught and 
enlightened. Because education is the main element in this repertoire there is a 
presupposed top-down relationship since the other members in this ‘exclusive group’ 
(“highly-qualified people, great professors, politicians”) will tell the participants what they 
should think. This repertoire also presents the participation in the process as something 
very special and extraordinary. According to their viewpoint, to become one of the 
national panellists was a prize to be won. 
 
„How important do you think it is that citizens should be involved in discussing a topic 
like that? 
 
I consider it pretty important, because the man in the street has not had the impression 
that he is allowed to become involved, so it’s a great honour, I mean there are highly-
qualified people, great professors, politicians [here], and well, I think few people have the 
opportunity to get in. Frankly, I am pleased to have got in, and a bit surprised, too.” 
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Moreover, among those participants who emphasised the educational effects of the 
‘Meeting of Minds’ project, some of them also emphasised their own role, literally, in fact. 
When these participants spoke about their role they used the expressions “my role”, “put 
my own part into the process”, “my opinion”, “my knowledge”, or to put it more bluntly, 
it seems that they see this process as a kind of preference aggregation procedure in which 
everybody puts in what he or she has and it will lead to a common result. This 
concentration of individual aspects and opinion can be clearly traced in the way the 
interviewee responded. While the answer was about the importance of involvement in a 
public discussion in general, the panel member responded by voicing that it is very 
important and a great honour for him to be involved.  
  
In the ‘dialogical repertoire’, the dialogical, open and dynamic manner of the project was 
stressed. Accordingly, participants conceived themselves as active members of a group, 
which is meant to think and create and reach a common opinion. Furthermore, 
participation was perceived as a very important and prestigious activity, which has to be 
supplemented with gathering and processing information about the issues concerned. 
Therefore, it seems the relation between acquiring knowledge and the activity of 
participation was that the former is expected to serve the latter. Getting informed is 
important in order to ensure the meaningfulness of participation, or in other words, 
acquiring knowledge is only the means for participation not its ultimate goal. The 
emphasis thus was on participation.  
 
„I mean I’m not trying to have an opinion on the technical aspect of the issue. It’s more 
what’s happening around it and what does it mean for us, do we feel that there should be 
priorities and where are our concerns. I think as long as we focus on those aspects there 
are no problems. I think we are competent enough. (…) If we feel that we don’t know 
enough about the certain thing then we get a lot of backup-support of people who can 
find out. Experts we can consult in the future. I’m not so much worried about the level of 
knowledge.” 
 
In this answer a totally different kind of relationship can be disclosed than in the ones 
above connected to the ‘educational repertoire’. While there is a clear intention to draw a 
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boundary between technical and social aspects of the issue, there is also an image of 
scientist who is not at the forefront of the project but appears as ‘backup-support’. This 
image implies that on the one hand, the knowledge of the participants is enough to form 
opinion, the scientists are not an exclusive group which the participants can join, but part 
of the staff who are responsible for helping the work of the citizens. So, what was most 
striking in the interviews is that the expert appeared in the answers as somebody who at 
the same time knows more and also less about a particular issue. It has also appeared that 
they do not perceive themselves as less competent in these issues than scientists. As one 
of them said: 
 
“I would expect a scientist to want to go further and further at any costs, just to improve 
his personal work, or his research and I don’t think it’s necessarily always what the people 
want. (…) The scientists are more about what we can do, the citizens are more about what 
we want to do.” 
 
Moreover, these attitudes were also correlated with the opinions that these kinds of 
initiatives are very important and participatory events should be held more often. This 
way, participation was not perceived as a ‘prize’ or as something extraordinary but as a 
natural right of the citizen, which has been long neglected. In connection with this, they 
did not give particular importance to the fact that the project is about a scientific issue. It 
was also evident from the fact that they mentioned scientists and politicians in a similar 
manner. I suppose that they did not perceive the project as something very special but as 
a political process about a scientific issue. 
 
These participants also spoke about their own life context, their own knowledge and their 
own opinion, which have to be channelled into the deliberation process but the emphasis 
was not on the individual but on the group. Accordingly, instead of using the words ‘I, 




“My role in this process in the national team… um, well we are talking together of course, 
tell different meanings, and we will try to have at least one opinion on every subjects. So 
with discussion, with talk about it, with research and so on, we are trying to have, well, our 
national opinion on certain items.” 
 
In the ‘sceptical repertoire’, citizens expressed their concern about the meaningfulness of the 
project, at worst interpreting the project as a strategy merely legitimising or advertising 
already decided policies. In contrast with the educational and the dialogical repertoire, 
participants who used the sceptical repertoire expressed their concern that their own part 
as citizens will be ‘lost in translation’.  
 
They spoke about the project as a remarkable form to involve citizens, however, they also 
expressed their worry that their opinions will not be taken into consideration at the 
decision-making level. In relation to this, almost all of the participants spoke about 
scientists and decision-makers “up there”. Accordingly, they admitted that they cannot 
decide in ‘technical’ questions, which is the job of the specialist, they can only discuss 
their social aspects. This way, citizens perceived themselves as playing a complementary 
role to an already set structure. 
 
“It’s quite clear to me that we can only make proposals, ok, it’s sure that they will 
consider what the fourteen of us say here, as we are the selected ones, but I do not feel its 
weight in the whole legislation, in the research process in general, I don’t feel that they 
would attach any importance to what the citizen wants, what common people want. But it 
would not be at all possible for the big ’stupid’ mass to decide what should be done, so this 
is why people get specialised to choose what it is that one is best at.” 
 
In connection with this approach, one of the citizens spoke about the project as a 
marketing strategy on behalf of brain scientists who are seeking research funds. In her 
view, the project only has a legitimising function, in other words, its main goal is merely 
to justify a pre-given decision. The participant also expressed her concern that 
participants would be manipulated to come to this decision in the course of this project. 
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„They expect me to give some kind of [financial] support, obviously so that they can 
spend more on brain research, or rather, to secure funds so that research can go in the 
direction they want, so there will be some sort of pressure in this direction. It is in essence a 
promotional thing to try to convince people that there really is a need for it and that we 
should speak on behalf of the public.” 
 
5.3. Many Europe-s  
 
When participants spoke about their European-ness and their European citizenship they 
usually justified their arguments not only by describing their own selves but by giving of 
an image of Europe. It was very interesting to see that almost each citizen connected his 
or her identity to a particular kind of Europe. In this section I shall describe these 
different ways to thematise Europe as a distinct entity. Accordingly, five different 
Europes, five different relationships and five different repertoires could be detected. 
These were the following repertoires: the political-economic, the cultural-historical, the 
equal groups of citizens, the unity of continent and the extending circles of loyalty 
repertoires.  
 
In the ‘political-economic repertoire’ the emphasis was on the image of Europe as the subject 
of an integration process. In a similar manner, citizens who organised their arguments 
around this repertoire spoke about their European-ness and European citizenship as 
being under construction, or in other words, as being part of a process itself. 
Furthermore, they also spoke about Europe in a similar manner, to use Bauman’s 
expression, as an ‘unfinished adventure’ (Bauman, 2004). This would-be Europe and 
would-be European citizenship can be identified in the answer of one of the citizens. 
 
„I haven’t thought about the question in what way I’m involved. Let’s say I’m a European 
citizen. I believe that sooner or later Europe will be united and there will be European 
people, there won’t be different nations and we will be able to work together very well. 
This will be a cool thing. When one will say ’European’ that will be a qualitative attribute.” 
 
It is quite remarkable that in the answer the interviewee uses the word ‘will’ many times 
expressing that according to his viewpoint Europe is not an existing reality but a potential 
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which can be realised in the future. In a way, he presupposes a would-be ‘united Europe’ 
and in relation to it he creates his own identity as European. It should be noted that in 
this repertoire a very formal and legal relation between Europe and its citizen seems to 
emerge en. Thus in many answers the interviewees referred to the fact that they are 
already European in a formal sense but this is empty in itself and that this empty ‘shell’ 
must be filled with actual content.  
 
In the ‘cultural-historical repertoire’ citizens stressed the importance of a common European 
history and culture which, despite many wars and conflicts, can be traced back to 
thousands of years. European citizens therefore are the inheritors of the same cultural 
legacy by virtue of a common European history. Many participants talked about their link 
to Europe as a historical-traditional connection between their national and European 
identity and citizenship. One of the citizens even articulated that the whole project has 
something to do with searching for a cultural background for Europe. Using his own 
words:  
 
„… there is this aspect in the whole program that Europe is seeking – well, not its roots, but 
its citizens questions, preferences in a number of directions. 
 
Do you think it draws on a democratic tradition? 
 
It’s not so much democracy, but it is the fact that there is a debate whether Europe is 
Christian or not. Thus, it’s evidently [going] back to its own roots. In our case I do not 
mean the democracy as European root but in terms of culture, and religion can also be 
part of that to some extent. There is a need to link Europe’s future to its past. And I see it in the 
way how people are get asked and they bring along their own attitude, their ’European-ness’ and 
opinions are added up by all that.” 
 
According to this quotation, although Europe appears as an already existing historical 
entity which needs to find its own identity, this identity can only be given by its citizens. 
From the answer we can see that citizens represent Europe’s link between its future and 
past. As I have indicated above, many citizens connected Europe’s unity to the common 
historical and cultural values of its citizens. However, this answer is even more interesting 
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because while assuming that such a cultural-historical background exists it also 
problematises the content of such a background since only citizens can identify their 
‘European-ness’ and it cannot be constructed from ‘above’. 
 
The ‘equal group of citizens repertoire’ depicted Europe as a home of various different groups 
who have an equally important culture. According to this viewpoint, the diversity of 
Europe has to be maintained and to be a European citizen is concomitant to living 
together with and respecting this plurality. This very plurality gives Europe a special edge 
because the differences can create a mutually beneficial relationship between people and 
nations but only if they trust each other. So, in this repertoire, Europe appeared as an 
existing reality not as an ongoing project. 
 
“And when we meet cultures that means, than we get richer… that’s a richer inside 
feeling and also feeling rich to communicate with each other, trust each other. Therefore 
I think we have to leave all borders because they are no borders. There is only 
communication and a social aspect between people. If you are French or if you are a 
Dutch, it is not important. I think that all people have to keep their culture. If it had 
positive elements on it, just keep it, because you can make the other citizens richer. That 
is in my point of view.” 
 
This answer really shows that in this repertoire the emphasis is not on the relationship 
between Europe and its citizens but on the intercultural links between fellow-citizens. It is 
not so important to establish a kind of all encompassing unity but to find the ways in 
which we can learn from our differences.  The same kind of view also appeared in the 
metaphor of Europe as a sports club:  
 
“I think Dutch citizenship is basically one of the groups of citizens in Europe, which 
have a more or less coherent cultural background. Of course, there have economic 
interests but especially I think for the Dutch we are very much depending on the rest of 
Europe. Because we are basically people who are trading, bringing services, so our market 
is basically Europe and Holland is to small to try to be isolated. So it’s a kind of…, like 
you are member of a club. The club is Europe and we are members maybe in one type of sport, or 
how you wanna see, but we have some things in common, we are all part of the total.” 
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This ‘sport club’ metaphor again emphasises the significance of the existing differences 
between nations. These differences and diversities create a good sports club and a 
harmoniously functioning transnational community such as the EU. This image highlights 
that this very diversity is the reason why citizens of different nations can collaborate. 
Therefore differences should be preserved and not dissolved in a forced unity. 
 
The ‘unity of the continent repertoire’ presented Europe as a unity in terms of its inwardly 
common features in contrast to other continents. According to this perspective, while 
citizens of different nations are different indeed in Europe they are closer to each other 
than to somebody from a different continent. So, being a European means that minor 
differences between fellow-Europeans dwindle in view of the differences between 
Europeans and people from other continents. So they stressed the geographic dimension of 
their relation to Europe as a continent. All in all, this continent aspect appeared in many 
answers as a means of stressing the inner unity of Europe and its difference to other 
countries, continents ‘outside’ Europe. According to one interviewee: 
 
“I feel myself a European. I’m not only Dutch. I feel myself like that. I don’t like feeling 
boundaries. I know the continents. That’s OK, because the people over there are totally 
different but in Europe everybody is from the same thoughts, not the same history, but 
they are closer than maybe somebody from Japan or somebody from United States or 
Indo-China. That’s different because all of the histories are different and here we have a 
European history.” 
 
This repertoire is quite the opposite of the sports club image since it emphasises a kind of 
relative closeness of nations and people in contrast with the rest of the world. While the 
‘equal group of citizens repertoire’ stresses the importance of mutual relationships here 
the emphasis is on drawing borders. This is a very robust discursive strategy to define 
oneself as undoubtedly European in view of the fact that it refers to the solidity of the 
continent’s geographical borders.  
 
177
The ‘extending circles of loyalty repertoire’ described Europe as a hierarchical political structure 
which erected a pyramid from local through regional up to the European level. The 
participants who organised their answers according to this repertoire emphasised that they 
are European because of their national citizenship.   
 
“There are minor differences here, for example I belong to my family and I live in 
Kisbattyán. At the same time I am Majoros because I belong to the Majoros family and 
that is how I can imagine a series of steps higher and higher that there is Hungarian-ness 
and this Hungarian-ness also belongs to the European Union, if it is enough. That is how 
I can imagine.” 
 
This relationship to Europe can be most bluntly expressed by Risse’s phrase ‘country first, 
but Europe too’.66 This view can be clearly read from one of the participant’s answers 
since European citizenship is a quality which is a further circle of loyalty based on local, 
regional and national attachments. Nevertheless, in many answers this was not so 
eloquently described as in this case but many participants emphasised that they only 
connect to Europe through their national citizenship and they do not have a double view 
in terms of their rights and obligations as citizens but they connect to these through the 
mediation of the nation state. 
 
These kinds of Europe-s and European citizenships are part of a diverse discursive field. 
One could ask which is the real Europe. Is Europe a political-economic process? Or a 
common historical and political tradition? Or is it a continent with clear-cut borders or a 
‘sports club’? Is it a hierarchical organisation in which local, regional, national levels are 
integrated? In a similar manner, it is also hard to identify which is the appropriate manner 
to participate in science and technology.  
66 Statistical analyses based on survey data and social psychological experiments confirm that most people, 
who strongly identify with their nation state, also feel a sense of belonging to Europe. Analyses from 
Eurobarometer data and other sources that ’country first, but Europe too’ is the dominant outlook in 
most EU countries and that people do not perceive this as contradictory.” (Risse, 2003)  
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5.4 Post-national Citizens. A model for all?  
 
In this section, I shall examine the issue of whether a common European political subject, 
sensitive to scientific-technological issues, can be constructed. Firstly, I will introduce 
Nielsen et al.’s case study about the different interpretations of participation in general 
and Consensus Conference in particular in different political contexts (Nielsen et al., 
2007). They show that in different contexts the organisers ‘construct’ their participants 
quite differently. Accordingly, they might answer the question of what is the point of the 
process of the Consensus Conference quite differently. Furthermore, it can be questioned 
whether a common model of participants in an international process such as the MoM is 
appropriate and justified. So, the second part of this section will reflect on the empirical 
findings of the interviewing in order to examine the question above in more depth. 
 
Participation in different political cultures 
 
The tendency to regard participatory tools as cross-nationally applicable may be closely 
connected with the widespread assumption that the concept participation incorporates 
universally agreed meanings and connotations. However, Nielsen et al. argue the term 
participation is understood, interpreted and employed differently in different nation 
states. They attempt to explore the underlying perceptions, interpretations and 
assumptions on the purpose and legitimacy of Consensus Conference, one of the oldest 
and most widely used participatory techniques ((Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 14-15).  
 
In a case study on Consensus Conferences organised by French, Norwegian and Danish 
officials, they show that deliberation and participation become infused with different 
meanings in different contexts. They conducted interviews to map out what the organisers 
of such events think about participation and the role of lay people and experts in different 
political cultures. In a way, their research project is complementary to the interviews 
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conducted with MoM participants since, in their case study, lay panelists were not 
included as interviewees. 
 
Just as the theoretical section of this paper draws heavily on Habermas’ model, they also 
used his ‘three paradigms of democracy’ as an analytical framework. As it was indicated in 
the theoretical section, Habermas introduces the liberal and the republican as the main 
strands of political thought and argues for a third model invoking a proceduralist-
deliberative notion of democracy. The authors of the case study use these different 
conceptions of democracy as a point of departure for their investigation of national 
interpretations of the participatory Consensus Conference (hereinafter, CC).  
 
According to their argument, the key to their exploration of these differences is the 
concept of democratic legitimacy. The main questions they asked were at what levels and 
under what circumstances legitimacy to political decisions emerges. They show that 
different models of democratic legitimacy prevail in different contexts. Furthermore, they 
argue that the relationship between legitimacy and participatory arrangements deeply 
affect how organisers understand the aim and purpose of the process and in relation with 
this, the roles of the experts and the participants (pp. 15-20).  
 
The reason for this is that under different conceptions of democracy, democratic 
legitimacy is attained in different ways and through various procedures. This shapes the 
ideas of when and how decisions are legitimate, which again leads to different perceptions 
of public participation and deliberation. Figure 15. summarises the source of legitimacy in 
different political cultures alongside the other aspects of Nielsen et al.’s case study. 
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Figure 15. Cross-National Perspectives of Consensus Conference (CC) 
 Danish CC Norwegian CC French CC 
Political 
Culture Deliberative Republican/Communitarian Liberal 
Source of 
Legitimacy 
correspondence to the 
ideals of the 
deliberative procedure; 
inclusive, transparent 
and public process; 
equal chances to make 
one’s voice heard 
shared notion of good life; 
political decision-making 
should reflect the shared 







status of all 
citizens 
Role of Lay 
People 
„the cooperation of people 
representing different views” 
– 
to set aside self-
interested point of view
„the voice of the people” – to 
express everyday knowledge 
„les naïfs” – 
to become semi-
experts 
Preparation to acquire social competences to acquire factual knowledge 
 
As it can be seen in Figure 15., the different political cultures invoke different perceptions 
of what is legitimate and what is the source of this legitimacy. Firstly, in the liberal-
proceduralist concept of democracy characterising the political culture of France is 
intertwined with the notion of legitimacy in which political equality is the highest value. 
This political equality, that is, the equal status of all citizens in the polity is secured 
through the equal right to vote, and thus the highest authority lies with elected 
representatives carrying out the mandate of the citizenry. Legitimacy is attained through 
the fairness, transparency, and trustworthiness of the procedures that guard political 
decision-making.  
 
Secondly, the republican paradigm, especially its communitarian reading, characteristic to 
Norway, is based on conceptions of political autonomy and equality that can only be 
realised by a community of citizens with common practices and shared values and 
traditions. Legitimacy, thus, is attained when political decision-making reflects the shared 
values, ethics and values of the community.  
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Thirdly, under the deliberative political model, which is dominant in Denmark, legitimacy 
depends on the correspondence to the ideals of the deliberative procedure. Therefore, the 
carrying out of deliberative procedures that are inclusive and transparent, and in which 
different actors and groups in society are accorded an equal chance to make their voice 
heard will impart democratic legitimacy to decision-making (Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 20-
27). 
 
It is also worth noting that while in Norway (communitarian-republican) and Denmark 
(deliberative) the process was compatible with the political system and legitimacy, in 
France (liberal-proceduralist) lay consultation at the parliamentary level interfered with 
legitimacy and political equality associated with representative democracy. Using Nielsen, 
Lassen and Sandøe’s own words:  
 
“Thus, descriptions of the method’s incompatibility with the political system invoke 
notions of legitimacy associated with the procedural model of democracy: if political 
decisions gain legitimacy through the workings of fair and transparent procedures, 
administered by publicly elected representatives, the allowing a small group of randomly 
selected citizens to take center stage, let alone give advice to decision makers, is deemed 
inappropriate and, as the interviews suggest, undemocratic. In the light of the French 
reception of the conference model, the idea that employment of consensus conferences 
per se enhances legitimacy in decision-making can be queried (Nielsen et al., 2007, p. 27).” 
 
As far as the role of lay people is concerned, the authors of the study show that organisers 
– along these different perspectives of gaining legitimacy – constructed their participants 
differently.  
 
In the case of France, the contribution of the laypeople was very much viewed in terms of 
what the layperson was not. The participants possessed neither the knowledge of the 
expert nor the mandate of the politician. They are often referred to as “les naïfs” and the 
primary benefit of the conference is that it gives lay people access to state-of-the-art 
knowledge and research. Their most important role was to acquire the knowledge and 
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vocabulary of the expert world, that is, to become semi-experts. Accordingly, teaching of 
factual knowledge is stressed over getting social competencies in the French context as 
the most important aspect of the preparation needed for lay people in order to participate 
in the conference. 
 
In contrast, in their answers Norwegian and Danish organisers framed the contribution of 
the laypersons as representing a different set of perspectives and form of knowledge that 
must be assessed on its own terms. Moreover, in both countries, there was quite a strong 
emphasis on social competences while preparing lay panelists to the public part of the 
conference. Despite sharing these aspects, there were also significant differences in the 
interpretation of lay participation. On the one hand, Norwegian interviewees’ spoke of 
citizens as possessing an “everyday knowledge” or “folk knowledge” and therefore could 
provide a “genuine” or “holistic” perspective. On the other hand, the Danish connected the 
value of lay people’s participation to their ability to set aside a self-interested point of view and 
participate in deliberations over the common good. These different interpretations of 
what valuable participation is, argue Nielsen et al., correspond to the political culture of 
each country respectively (Nielsen et al., 2007, pp. 28-32).  
 
Participants in an International Project 
 
As it has been mentioned above, the case study of Nielsen et al. is complementary in 
many ways to the interviews conducted with participants of the MoM process. As it could 
be read in the ‘Official Discourse Layer’ there is an official attempt to construct a 
common identity and model of citizenship for the ‘people of Europe’. This model and 
identity is based not on common values and cultural heritage but on the participation and 
engagement in a common transnational polity. This participation is intended to be 
facilitated by international platforms where citizens can meet, either face-to-face or 
virtually, and discuss the common matters of their political community.  
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This model presupposes that participation means the same in every political culture across 
Europe and this model closely related to a deliberative model of citizenship can be easily 
transferred to and implemented in every European nation. However, as Nielsen et al. 
showed in their case study, participation can be imbued with very different meanings in 
different contexts. This also means that the model of post-national citizenship is not at all 
independent of cultural contexts as the official documents imply. This model is strongly 
connected to those political cultures where deliberation is a central element of the 
political culture.  
 
As far as the interviews conducted with the MoM participants are concerned, it is 
important to highlight how the different repertoires identified divided between Dutch and 
Hungarian participants.  
 
Figure 16. Difference between the Dutch and the Hungarians 
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First of all, it is important to mention that Hungary has a liberal-representative political 
culture with a strong withdrawal into private spheres. The reason for this is that while the 
socialist era has been over now for fifteen years the previous forty years still have their 
effects on Hungarian social life. In the last period of socialism in Hungary the Party’s goal 
was to systematically depoliticise public life and to turn people’s attention to their own 
economic enrichment by providing space for small, private enterprises. This was the 
compromise between the depoliticised public and the permissive political elite of the late 
period of socialism, which is called ‘fridge- or goulash-communism’ referring to the 
emergence of consumer ideals in a socialist context. I believe that is the reason that when 
Hungarians spoke about their role in the process they never used the expressions like 
“together”, “we”, “our” but emphasised phrases like “my opinion”, “my goal”. However, 
it is also noticeable that not all civil initiatives are at odds with the Hungarians, yet these 
usually take the forms of institutionalised or informal resistance to an already existing 
social or technical system (Király, 2005). 
 
In contrast, the Dutch political system is based on a consensus model called ‘poldermodel’ 
which has quite a different historical background from the Hungarian political system. 
The Dutch society has been characterised by this consensus model for many centuries. 
The origin of this striving for consensus is the struggle against water, which goes back to 
the Middle Ages. At that time farmers, noblemen, cities and all citizens had to work 
together in order to build dykes to fight against the sea. The only way to do this was to 
cooperate irrespective of rank and wealth. Today this model means that in the Dutch 
political system the employers, the unions and the government sit around the table to 
come to labour agreements. However, traces of this model could be found in the 
economic sphere, in the educational system and in other spheres of social life as well. 
Usually, Dutch people attempt to evade radical standpoints and attempt to see the other 
person's position. This may be the reason why in the answers they often used terms ‘we’, 
‘our’, ‘together’ and the ‘opinion of the group’. 
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As far as the role of the participants is concerned, whilst the sceptical repertoire could be 
detected in both groups the educational discursive node was more characteristic of the 
Hungarians and the dialogic one could be traced more clearly in the Dutch answers. In 
my opinion, the explanation for this difference is that in a way the Dutch are ‘playing on a 
home turf’ because their political culture, education and economy requires from them a 
certain kind of activity and team work. Above, in Nielsen et al.’s case study one could see 
that the deliberative model, which is in a way central in the idea of the Consensus 
Conference model, is only characteristic of the Danish political context. In a similar 
fashion, the dialogic repertoire, which has its direct connections with the post-national 
citizen model, is much closer to the Dutch political culture than to the Hungarian.  
 
In contrast, an initiative like the Meeting of Minds was totally new for the Hungarian 
citizens and they could not really find their own place in it. These kinds of initiatives are 
not only far from the political culture but education and human relations in the economy 
are also organised along different lines. Concerning the case study of Consensus 
Conferences, it could be read that the French organisers put a very strong emphasis on 
the educational aspect of the process. Similarly, for the Hungarians this aspect of the 
MoM seemed more tangible as they had had no contact with public deliberations before. 
Consequently, they downplayed this other aspect in their answers.  
 
As far as the participants’ relationship to Europe is concerned, it is worth mentioning that 
it seemed from the interviews that Hungarian citizens have an ambiguous relationship to 
Europe. While they expressed a cultural, historical connection with Europe they also 
depict Europe as ‘out there’, as ‘they’ and emphasised that Hungarians still have to 
improve their condition to become truly Europeans. So, this above-mentioned 
ambivalence stems from the fact that the Hungarians use two different aspects of Europe 
in their arguments. Firstly, a cultural-historical dimension of Europe which Hungarians 
also share and secondly an economic-political dimension which is a Europe ‘out there’ 
and with which Hungary has to fall into line. In that sense, the most appropriate 
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expression for this relationship comes from one of the participants, which is that 
Hungarians are “not non-Europeans”. Quoting one of the Hungarian citizens: 
 
„I have never felt non-European, so we are getting closer to one another. I have never felt 
[we are] on opposite sides because I have always approached [the issue] that he belongs 
here, and I belong here too when we went on holiday to Germany or France. I have 
never felt inferior to them. The fact that we are poorer is a different issue altogether, but 
that has never made me feel inferior to them.” 
 
This interview part clearly shows that among many Hungarian citizens there is still a 
strong feeling of contrast between us and them which signifies the rest of Europe. The fact 
that the interviewee negates two time inferiority to them while the question was about her 
European identity clearly shows that there is an economic-political inferiority complex 
among the Hungarian participants.  
 
As for the Dutch citizens, it seems that being Dutch also means being European and this 
belonging to Europe is an immanent part of the Dutch identity. Furthermore, when they 
talked about their relationship to Europe they used phrases and expressions which 
referred to the geographical position of the country as a fact. Consequently, they claimed 
an immanent unity of Europe which, according to them, can be very clearly seen by 
contrasting Europe with other continents. Apart from that, some of them also 
emphasised that Europe is an association of diverse groups of citizens who are equal and 
this diversity is a valuable thing and it should be maintained. This unproblematic relation 
is clearly present in one of the Dutch participants answer: 
 
“I mean 100% I’m Dutch, because that’s what I am, I was born there, I was raised there 
and at the same time my 100% is European, because Holland is a European country. We 
are in Europe, we are living there.” 
 
The fact that the Hungarians and the Dutch used different kinds of repertoires also 
indicates that there is a difference in political culture and in their relationship to Europe. 
This underscores the argument that the model of post-national citizenship is dependent 
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on political culture and historical developments. This seems even more important if one 
considers the fact that actual participatory arrangements can be based on this citizenship 
model. For example, the MoM did not treat participants with different cultural 
background in a different way. Although different handling may have raised questions 
about political correctness but it would have been necessary if the aim was to construct a 
debating subject in an international context, that is, the post-national citizen. As it can be 
clearly seen in the interviews the Hungarians for example might have needed a different 
kind of preparation for the process than the Dutch or the Danish.  
 
While I am sure that in the long run a shift in the Hungarian political culture towards a 
more deliberative and consensus based model would be very beneficial, I shall argue that 
international participatory projects like MoM cannot simply overlook the difference 
between participants with diverse backgrounds. This difference might be incorporated in 
the design of the process either by trying to level it off in the preparatory phase of the 
project or taking into account its implications in another way.  
 
Furthermore, MoM was based on a post-national citizenship model, a model which has 
been created to overstep historical and cultural differences. It is important to highlight 
however, that while there is a constant search for a model on the part of EU officials to 
construct a citizenship model transcending national aspects, post-national citizenship 




As far as the role of the citizens is concerned, these discursive repertoires were the 
educational, the dialogical, and the sceptical repertoires. In the ‘educational repertoire’ the 
emphasis was on the educational effects of the project and participation is considered to 
be a means of education. In the ‘dialogical repertoire’, the dialogical, open and dynamic 
manner of the project was stressed. Accordingly, participants conceived themselves as 
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active members of a group, which is meant to think and create and reach a common 
opinion. In the sceptical repertoire, citizens expressed their concern about the 
meaningfulness of the project, at worst interpreting the project merely as a strategy meant 
to legitimise or advertise already decided policies. Whilst the sceptical repertoire could be 
detected in both groups, the educational repertoire was more characteristic of the 
Hungarians and the dialogic could be more clearly identified in Dutch answers. 
 
When participants spoke about their European-ness and their European citizenship they 
usually justified their arguments by describing Europe. Five different Europe-s, five 
different relationships and five different discursive repertoires could be detected 
respectively. These were the following repertoires: the political-economic, the cultural-
historical, the equal groups of citizens, the unity of continent and the extending circles of 
loyalty repertoires. In the political-economic repertoire the emphasis was on the image of 
Europe as the subject of an integration process. In a similar manner, citizens who 
organised their arguments around this repertoire spoke about their European-ness and 
European citizenship as being under construction, or in other words, as being part of a 
process itself. In the cultural-historical repertoire citizens stressed the importance of a 
common European history and culture which despite many wars and conflicts can be 
traced back to thousands of years. European citizens, therefore, are the inheritors of the 
same cultural legacy by virtue of a common European history. The equal group of citizens 
repertoire depicted Europe as a home of various different groups who have equally 
important culture. According to this viewpoint, the diversity of Europe has to be 
maintained and to be a European citizen is concomitant to living together with and 
respecting this plurality. The unity of the continent repertoire presented Europe as a unity 
in terms of its inwardly common features in contrast to other continents. According to 
this perspective, while citizens of different nations are different indeed, in Europe they 
are closer to each other than to somebody from a different continent. So, being a 
European means that minor differences between fellow-Europeans dwindle compared to 
differences between Europeans and people from other continents. The extending circles 
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of loyalty repertoire described Europe as a hierarchical political structure which is erected 
as a pyramid from local through regional up to the European level. European citizenship, 
therefore, is a quality which is a wider circle of loyalty based on local, regional and 
national attachments. 
 
What is most striking in the ‘citizens’ discursive layer’ is the variety of different repertoires 
in terms of how citizens describe their role and their relationship to Europe, their 
European citizenship. Although one can identify arguments, symbols, rhetorical elements 
which may have academic or official origin in their answers, the ways they explain their 
position cannot be reduced to either of them. It seems that both participation and 
European-ness is a discursive field which is a container of different practices, meanings 
and identities.  
 
In the ‘citizens’ discursive layer’ one can also identify this kind of ambiguity towards the 
future results and possible impact of the project. While the citizens were very much in 
favour of participation in issues about science and technology in particular and in politics 
in general, many of them expressed their concern that their opinion will not be taken into 
consideration. In this section I attempted to identify different discursive repertoires 
around which Hungarian and Dutch citizens organised their arguments about their role in 
the project and their relationships to Europe and European citizenship.  
 
The second section of the chapter examined the issue whether common European 
political subjects, who are sensitive to scientific-technological issues, that is, post-national 
scientific citizens can be constructed. Firstly, I introduced Nielsen et al.’s case study about 
the different interpretations of participation in general and Consensus Conference in 
particular in different political contexts. According to their research, in different contexts 
the role of the laypersons can be very diverse. They argue that the organisers ‘construct’ 
their participants quite differently and in line with their ideas of what the benefits of the 
process of the Consensus Conference are. Consequently, it can be re-considered whether 
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an unquestioned common model of participants in an international process such as the 
MoM is appropriate and justified.  
 
A comparison between the Dutch and the Hungarians showed that the model of post-
national scientific citizenship is much closer to the Dutch political culture. While the post-
national citizenship model is supposed to transcend historical and cultural differences, it is 
important to highlight that it might not be as irrespective of national contexts as it had 
been assumed. 
 
It might be said that the analysis of the citizenship discursive layer completed the 
‘collection of samples’ from different discursive layers. This sample collection attempted 
to illustrate all important aspects and perspectives of citizenship, science and Europe. As 
one could see, both European policy documents and the MoM project favour a special 
kind of identity position, namely, the post-national citizenship. However, this chapter 
showed that the subject positions of the citizens’ self-understanding cannot be reduced to 
this idea alone and the space around the term participation is much broader than this 
narrow concept. As a conclusion, in the next and final chapter both the viability and the 






In this section, I shall attempt to draw a conclusion from the various issues, problems and 
policy approaches discussed above. I will briefly sum up the main arguments discussed in 
this thesis and reconstruct the train of thought. The focus of attention will be again the 
‘Meeting of Minds’ project. It will be discussed in the light of the questions the following 
dilemma raises. The main question about deliberative processes in general, and about 
MoM in particular, is what impact these projects and their results can have. I will argue 
that just as Pasteur had to restructure or ‘pasteurise’ the social level in accordance with the 
conditions of his laboratory, national and European politics should be restructured, that 
is, should be ‘deliberalised’ as well.  
 
In the first part of this thesis, there was an introduction to and analysis of the MoM 
project as a laboratory where ideal conditions are guaranteed by painstakingly framing the 
process. It has been argued that one of the underlying ideas of the project was the ‘ideal 
speech situation’ developed by Habermas. There was a constant and clear effort on behalf 
of the organisers to maintain a symmetrical and open communication between citizens 
who were to elaborate recommendations on the possible future applications of brain 
science. It is claimed that this communicative situation could only be guaranteed by 
enrolling many other entities than just the citizens alone. These entities were facilitators, 
the interior design, the microphones, the beamer, the headphones and so on and so forth. 
Without these ‘additional’ elements such balance in the discourse could not have been 
achieved. This highlights the fact that ‘ideal speech situation’ is not a discursive state 
which can just arise spontaneously. It had to be constructed and in the ‘under 
construction’ period many other elements had to be involved. Afterwards, these elements 
remained in the background ‘dormant’ providing a frame for the conversations.67 I have 
67 This web of mute entities has been described by Bauman too as silent culture: „Another kind of culture, 
a silent culture, a culture unaware of being a culture, a culture that keeps the knowledge of being a culture 
a secret, a culture working anonymously or under an assumed name (…) – such a culture might be a 
handmaiden, a fuel station and a repair workshop servicing the current web of human interaction called 
‘society’.” (Bauman, 2004, Wp. p. 12-13.) 
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explored and analysed this frame by using Actor-Network-Theory, which emphasises the 
role of associations of non-human and human elements in establishing social order. 
Moreover, the chapter also reflected on the challenge the MoM project was faced with, 
that is, what role the results of this laboratory, this ‘micro-process’ is going to play at a 
macro level. This challenge will be discussed in some depth below. 
 
In the second part, I explained the different interpretations of the transnational 
participation of citizens concerned with science and technology. I have identified three 
main ways which dominate the theoretical, the policy and the public discourse on 
scientific and European citizenship. These can be connected to three important strands of 
political thought, namely, the liberal, the republican and the deliberative theories and their 
models of citizenship, respectively. 
 
One of these models, namely, the deliberative model of citizenship has been more 
extensively covered in this essay than the others. There are two reasons for that. Firstly, 
there is a significant shift in the rhetoric of European Commission documents. The 
documents that have been discussed in the third section call for more accountable and 
participatory politics on behalf of the Commission. Moreover, one can see that these 
initiatives do not stop at the borders of narrowly defined politics but demand alternatives 
through which science and technology can become more accountable and open to 
citizens. In these documents, involvement and participation are often depicted through a 
deliberative democratic model in which a debating circle surrounds policy and decision-
making. In these documents a clear shift can be seen from a citizenship model which 
depicts citizens as consumers of science and technology towards a model which 
encourages citizens to form opinions about developments in these spheres.  
 
It can be stated that, as it is apparent in theoretical discourse, these documents express an 
intention to establish a post-national citizenship model in the European polity in general, 
and in the spheres of European science and technology in particular. This model of 
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citizenship would be based on participation and engagement in a post-national 
community transcending cultural, linguistic and national borders. As a consequence, a 
new model for the social integration of the European population would be political 
involvement in common issues (Giesen & Eder, 2001).68 Yet, with this shift important 
questions emerge such as: what would be the follow up to the opinions elaborated in 
deliberative processes after they have been expressed; and how can the voices of citizens 
be effectively channelled into ‘appropriate bodies’; and how sensitive these bodies are to 
external influences and how to make them even more sensitive? We could see that these 
documents avoid these questions.  
 
The final part of this paper is again closely connected with the ‘Meeting of Minds’ project 
which was actually a European deliberation process. In this part there is an attempted to 
show how citizens perceive their role and their European-ness in relation to the project. 
We could see that this project can at the same time be interpreted as a classroom for 
acquiring knowledge as the ‘educational repertoire’ suggest, as a circus for marketing and 
the amusement of the folk as the ‘sceptical repertoire’ frames or as an arena of thoughts 
where different views, opinions and interests meet and strive for reaching a consensus as 
the ‘dialogical repertoire’ assumes. In a similar manner, European-ness can be understood 
along many more different lines than just in terms of political participation, such as 
geographic, cultural, economic and political frames.  
 
Moreover, it could also be seen that the post-national citizenship construction is not as 
‘cosmopolitan’ and irrespective of national contexts as it had been supposed. While 
apparently Dutch participants could use this identity position and play according to its 
rules imposed, Hungarian citizens did have problems understanding and positioning 
themselves in such a role. While it is certain that the Hungarians could also contribute to 
the process in a valuable way, cultural differences could be reflected more in the structure 
68 Science and technology was always a joint international venture, and issues of science usually go beyond 
national borders. Consequently, the topic of brain science probably also seemed an appropriate area to 
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of the process because this citizenship might not travel as well between cultures as policy-
makers might hope. 
 
Coming back to the main argument, the above-mentioned repertoires are all different 
kinds of interpretations developed by the participants to understand their role and place 
in the process. However, while the good intentions of those organisers who built the 
model of post-national scientific citizen into the project is beyond doubt, it is hard not to 
agree with those who are sceptical if there are no guarantees for citizens that politicians 
and scientists will take notice of them. Habermas also emphasised that: 
 
“As we have seen, democratic procedures should produce rational outcomes insofar as 
opinion-formation inside parliamentary bodies remains sensitive to the results of a 
surrounding informal opinion-formation in autonomous public spheres (Habermas, 1997, 
p. 60).” 
 
Yet, if parliamentary bodies remain insensitive to the results of such project as the MoM, 
one suspects that participation procedures on science and technology, instead of a “true 
dialogue”, will foster disillusionment and cynicism from citizens who cannot see their 
opinion taken seriously. On the website of the project we could read that the envisaged 
effects of participatory technology assessment generally are: (i) to enhance social learning 
among experts, stakeholders and citizens; (ii) to stimulate public debate; and (iii) to provide 
policy advice (MoM, 2005A, Wp.). In this sense, ‘Meeting of Minds’ is designed to help 
develop new forms of social debate and decision-making processes at European cross-
national level, as well as creating a network of interested parties and stakeholders by 
making issues public at a European level. However, these are quite vague and far-reaching 
goals which are not easily measured or internalised within a short period of time.   
 
Even so, the most problematic point is the question how the results of this public 
deliberation may shape future policies concerning brain sciences. One way to answer this 
realize this shift between citizenship models. 
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question is what Simon Joss69 said at one of the ‘Steering Committee’ meetings.70 His 
answer to a similar question was that the project aims do not focus on ‘government’ but 
‘governance’. This means that the main goal is not to have a direct effect on policy-
making but to influence all the important actors and stakeholders who are interested in 
issues about brain science. So, the effect can also be very indirect and one will only be 
able to directly experience its effect in the long run. In the interview Rinie van Est also 
emphasised that this is a pilot project and it is not only the citizens who have to learn this 
new practice but the organisers also have to create a network of interested parties. 
Moreover, they also have to increase politicians’ and scientists’ awareness of the findings 
which a deliberative arrangement could provide. This project therefore is an experiment 
not only in its process and results but also with regard to its impacts on the political and 
the scientific community.  
 
“It is part for me, it is part of the methodology. That’s communication finding out which 
politicians, which policy makers are interested. (…) 
 
The classical way in the history of Technology Assessment that is you make a report, 
which is neutral, and you give it to policy makers and they will use. That doesn’t work, it 
has never worked but we’ve come to realize that it has never worked.  
 
So we really have to have some kind of communication strategy and I have stressed to 
make this kind of quest, who is interested, that’s part of the process, meaning that so you 
have a nice participatory process but nobody’s interested. Ok, nobody is interested but 
you do a lot to get that interest. That is a clear result for me.” 
 
In the course of the interview, Rinie van Est also emphasised moreover that it is very 
hard to answer the question whether the climate among the decision makers and scientists 
is congenial enough to make full use of the results of a public deliberation like the 
Meeting of Minds. There are no guarantees that the report will have a direct impact on 
policy making but these initiatives are part of a trial-and-error process. Apart from this, 
69 Simon Joss is a researcher at the Center for Democracy at the University of Westminster. Together with 
Alison Mohr, he provides methodological pieces of advice to the project coordinators. 
70 Meeting of Minds. European Citizens’ Deliberation on Brain Science Project: Steering Committee 
Meeting. 7-8/ 07/2005 Brussels. 
196
there are substantial efforts on behalf of the project coordinators to exert an effect at 
different levels and on various actors.  
 
“You cannot give guarantees but you can do everything, you have to mobilize things to 
get an impact. (…) It is such a complex thing but there are no guarantees. At the same 
time I mean I can understand quite well that from the point of view of the citizens. That’s 
why they do it, because they want to have an impact.  Because if they don’t have an 
impact why should they do it? But it is the same with the organisers, if we have the idea 
that we would not have any impact we wouldn’t do it.” 
 
The website claims that the Meeting of Minds initiative wishes to meet EU calls for 
greater public involvement in the debate on future research, technological decision-
making and governance. This way, argues the writer of the text, Meeting of Minds will 
also make a significant, tangible contribution to the development of the European 
governance agenda in the field of research. However, in view of the above-mentioned 
arguments, the organisers of the project seem less confident when they are directly asked 
about. It seems that the project in particular and TA procedures at a European level in 
general have to be ‘sold’ to policy-makers and scientists also as it had been promoted to 
citizens. Without this, these kinds of deliberative forms cannot ‘make a concrete, tangible 
contribution’. 
 
At the end of this journey, I would like to develop an argument that these participatory 
processes might take steps to, in a latourian sense, ‘deliberatise’ national and European 
political spheres if they want to uphold their credibility in the eyes of the citizens. In the 
first section of this paper we could see that Pasteur had to translate the conditions of his 
laboratory firstly to the level of farms and secondly to the social level. He was able to 
reconstruct the very texture of society by turning the farms and the ‘outside world’ into a 
gigantic laboratory. So the problem to be addressed is how to translate the conditions of a 
deliberative process into national and EU political levels. From the above mentioned 
arguments, it seems that even the organisers are not sure how to proceed. However, it is 
not my intention here to criticise the organisers but to suggest a possible solution to this 
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problem.  If the comparison between Pasteur’s case and the MoM is carried further, it can 
be said the organisers are doing the right thing. Pasteur built a network of interested 
parties in order to attain his goal. He ‘enrolled’ farmers and microbes first, politicians and 
the hygienic movement later. As we could read in the interview with Rinie van Est, the 
organisers currently have the same goals. They are trying to build up a network of 
interested parties who would help to attain the goals of the process and this activity is part 
of the project. 
 
Apart from this, we could also see the question of identity in Callon’s example. From the 
above mentioned arguments, it seems that there is a political intention to realise a shift 
towards a politically active citizen in a post-national community. Moreover, issues about 
science and technology also seem to be an adequate ‘turf’ to experiment with this new 
type of ‘deliberative game’ with its own rules and guidelines. However, it is also important 
to emphasise that the conclusion to be drawn from the case studies in connection with 
the concept of laboratisation is that, similarly to scientific facts, identity constructs are not 
easily fixed and maintained.  
 
If the conditions outside the laboratory are not ensured, these identities become hollow 
and lose their substance. This might prove even truer for those participants who are 
‘newcomers’ in a process related to political cultures based on discussion and deliberation. 
As Latour and Callon showed, if there are no structures outside the laboratory to enforce 
certain ‘identity’ positions, people stop behaving like ‘homo economicus’ and microbes 
stop behaving like vaccines. In a similar fashion, it could be achieved that citizens in a 
very limited and confined space should behave as ‘real’ post-national scientific citizens do. 
The challenge is to keep these identity constructs together deploying them as new actors 
of European integration both in terms of political and scientific-technological integration. 
So far, it seems that according to documents that this is the ‘official’ intention. I would 
assume that this is only possible if citizens who take part in a deliberative process in 
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particular, and citizenry in general, can not only believe that their opinions are taken into 
consideration but they can actually follow them up.  
 
My question, however, is not about how the organisers should do their jobs better but 
how the channelling of public opinion into political centres should happen. To put it 
more bluntly, what are the minimum requirements of deliberative processes which the 
political culture encompassing them should provide? What might be emphasised here is 
the expression of ‘minimum requirements’ because there is no place for the elaboration of 
complex idyllic plans about how the national and the European might be restructured in a 
more democratic and transparent way. Here, I would rather attempt to find and suggest 
the very first and by all means necessary step to launch this journey towards these goals.   
 
First of all, the core of the problem seems obvious, given that both these deliberative 
processes and the citizens participating in them lack any kind of formal power. Yet, is it 
necessary to give formal power to the public? It is not an easy question to answer since 
traditional political institutions based on a representative democratic model are short of 
legitimacy. A straightforward solution would be to establish new political institutions 
based on direct political participation. However, in a modern society this is not at all 
obvious since the issues needing to be discussed and the administrative system are far too 
complex to be directly governed by ordinary citizens. That is why Habermas argues that 
an ‘in-between’ solution is needed combining the administrative functioning of modern 
societies and political participation. According to him, the  
 
“…power of public discourses that uncover topics of relevance to all of society, interpret 
values, contribute to the resolution of problems, generate good reasons, and debunk bad 
ones. Of course, these opinions must be given shape in the form of decisions by 
democratically constituted decision-making bodies. The responsibility for practically 
consequential decisions must be based in an institution. Discourses do not govern. They 
generate a communicative power that cannot take the place of administration but can only 
influence it. This influence is limited to the procurement and withdrawal of legitimation 
(Habermas, 1992, p. 452).” 
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In line with this, deliberative processes can represent this ‘in-between’ solution not by 
giving citizens legislative power but by effectively channelling their opinions into the 
arenas where the actual decisions are made. But again what does ‘effective channelling in’ 
actually mean? How can the sensitivity of parliamentary bodies be guaranteed? How can it 
be achieved that results of deliberative projects are taken on board by politicians?  
 
If it is not intended that deliberative processes should replace political participation from 
representative democracy in general but is meant to improve its functioning, then I shall 
argue that it is important that the results and recommendations developed by the citizens 
should be discussed by the authoritative political body concerned.71 As we could see from 
the story of MoM, these authoritative political bodies can be at national level like 
parliaments and/or international bodies like the European Parliament. Moreover, there 
can be deliberative methodologies like the scenario workshop or the citizens’ jury, which 
are more closely connected to the local level. In the case of such processes, authoritative 
bodies could be local or regional governments. All things considered, no matter on which 
political level these processes take place, the important thing is that these 
recommendations are taken seriously by the decision-makers. Furthermore, they should 
not only be taken seriously but citizens might also be part of the discussions about the results 
of deliberative processes, and/or at the very least could be observers when the results are 
being discussed.  
 
This solution would mean that these processes transcend their role as mere public 
experiments and enter the realm of real public discussion about matters which are 
important for the transnational, national and/or local political communities. It would 
represent a guarantee that citizens can really follow up the results and make sure that their 
71 I am not discussing here the issues of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ but stick to the issues of political 
participation. It may be worth mentioning, though, that accountability, stakeholder engagement and 
responsibility is start to spill-over from a political to an economic context. It is a similar dynamic which is 
happening now with the area of corporations which is also happening with scientific research. To put it 
more bluntly, these spheres which were formerly free of ethical deliberations and reflections are in a way 
200
final report does not end up on the shelf somewhere in an empty office. If these 
conditions are met, these processes could represent real forums of political discussions. 
 
It may be worth mentioning that this solution is not at all foreign to our political culture. 
There is a way through which ordinary Hungarian citizens can influence the agenda of 
issues discussed in the Parliament. National public initiative can force “the Parliament to 
place a subject under its jurisdication” (Hun. Const. 1949, Article 28D). If the strict 
requirements of this initiative are met the “Parliament shall debate the subject defined by” 
citizens in advance. This means a possibility of intervention in the course of formal 
politics by the citizenry.   
 
I would like to argue that this could be a way of dealing with the outcomes of deliberative 
processes as well. There should be a reliable formal guarantee in the processes so that 
politicians should be obliged to at least discuss these results and take them into 
consideration.  In other words, such processes would not necessarily have direct 
connection with legislation but such a model would assure that the recommendations 
expressed by citizens are truly  considered by members of parliament. 
 
So, this could be a model for feedback on deliberative processes. Without the guarantee 
that the political elite at least will have to deal with the questions and problems arising on 
the interface of the public and the administrative spheres, these processes remain totally 
meaningless and even ideological since they do not represent real participation. This is the 
minimum prerequisite of ‘deliberatising’ politics at local, at national and/or at European 
level. 
 
This idea is utopian and realistic at the same time. Utopian because it would mean that 
certain areas be opened up for public discussions and politics and policies concerned 
repoliticized. Consequently, participation of and responsibility towards citizens and consumers are 
becoming more and more important in the discourses of these areas.  
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would be more accountable. If these processes are implemented in a top-down manner 
like MoM was, it is too idealistic to expect that national or European politics would also 
accept and establish them not just as public experiments but as real channels of political 
participation.  
 
As Markroff (Markoff, 1999) emphasises, democratisation, so far, in local and in national 
arenas has been the result of social movements’ constant effort to control and disrupt the 
plans of those at the top. As a consequence, political power has been shaped to a more 
accountable form by the activities of movements which represented a pressure from 
below. Markoff also argues that during “the eighteenth century, social movements 
reoriented themselves from local power structures to national states but they have been 
less effective in reorienting themselves yet again to the suprastate level” (Markoff, 1999; 
p. 21). Considering these historical dimensions of democratisation processes one can say 
that the self-democratising power from above is an oxymoron in itself.  
 
Considering Markoff’s ideas, it could be said that in a way the European and the 
Hungarian polity share the same problems. Both consist of a set of relatively recently 
formed political institutions of a political community claiming itself democratic. However, 
both lack a fairly mature civil society to control their power and force them to use it in a 
more transparent and accountable way. Lacking this pressure from below they cannot be 
truly democratic. Accordingly, the need to give a formal status to channels of political 
participation like deliberative processes can only arise in the civil society. Furthermore, 
obviously only this sphere can be truly effective in enforcing such a need. 
 
However, I would like to argue that an argument of giving a formal status to channels 
deliberation is also realist in a sense. It is realistic because democratic deficit is an 
inevitable challenge for the political institutions depending on a representative form of 
democracy. They have to deal with the problems arising from the fact that traditional 
channels of opinion and will-formation and expressions have become hollow and cannot 
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be simply rejuvenated. One can say that there is reason to keep up the hope since the EU 
has just recently set off several initiatives aiming to deal with democratic deficit, with the 
gap between European citizen and European institutions and with the lack of engagement 
of civil society organisations. This also can have a spill-over effect on the national level 
particularly for new member states where democracy is nigh but a newly prompted 
endeavour. So, if these political institutions really want to find remedies for the 
democratic deficit and lack of legitimacy they might consider establishing and formally 
accepting ways of participation apart from the representative forms of will-expression. 
Without such actions, arguments about dealing with these challenges remain pure 
rhetoric. 
 
All in all, I would like to argue that to really delibertise national and European politics, 
there should be ways to guarantee that the outcomes of deliberative politics are really 
taken into account. On the one hand, this need should be enforced from below on behalf 
of the national and European civil society which both have just started to find evidence of 
their existence. On the other hand, such need should be identified and recognised by the 
political elites as well if they want to regain their balance and their credibility in doing 
politics.  
 
One more important issue needs to be addressed, which is the question of the scientist in 
this matter. Since the MoM was about brain science and the central concept of this thesis 
was ‘scientific citizenship’ the question arises ‘how can the scientist be influenced by such 
deliberative processes’? This is a tricky question since it is easy to localise the political 
elites whom one wants to address with his or her opinions, concerns and hopes regarding 
an issue but what about scientists? 
 
One obvious way to influence them is indirect since the most important addressees of a 
final report of a deliberative process are always the politicians. They are the ones who, in 
case of sciences and technologies, are supposed to develop the necessary legislative 
203
framework for ethical and fair research and development. One can say that this is just as 
undemocratic for the scientist as it would be for the citizen not to be involved. 
Furthermore, the Hungarian Constitution lays down the law: 
 
„Article 70G [Arts, Academia, Teaching, Science] 
(1) The Republic of Hungary shall respect and support the freedom of scientific and 
artistic expression, the freedom to learn and to teach. 
(2) Only scientists are entitled to decide in questions of scientific truth and to determine 
the scientific value of research. (Hun. Const. 1949; Article 70G)” 
 
Nonetheless, I would argue that the aim is not to violate scientific impartiality but to find 
the acceptable framework for the ethical conduct of research and the generally acceptable 
goals of R&D on which the taxpayer’s money is spent. This would also mean a totally 
new perspective of science and scientific activity as the above quoted excerpt suggests. 
According to this new perspective, scientists are accountable and responsible to their 
social environment and their political community and not only to their scientific ideals 
and close community of experts. 
 
However, I shall emphasise if deliberative processes in the area of science and technology 
are to succeed they should directly influence the scientific community concerned. The 
general aim of the processes called Participatory Technology Assessment is not to impose 
unacceptable rules, regulations and restrictions on the scientific community from the 
outside but to involve scientists in the discussion and deliberation as well. It may be 
worth mentioning that it seemed to work in the case of MoM. 
 
Moreover, scientists could also be receptive and sensitive to the results of deliberative 
processes and modify their behaviour, scientific practices and general goals of research 
according to public opinion. Ideally, it would not appear to them as something violating 
their right to the “freedom of scientific expression” but as something informative and 
orientating. If science means to work towards the public good it also should be open to 
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